대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A (The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A)

대한전기학회 (The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers)
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게임이론을 적용한 전력시장 전력거래방식의 후생 측면 비교 연구

A Comparative Welfare Analysis on the Trading System in an Electricity Market by Using Game Theory

  • 이광호 (단국대 전기전자컴퓨터공학부)
  • 발행 : 2003.10.01
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⟨ 이전 논문 다음 논문 ⟩

초록

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry, The trading system in an electricity market has been one of the most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper deals with comparisons of the major two types of the trading system: compulsory pool market and bilateral contract market. The two trading systems are compared quantitatively from the viewpoint of consumer's surplus and social welfare, This paper, also, proposes a unified model of Cournot and Bertrand for analyzing the mixed trading system of pool market and bilateral contract market. Nash equilibrium of the unified model is derived by criteria for participating in bilateral contract market. Numerical results from a sample case show that a mixed trading system of pool market and price-competitive bilateral market is beneficial to consumer from the view points of consumer's surplus.

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참고문헌

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