Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering (한국정보통신학회논문지)

The Korea Institute of Information and Commucation Engineering (한국정보통신학회)
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The Effects on Social Welfare of Asymmetric Regulation in Mobile Telecommunications Termination Access Charge

이동망 착신접속료 차등의 사회후생효과 분석

  • Published : 2009.10.31
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Abstract

We analyze the economic effects of mobile termination rate asymmetry by simulation model. The asymmetry allows the mobile operator to get access profits at the expense of the incumbent and induces negative effects such as the entry of inefficient operator and allocative efficiency as well as productive efficiency. We use simulation model to investigate the effect on social welfare of asymmetric regulation. If the brand loyalty is high, social welfare increase as the termination charge of entrant increases. The extension of the basic model shows that the degree of social welfare increase becomes higher as the brand loyalty increases when the cost of entrant is smaller than that of incumbent. But, the degree of social welfare decrease becomes lower as the substitution effects increase.

본 논문은 이동망 착신접속료에 대한 현재의 접속료 차등규제가 사회후생에 어떠한 영향력을 주는가를 분석 한다. 브랜드 충성도가 낮은 경우 서비스 대체성 수준과 관계없이 후발사업자의 착신접속료 증가는 사회후생을 감소시킨다. 브랜드 충성도가 높은 경우 후발사업자의 접속료가 증가함에 따라 사회후생은 증가한다. 모형을 확장하여 후발사업자의 비용이 기존사업자의 비용보다 큰 경우엔 브랜드 충성도가 증가함에 따라 사회후생 증가의 폭은 비용이 동일한 것에 비해 상대적으로 적다. 그러나 대체성이 증가함에 따라 사회후생의 감소폭은 더욱더 커진다. 후발사업자의 비용이 기존사업자의 비용보다 작은 경우엔, 전체적으로 브랜드 충성도가 증가함에 따라 사회후생의 증가폭은 더욱 커진다. 그러나 대체성이 증가함에 따라 사회후생의 감소폭은 비용이 동일할 때와 비교하면 줄어든다.

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