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NOTE ON PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MATRIX GAMES
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 Title & Authors
NOTE ON PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MATRIX GAMES
Ma, Weidong;
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 Abstract
Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a "sufficient condition" for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games [5]. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.
 Keywords
pure-strategy equilibrium;matrix game;saddle point;
 Language
English
 Cited by
 References
1.
D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory, The MIT Press, 1992.

2.
J. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Ann. of Math. (2) 54 (1951), 289-295.

3.
G. Owen, Game Theory, Academic Press, 1982.

4.
J. H. Wang, The Theory of Games, TsingHua University Press, 1988.

5.
T. Yoon and O. Kwon, On pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games, Bull. Korean Math. Soc. 37 (2000), no. 2, 377-385.