- Volume 13 Issue 2
We investigate the two recent simulations of the proto-type domestic carbon emission trading system in Korea and draw some policy implications. The first simulation includes the 5 electric power companies based on baseline and credit. But the second one is with the 7 energy-intensive companies based on cap and trade. The voluntary approaches in this paper revealed the instability of market equilibrium, i.e., price volatility or distortion, excess supply or demand. These phenomena stems from excess incentives to the players, asymmetric information, players' irresponsible strategic behaviors, and non acquaintance of trading system. This paper suggests the basic design for domestic carbon trading system in future and a stepwise introduction strategy for it including the incentive auction scheme, the total quantity of incentive needed, and how to finance it. Meantime, the further simulations on the various sectors based on voluntary participation must be essential for learning experiences and better policy design.