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Conceptional Framework of Level of Protection for Facilities
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 Title & Authors
Conceptional Framework of Level of Protection for Facilities
Kee, Jung Hun; Lee, Hyun Seok; Jamot, Dongfack Guepi Clovis; Park, Jong Yil;
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 Abstract
Although attention to terrorism has increased sharply in recent years within many countries, it is by no means a new phenomenon. Majority of these countries have limited regulations or guidelines about terrorism. LOP (Level Of Protection) can be consider as a first step. This paper seeks to present a process to determine LOP and allowable damage. LOP is determined by asset value reason why it should be based on cost. The asset value is defined as "cost induced when asset is damaged". For example, the collateral damage outside the facility should be taken in consideration in the asset value. Allowable structural damage is assigned depending on LOP.
 Keywords
protection;blast resistance;safety;
 Language
Korean
 Cited by
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