DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

Investigating Dynamics in Salesforce Compensation Plan

판매원의 경험에 따른 임금의 동태적 변화 고찰

  • 정호진 (홍익대학교 경영대학 경영학과) ;
  • 권경민 (홍익대학교 경영대학 경영학과)
  • Received : 2015.08.12
  • Accepted : 2015.09.07
  • Published : 2016.02.28

Abstract

This study explains about a phenomenon where the structure of the compensation plan for a single salesperson may vary as he/she gains experience. Unlike past studies that implicitly assume the limited effect on salesperson's experience, our result predicts that a salesperson will make an effort at every period early in his/her career without any commissions in order to gain experience. However, if one cannot expect any marginal returns of accumulated efforts, the sales manager must provide commissions on the high volume of sales at each period, to facilitate a high effort of a salesforce at earlier periods. Our paper provides important implications about dynamics in the compensation plan, which has not been addressed in the past studies but has frequently been witnessed in practice.

Keywords

Salesforce Compensation;Dynamics in Compensation Plan;Salesperson Experience

Acknowledgement

Supported by : 홍익대학교

References

  1. A. K. Basu, R. Lal, V. Srinivasan, and R. Staelin, "Salesforce compensation plans: An agency theoretic perspective," Marketing science, Vol.4, No.4, pp.267-291, 1985. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.4.4.267
  2. R. Lal and R. Staelin, "Salesforce Compensation Plans in Environments With Asymmetric Information," Marketing Science, Vol.5, No.3, pp.179-198, 1986. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.5.3.179
  3. R. C. Rao, "Compensating Heterogeneous Salesforces: Some Explicit Solutions," Marketing Science, Vol.9, No.4, pp.319-341, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.9.4.319
  4. J. S. Raju and V. Srinivasan, "Quota-Based Compensation Plans for Multiterritory Heterogeneous Salesforces," Management Science, Vol.42, No.10, pp.1454-1462, 1996. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.42.10.1454
  5. A. Gaba and A. Kalra, "Risck Behavior in Response to Quotas and Contests," Marketing Science, Vol.18, No.3, pp.417-434, 1999. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.18.3.417
  6. A. Kalra and M. Shi, "Designing Optimal Sales Contests: A Theoretical Perspective," Marketing Science, Vol.20, No.2, pp.170-93, 2001. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.20.2.170.10193
  7. S. M. Lee, "A Study on the Difference Job Satisfaction Between Korean Brand and Foreign Brand in the Restaurants Business," The Journal of the Korea Contents Association, Vol.6 No.7, pp.119-126, 2006.
  8. G. John and B. Weitz, "An Empirical Investigation of Factors Related to the Use of Salary Versus Incentive Compensation," Journal of Marketing Research, Vol.26, No.1, pp.1-14, 1989. https://doi.org/10.2307/3172665
  9. R. Lal, D. Outland, and R. Staelin, Salesforce Compensation Plans: An Empirical Test of the Agency Theory Framework, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, 1990.
  10. M. Ghosh and G. John, "Experimental Evidence for Agency Models of Salesforce Compensation," Marketing Science, Vol.19, No.4, pp.348-365, 2000. https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.19.4.348.11792
  11. L. Argote and D. Epple, "Learning Curves in Manufacturing," science, Vol.247, pp.920-924, 1990. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.247.4945.920
  12. I. Kwon, "Incetives, Wages, and Promotions: Theory and Evidence," Rand Journal of Economics, Vol.37, No.1, pp.100-121, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00006.x