• Title, Summary, Keyword: side channel attacks

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Differential Side Channel Analysis Attacks on FPGA Implementations of ARIA

  • Kim, Chang-Kyun;Schlaffer, Martin;Moon, Sang-Jae
    • ETRI Journal
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    • v.30 no.2
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    • pp.315-325
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    • 2008
  • In this paper, we first investigate the side channel analysis attack resistance of various FPGA hardware implementations of the ARIA block cipher. The analysis is performed on an FPGA test board dedicated to side channel attacks. Our results show that an unprotected implementation of ARIA allows one to recover the secret key with a low number of power or electromagnetic measurements. We also present a masking countermeasure and analyze its second-order side channel resistance by using various suitable preprocessing functions. Our experimental results clearly confirm that second-order differential side channel analysis attacks also remain a practical threat for masked hardware implementations of ARIA.

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A Study on Smartcard Security Evaluation Criteria for Side-Channel Attacks (스마트카드 부채널공격관련 안전성 평가기준 제안)

  • Lee, Hoon-Jae;Lee, Sang-Gon;Choi, Hee-Bong;Kim, Chun-Soo
    • The KIPS Transactions:PartC
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    • v.10C no.5
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    • pp.557-564
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    • 2003
  • This paper analyzes the side channel attacks for smartcard devices, and proposes the smartcard suity evaluation criteria for side-channel attacks. To setup the smartcard security evaluation criteria for side-channel attacks, we analyze similar security evaluation criteria for cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic modules, and smartcard protection profiles based on the common criterion. Futhermore, we propose the smartcard security evaluation criteria for side-channel attacks. It can be useful to evaluate a cryptosystem related with information security technology and in addition, it can be applied to building smartcard protection profile.

Side-Channel Attacks on AES Based on Meet-in-the-Middle Technique (중간 일치 분석법에 기반한 AES에 대한 부채널 공격)

  • Kim, Jong-Sung;Hong, Seok-Hie;Lee, Sang-Jin
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.19 no.2
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    • pp.3-9
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    • 2009
  • In this paper we introduce a new side-channel attack using block cipher cryptanalysis named meet-in-the middle attack. Using our new side-channel technique we introduce side-channel attacks on AES with reduced masked rounds. That is, we show that AES with reduced 10 masked rounds is vulnerable to side channel attacks based on an existing 4-round function. This shows that one has to mask the entire rounds of the 12-round 192-bit key AES to prevent our attacks. Our results are the first ones to analyze AES with reduced 10 masked rounds.

Rekeying Approach against Side Channel Attacks

  • Phuc, Tran Song Dat;Seok, Byoungjin;Lee, Changhoon
    • Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
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    • pp.373-375
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    • 2017
  • Side-channel attacks and in particular differential power analysis (DPA) attacks pose a serious threat to cryptographic implementations. One approach to counteract such attacks is cryptographic schemes based on fresh re-keying. In settings of pre-shared secret keys, such schemes render DPA attacks infeasible by deriving session keys and by ensuring that the attacker cannot collect side-channel leakage on the session key during cryptographic operations with different inputs. This paper present a study on rekeying approach against side channel attacks with current secure schemes and their rekeying functions.

Side-Channel Attacks on Square Always Exponentiation Algorithm (Square Always 멱승 알고리듬에 대한 부채널 공격)

  • Jung, Seung-Gyo;Ha, Jae-Cheol
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.24 no.3
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    • pp.477-489
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    • 2014
  • Based on some flaws occurred for implementing a public key cryptosystem in the embedded security device, many side-channel attacks to extract the secret private key have been tried. In spite of the fact that the cryptographic exponentiation is basically composed of a sequence of multiplications and squarings, a new Square Always exponentiation algorithm was recently presented as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks based on trading multiplications for squarings. In this paper, we propose Known Power Collision Analysis and modified Doubling attacks to break the Right-to-Left Square Always exponentiation algorithm which is known resistant to the existing side-channel attacks. And we also present a Collision-based Combined Attack which is a combinational method of fault attack and power collision analysis. Furthermore, we verify that the Square Always algorithm is vulnerable to the proposed side-channel attacks using computer simulation.

