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A Simple Power Analysis Attack on ARIA Key Expansion Based on Hamming Weight Leakage
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 Title & Authors
A Simple Power Analysis Attack on ARIA Key Expansion Based on Hamming Weight Leakage
Park, Aesun; Han, Dong-Guk; Choi, Jun;
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The symmetric key encryption algorithms, such as the AES or the ARIA, generate round keys by the key expansion mechanism. While the algorithm is executed, key expansion mechanism emits information about the secret key by the power consumption. The vulnerability exists that can reduce significantly the candidate of the secret key by the simple power analysis attack using a small number of the power traces. Therefore, we`ll have to study about the attack and the countermeasure to prevent information leakage. While a simple power analysis attack on the AES key expansion has been studied since 2002, ARIA is insufficient. This paper presents a simple power analysis attack on 8-bit implementations of the ARIA-128 key expansion. The presented attack efficiently utilizes this information leakage to substantially reduce the key space that needs to be considered in a brute-force search for the secret key. We show that ARIA is vulnerable to a SPA attack based on hamming weight leakage.
Side-Channel Analysis;Simple Power Analysis;ARIA key expansion;
 Cited by
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