Fig. 1. Scheme of ESS ownership and operation for energyarbitrage by market participants
Fig. 2. Two-period model: effects of energy arbitrage usingESS on price and demand in periods 1 and 2
Fig. 3. Two-period model under TOU tariff
Fig. 4. Two-period model under SMP with the assumptionthat ESOs are price-takers
Fig. 5. Welfare changes in CASE 1 according to theamount of ESS for energy arbitrage by the costs ofstoring: (a) welfare changes, and (b) marginalwelfare changes
Fig. 6. Best response functions and Nash equilibrium oftwo customers’ non-cooperative game for CASE 2
Fig. 7. Impacts of risk-free contracts on surplus ofinvestors
Fig. 8. Best response functions of a customer and tensymmetric MSOs and their Nash equilibria according
Table 1. Representative entities
Table 2. Value of market and ESS parameters.
Table 3. Total optimal amounts of ESS investment by each sector by the number of market participants (w =0).