JOURNAL BROWSE
Search
Advanced SearchSearch Tips
The Ramp-Rate Constraint Effects on the Generators' Equilibrium Strategy in Electricity Markets
facebook(new window)  Pirnt(new window) E-mail(new window) Excel Download
 Title & Authors
The Ramp-Rate Constraint Effects on the Generators' Equilibrium Strategy in Electricity Markets
Joung, Man-Ho; Kim, Jin-Ho;
  PDF(new window)
 Abstract
In this paper, we investigate how generators' ramp-rate constraints may influence their equilibrium strategy formulation. In the market model proposed in this study, the generators' ramp-rate constraints are explicitly represented. In order to fully characterize the inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints, a dynamic game model is presented. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution of the game and the backward induction procedure for the solution of the game is designed in this paper. The inter-temporal nature of the ramp-rate constraints results in the Markov property of the game, and we have found that the Markov property of the game significantly simplifies the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium characterization. Finally, a simple electricity market numerical illustration is presented for the successful application of the approach proposed.
 Keywords
Dynamic game theory;Electricity markets;Markov property;Ramp rate constraints;Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium;
 Language
English
 Cited by
1.
Impacts of Ramp Rate Limits on Oligopolistic Opportunities in Electricity Markets, IEEE Systems Journal, 2016, 10, 1, 127  crossref(new windwow)
 References
1.
S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell, and S. Stoft, 'The competitive effects of transmission capacity in a deregulated electricity industry,' RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 294-325, 2000 crossref(new window)

2.
B. Willems, 'Modeling Cournot competition in an electricity market with transmission constraints,' The Energy Journal, Vol. 23, pp. 95-125, 2002

3.
D. M. Quick and J. M. Carey, 'An analysis of market power mitigation strategies in Colorado's electricity industry,' The Energy Journal, Vol. 22, pp. 55-77, 2001

4.
T. O. Leautier, 'Regulation of an electric power transmission company,' The Energy Journal, Vol. 21, pp. 61-92, 2000

5.
S. E. Stoft, 'Financial transmission rights meet Cournot: How TCC's curb market power,' The Energy Journal, Vol. 20, pp. 1-23, 1999

6.
I.-K. Cho, I.-K., 'Competitive equilibrium in a radial network,' RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 34, pp. 438-460, 2003 crossref(new window)

7.
R. Baldick and W. Hogan, 'Capacity constrained supply function equilibrium models of electricity markets: stability, non-decreasing constraints, and function space iterations,' University of California Energy Institute Working paper PWP-089, Dec. 2001

8.
J. M. Arroyo and A. J. Conejo, 'Multiperiod auction for a pool-based electricity market,' IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 1225-1231, Nov. 2002 crossref(new window)

9.
C. Wang and S. M. Shahidehpour, 'Optimal generation scheduling with ramping costs,' Power Industry Computer Application Conference, pp. 11-17, May 1993

10.
F. N. Lee, L. Lemonidis, and K.-C. Liu, 'Price-based ramp-rate model for dynamic dispatch and unit commitment,' IEEE Trans. on Power Systems, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 1233-1242, Aug. 1994 crossref(new window)

11.
A. Mas-Colell and M. D. Whinston, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, Inc., 1995