Estimating the Price of Anarchy Using Load Balancing Measure

  • Kim, Jae-Hoon (Division of Computer Engineering, Pusan University)
  • Published : 2009.06.30

Abstract

We consider the problem of optimizing the performance of a system with resources shared by non-cooperative users. The worst-cast ratio between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost, called Price of Anarchy, is investigated. It measures the performance degradation due to the users' selfish behavior. As the objective function of the optimization problem, we are concerned in a load balancing measure, which is different from that used in the previous works. Also we consider the Stackelberg scheduling which can assign a fraction of the users to resources while the remaining users are free to act in a selfish manner.

Keywords

Nash equilibrium;load balancing;Price of Anarchy

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