CacheSCDefender: VMM-based Comprehensive Framework against Cache-based Side-channel Attacks

  • Yang, Chao;Guo, Yunfei;Hu, Hongchao;Liu, Wenyan
    • KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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    • v.12 no.12
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    • pp.6098-6122
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    • 2018
  • Cache-based side-channel attacks have achieved more attention along with the development of cloud computing technologies. However, current host-based mitigation methods either provide bad compatibility with current cloud infrastructure, or turn out too application-specific. Besides, they are defending blindly without any knowledge of on-going attacks. In this work, we present CacheSCDefender, a framework that provides a (Virtual Machine Monitor) VMM-based comprehensive defense framework against all levels of cache attacks. In designing CacheSCDefender, we make three key contributions: (1) an attack-aware framework combining our novel dynamic remapping and traditional cache cleansing, which provides a comprehensive defense against all three cases of cache attacks that we identify in this paper; (2) a new defense method called dynamic remapping which is a developed version of random permutation and is able to deal with two cases of cache attacks; (3) formalization and quantification of security improvement and performance overhead of our defense, which can be applicable to other defense methods. We show that CacheSCDefender is practical for deployment in normal virtualized environment, while providing favorable security guarantee for virtual machines.

A Study on Rekeying and Sponged-based Scheme against Side Channel Attacks (부채널 공격 대응을 위한 Rekeying 기법에 관한 연구)

  • Phuc, Tran Song Dat;Lee, Changhoon
    • Journal of Digital Contents Society
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    • v.19 no.3
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    • pp.579-586
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    • 2018
  • Simple Power Analysis(SPA) and Differential Power Analysis(DPA) attacks are Side Channel Attacks(SCA) which were introduced in 1999 by Kocher et al [2]. SPA corresponds to attacks in which an adversary directly recovers key material from the inspection of a single measurement trace (i.e. power consumption or electromagnetic radiation). DPA is a more sophisticated attacks in which the leakage corresponding to different measurement traces (i.e. different plaintexts encrypted under the same key) is combined. Defenses against SPA and DPA are difficult, since they essentially only reduce the signal the adversary is reading, PA and DPA. This paper presents a study on rekeying and sponged-based approach against SCA with current secure schemes. We also propose a fixed ISAP scheme with more secure encryption and authentication based on secure re-keying and sponge functions.

Differential Side Channel Analysis Attacks on FPGA Implementations of ARIA (FPGA 기반 ARIA에 대한 차분부채널분석 공격)

  • Kim, Chang-Kyun;Yoo, Hyung-So;Park, Il-Hwan
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.17 no.5
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    • pp.55-63
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    • 2007
  • This paper has investigated the susceptibility of an FPGA implementation of a block cipher against side channel analysis attacks. We have performed DPA attacks and DEMA attacks (in the nea. and far field) on an FPGA implementation of ARIA which has been implemented into two architectures of S-box. Although the number of needed traces for a successful attack is increased when compared with existing results on smart cards, we have shown that ARIA without countermeasures is indeed very susceptible to side channel analysis attacks regardless of an architecture of S-box.

Side Channel Attack on Block Cipher SM4 and Analysis of Masking-Based Countermeasure (블록 암호 SM4에 대한 부채널 공격 및 마스킹 기반 대응기법 분석)

  • Bae, Daehyeon;Nam, Seunghyun;Ha, Jaecheol
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.30 no.1
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    • pp.39-49
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    • 2020
  • In this paper, we show that the Chinese standard block cipher SM4 is vulnerable to the side channel attacks and present a countermeasure to resist them. We firstly validate that the secret key of SM4 can be recovered by differential power analysis(DPA) and correlation power analysis(CPA) attacks. Therefore we analyze the vulnerable element caused by power attack and propose a first order masking-based countermeasure to defeat DPA and CPA attacks. Although the proposed countermeasure unfortunately is still vulnerable to the profiling power attacks such as deep learning-based multi layer perceptron(MLP), it can sufficiently overcome the non-profiling attacks such as DPA and CPA.

Improved Elliptic Scalar Multiplication Algorithms Secure Against Side-Channel Attacks (부가채널 공격에 안전한 효율적인 타원곡선 상수배 알고리즘)

  • 임채훈
    • Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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    • v.12 no.4
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    • pp.99-114
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    • 2002
  • Improved algorithms for elliptic scalar multiplication secure against side-channel attacks, such as timing and power analysis, are presented and analyzed. We first point out some potential security flaws often overlooked in most previous algorithms and then present a simple $\pm$1-signed encoding scheme that can be used to enhance the security and performance of existing algorithms. More specifically, we propose concrete signed binary and window algorithms based on the proposed $\pm$ 1-signed encoding and analyze their security and performance. The proposed algorithms are shown to be more robust and efficient than previous algorithms.