Software Bundling for Competitive Advantage: Vendor Strategies and Public Policy Implications

  • Published : 2010.06.30

Abstract

As an engineered product, a software package has multiple dimensions that must be designed judiciously to enhance its competitive viability. Functionality, reliability and price are three such common dimensions. However, many software products are sold as bundles of individual components and the competitive impact of bundling has received less attention in the research literature. In this paper, we examine the implications of software vendors using bundling as an element of competitive strategy. A game theoretic model of the actions of an incumbent and a new entrant is developed and the impact on vendor and consumer welfare is analyzed. Numerical experiments with the model show that (i) increasing bundle size is an effective strategy for the incumbent to increase its payoff at the cost of the entrant's payoff and consumer surplus, especially when the entrant's quality is low (ii) in the presence of bundling, the entrant can still increase its own payoff and consumer surplus at the cost of the incumbent's payoff, by increasing product quality up to the level that best segments market demand with the incumbent and (iii) an increase in bundle size by the incumbent, or an increase in quality by the entrant, can both result in an increase of total surplus. Similar results are observed in a related case where the entrant offers free software bundles. Our results provide insights into how software vendors may strategically use bundling and quality as additional product dimensions in order to stay competitive in the market. These results also inform the competing vendors of the impact of bundling related public policy actions on their respective payoffs.

Keywords

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