The Estimation of Incomplete Information in Electricity Markets by Using Load Pattern Changes

부하패턴을 이용한 전력시장 정보의 불완비성 추정에 관한 연구

  • Published : 2007.05.01

Abstract

This paper presents a methodology of estimating incomplete information in electricity markets for analyzing the gaming behavior of Generating Companies (GENCOs). Each GENCO needs to model its opponents' unknown information of strategic biddings and cost functions. In electricity markets with complete information, each GENCO knows its rivals' payoff functions and tries to maximize its own profit at Nash equilibriurnl Nli) by acknowledging the rivals' cost function. On the other hand, in the incomplete information markets, each GENCO lacks information about its rivals. Load patterns can change continuously due to many factors such as weather, price, contingency, etc. In this paper, we propose the method of the estimation of the opponents' cost function using market price, transaction quantities. and customer load patterns. A numerical example with two GENCOs is illustrated to show the basic idea and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

Keywords

Load Pattern;Incomplete Information;Cost Function;Nash Equilibrium;Social Welfare

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