Asymmetric Information and Bargaining Delays

비대칭적 정보와 협상지연

  • Received : 2013.01.11
  • Accepted : 2013.04.11
  • Published : 2013.04.30


Applying Markov Stochastic Process theory, this paper attempts to suggest a tentative model explaining how private information may cause bargaining delay. It is shown that the bargaining delay is critically dependent on the specification of information. It turns out that the delay tends to be longer in bargaining where information is imperfect. This means that bargaining models frequently can have an infinite delay under imperfect information while they have finite delay of bargaining before reaching the agreements if information is perfect. Other interesting result is that bargaining delay may depend on who makes the offer first. And it is also shown that bargaining tends to end earlier if both players (seller and buyer) can make offers in turn than the case where only one side make a offer.


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