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A Study on the Management of International Fishery Resources using Cooperative Game Theory
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  • Journal title : Ocean and Polar Research
  • Volume 30, Issue 2,  2008, pp.173-180
  • Publisher : Korea Institute of Ocean Science & Technology
  • DOI : 10.4217/OPR.2008.30.2.173
 Title & Authors
A Study on the Management of International Fishery Resources using Cooperative Game Theory
Choi, Jong-Du; Cho, Jung-Hee;
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This study demonstrates that cooperative management can provide more benefits than noncooperative management for Korea and Japan fishery. We have studied one management strategy, namely, fishing under joint maximization of net benefits in coastal waters of two countries, using a cooperative game theory. The present net return under non-cooperation amounts to 420,255 million won. However, if two countries cooperate one with another, this figure can get to 2,636,565 million won. We consider this to be an important conclusion as close management relationships have developed between the two countries since the establishment of the EEZ in 1996. The results of the study can also help balance resource conservation and the appropriate catch quota in each country.
joint maximization;cooperative game theory;present value of net benefit;
 Cited by
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