Bulletin of the Korean Mathematical Society (대한수학회보)
- Volume 49 Issue 6
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- Pages.1251-1254
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- 2012
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- 1015-8634(pISSN)
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- 2234-3016(eISSN)
DOI QR Code
NOTE ON PURE-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA IN MATRIX GAMES
- Ma, Weidong (Institute of Applied Mathematics AMSS Chinese Academy of Sciences)
- Received : 2011.01.13
- Published : 2012.11.30
Abstract
Pure-strategy Nash Equilibrium (NE) is one of the most important concepts in game theory. Tae-Hwan Yoon and O-Hun Kwon gave a "sufficient condition" for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in matrix games [5]. They also claimed that the condition was necessary for the existence of pure-strategy NEs in undominated matrix games. In this short note, we show that these claims are not true by giving two examples.
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References
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- J. H. Wang, The Theory of Games, TsingHua University Press, 1988.
- T. Yoon and O. Kwon, On pure-strategy equilibria in matrix games, Bull. Korean Math. Soc. 37 (2000), no. 2, 377-385.