Case Study on Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration and Environmental Litigations with Specific Reference to Chevron/Ecuador Litigation

환경 소송과 국제투자중재 - 쉐브론 사건을 중심으로

  • 강병근 (고려대학교 법학전문대학원)
  • Received : 2015.11.11
  • Accepted : 2015.11.21
  • Published : 2015.12.01


The Chevron saga including Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 34877(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron I") and Chevron/TexPet v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2009-23(hereinafter referred to as "Chevron II") started out of domestic litigations between TexPet and Ecuador in the early 1990s. In Chevron I, the Tribunal decided that Article 2(7) of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT on effective means of provision was breached because of undue delays in the seven legal proceedings TexPet had brought against Ecuador in respect to contractual obligations. In Chevron II, it was contended that through the actions and inactions of the judiciary and the executive, Ecuador breached her several obligations under the BIT. Ecuador objected to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because TexPet's investment was terminated in 1992, and because Chevron is not a party to the 1995 Settlement Agreement and 1998 Final Release. In its Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, the Tribunal applied a prima facie standard to the facts alleged by the Claimants but denied by the Respondent, and decided that questions in respect of the Respondent's jurisdictional objections should be joined to the merits under Article 21(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In the merits phase of Chevron II, the Tribunal divided the merits of the Parties' dispute into two parts, entitled "Track 1" and "Track 2". In its Partial Award on Track 1, the Tribunal decided that Chevron is a "Releasee" under the 1995 Settlement Agreement. In a decision on "Track 1B", the Tribunal decided that the Lago Agrio complaint cannot be read as pleading "exclusively" or "only" diffuse claims, and that, to this extent, the Claimants' reliance on the 1995 Settlement Agreement as a complete bar to the Lago Agrio complaint must fail, as a matter of Ecuadorian law. The Tribunal maintained the position that the Parties' disputes on both merit and jurisdiction should be reserved for Track 2. It remains to be seen how the Tribunal addresses the Claimants' allegations of multiple denials of justice under international law against the judgments of the Respondent's Courts, together with the Respondent's jurisdictional objections in Track 2 of the arbitration.


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