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A Linearized Transmission Model Based Market Equilibrium In Locational Pricing Environments
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 Title & Authors
A Linearized Transmission Model Based Market Equilibrium In Locational Pricing Environments
Joung, Man-Ho; Kim, Jin-Ho;
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In this paper, we have investigated how transmission network constraints can be modeled in an electricity market equilibrium model. Under Cournot competition assumption, a game model is set up considering transmission line capacity constraints. Based on locational marginal pricing principle, market clearing is formulated as a total consumers# benefit maximization problem, and then converted to a conventional optimal power flow (OPF) formulation with a linearized transmission model. Using market clearing formulation, best response analysis is formulated and, finally, Nash equilibrium is formulated. In order for illustration, a numerical study for a four node system with two generating firms and two loads are presented.
Cournot competition;Deregulated electricity markets;Electricity market equilibrium model;Game theory;Nash equilibrium;Power system network constraints;
 Cited by
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