Reorganization of Central Office Group in Korea from the Perspective of Politicians and Bureaucrats

정치가와 관료측면에서 한국 중앙부처의 조직재편에 관한 연구 -이명박 정부의 관료조직 재편성 사례를 중심으로-

  • 류상일 (동의대학교 소방행정학과) ;
  • 이민규 (충북대학교 행정학과)
  • Received : 2013.07.31
  • Accepted : 2013.08.27
  • Published : 2013.09.28


This study reviewed reorganization of bureaucrats in the beginning of Lee Myung bak's government from the perspective of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. In other words, it analyzed the reorganization of central office group of Korean government in 2008 as the relationship between calling to account by politicians and avoiding calling to account by bureaucrats. Conclusively, first, separation or abolition of a certain organization was resulted from calling to account by president (the ruling party). Second, merging organizations was done because president wanted strong control on that agency or he wanted to realize presidential election pledge (policy) through the agency. Third, if an organization was not changed even though it was selected as the target of abolition, it meant that the organization succeeded in defense. As seen from the above cases, it was found that politicians and bureaucrats played a kind of game for reorganization of government organizations. First of all, if politicians succeeded in calling to account, the bureaucratic organization was separated or abolished. If bureaucrats succeeded in self defense, the organization became expanded. Finally, if both parties were even, corresponding organizations would not have changes.


Reorganization of Central Office Group;Perspective of Politicians and Bureaucrats


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