ON PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN MATRIX GAMES

  • Yoon, Tae-Hwan (Department of Mathematics, Korea University) ;
  • Kwon, O-Hun (Department of Mathematics, Korea University)
  • Published : 2000.05.01

Abstract

In this paper we find a sufficient condition to guarantee the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games. In the process of formulating our condition, the alternative theorem of Farkas is used. The formulated condition is necessary and sufficient to the existence of pure-strategy equilibria in undominated matrix games.

Keywords

matrix game;equilibrium;Farkas' theorem

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