• Title, Summary, Keyword: antitrust damage

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Apple eases up on SDK policy: Avoiding antitrust? or strategic decision? (Apple의 폐쇄적 SDK정책 포기의 함의: 반독점성 시비의 회피와 전략적 결정)

  • Kim, Joon-Young;Park, Jin-Kyung;Lee, Bong-Gyou
    • Journal of Internet Computing and Services
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    • v.11 no.6
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    • pp.135-144
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    • 2010
  • Apple recently announced a new policy about software development kit that banned the use of tools that convert apps built on other platforms into iPhone apps. Therefore, Adobe cannot develop their software to AppStore that inquire to the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission about antitrust actions. Someone argue that Apple try to exclusive smartphone market such as the Microsoft antitrust lawsuit in 1998, but this case is essentially different. First, it need to define Apple's software development kit for iPhone and iPad is whether antitrust or not. Because of the characteristics of two-sided market in Smartphone Apple's iPhone cannot monopoly in cellphone or smartphone market, but it can be an antitrust in application store market. However, Apple re-announced new software development kit policy that shows positive results. Instead of hastily intervened regulatory agencies, the DOJ or the FTC, it is quite desirable that watching the interaction between companies that whether market failures or not and if it's harmful for consumer's benefit. Adobe attack Apple to advocate consumers and developers freedom of choice, but the most important thing is conclusion based on a comprehensive analysis need to objective point of view that Apple do whether antitrust act or not and damage to developers and consumers who are both side of platform.

Theoretical and Empirical Issues in Conducting an Economic Analysis of Damage in Price-Fixing Litigation: Application to a Transportation Fuel Market (담합관련 손해배상 소송의 경제분석에서 고려해야 할 이론 및 실증적 쟁점: 수송용 연료시장에의 적용)

  • Moon, Choon-Geol
    • Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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    • v.23 no.2
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    • pp.187-224
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    • 2014
  • We present key issues to consider in estimating damages from price-fixing cases and then apply the procedure addressing those issues to a transportation fuel market. Among the five methods of overcharge calculation, the regression analysis incorporating the yardstick method is the best. If the price equation relates the domestic price to the foreign price and the exchange rate as in the transportation fuel market, the functional form satisfying both logical consistency and modeling flexibility is the log-log functional form. If the data under analysis is of time series in nature, then the ARDL model should be the base model for each market and the regression analysis incorporating the yardstick method combines these ARDL equations to account for inter-market correlation and arrange constant terms and collusion-period dummies across component equations appropriately so as to identify the overcharge parameter. We propose a two-step test for the benchmarked market: (a) conduct market-by-market Spearman or Kendall test for randomness of the individual market price series first and (b) then conduct across-market Friedman test for homogeneity of the market price series. Statistical significance is the minimal requirement to establish the alleged proposition in the world of uncertainty. Between the sensitivity analysis and the model selection process for the best fitting model, the latter is far more important in the economic analysis of damage in price-fixing litigation. We applied our framework to a transportation fuel market and could not reject the null hypothesis of no overcharge.