Solving Mixed Strategy Nash-Cournot Equilibria under Generation and Transmission Constraints in Electricity Market

- Journal title : Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
- Volume 8, Issue 4, 2013, pp.675-685
- Publisher : The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
- DOI : 10.5370/JEET.2013.8.4.675

Title & Authors

Solving Mixed Strategy Nash-Cournot Equilibria under Generation and Transmission Constraints in Electricity Market

Lee, Kwang-Ho;

Lee, Kwang-Ho;

Abstract

Generation capacities and transmission line constraints in a competitive electricity market make it troublesome to compute Nash Equilibrium (NE) for analyzing participants' strategic generation quantities. The NE can cause a mixed strategy NE rather than a pure strategy NE resulting in a more complicated computation of NE, especially in a multiplayer game. A two-level hierarchical optimization problem is used to model competition among multiple participants. There are difficulties in using a mathematical programming approach to solve a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents heuristics applied to the mathematical programming method for dealing with the constraints on generation capacities and transmission line flows. A new formulation based on the heuristics is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the heuristics and the newly-formulated equations.

Keywords

Cournot model;Electricity market;Generation capacity;Mixed strategy;Nash equilibrium (NE);Power transfer distribution factor (PTDF);Transmission congestion;

Language

English

Cited by

1.

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