Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회논문지)

The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
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Empirical Analysis on Agent Costs against Ownership Structure in Accordance with Verification of Suitability of the Model

모형의 적합성 검증에 따른 소유구조대비 대리인 비용의 실증분석

  • Received : 2012.06.05
  • Accepted : 2012.08.09
  • Published : 2012.08.31
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Abstract

This study aims to determine how ownership structure (share-holding ratio of insiders, foreigners) affects agent costs (the portion of asset efficiency or non-operating expenses) through empirical analysis. However, as existing studies on correlations between ownership structure and agent costs adopted Pooled OLS Model, this study focused on additionally formulating Fixed Effect Model and Random Effect Model aimed to reflect the time of data formation and corporate effects as study models based on verification results on the suitability of Pooled-OLS Model before comparative analysis for the purpose of improvement of credibility and statistical validity of the results of empirical analysis based on the premise that the Pooled OLS Model is not reliable enough to verify massive panel data. The data has been accumulated over 10 years from 1998 to 2007 after the IMF crisis hit the nation, from a subject 331 companies except for financial institutions. As a result of the empirical analysis, verification of the suitability of model has determined that the Random Effect Model is appropriate in terms of asset efficiency among agent costs items. On the other hand, the Fixed Effect Model is appropriate in terms of non-operating costs. As a result of the empirical analysis according to the appropriate model, no hypothesis adopted in the Pooled OLS Model has been accepted. This suggests that developing an appropriate model is more important than other factors for the purpose of generating statistically significant empirical results by showing that different empirical results are produced according to the type of empirical analysis.

본 연구는 기본적으로 소유구조(내부 외국인 지분율)가 대리인 비용(자산효율성 비중 영업외비용 비중)에 어떠한 영향을 미치는 가에 대한 실증연구이다. 그러나 소유구조와 대리인 비용의 상관성에 대한 기존연구들이 단순히 Pooled OLS Model을 사용하고 있기에 본 연구에서는 단순 Pooled OLS Model이 방대한 양의 패널형 자료의 검증에는 통계적 신뢰성이 부족하다는 전제하에, Pooled-OLS Model의 적합성 검증 결과를 토대로, 자료형성의 시점 및 기업의 효과를 반영하는 Fixed Effect Model과 Random Effect Model을 추가적인 연구모형으로 형성하고 이를 비교분석함으로써 실증분석 결과의 신뢰성 및 통계적 타당성을 높이고자 하였다. 연구 자료는 IMF 경제 위기 이후인 1998~2007년까지 10년간이며 금융업을 제외한 331개 기업을 대상으로 하였다. 주요 결과로는 모델의 적합성 검증결과 대리인 비용 항목 중 자산효율성 비중은 Random Effect Model을 사용하는 것이 적절하였으나 이에 반하여 영업외비용 비중은 Fixed Effect Model의 사용이 적합하였다. 이에 따른 실증분석결과는 Pooled OLS Model에서 채택되었던 가설이 대부분 기각되는 결과가 나왔다. 이는 실증분석에 있어서 사용하는 모형에 따라 다른 분석결과의 도출이 가능하다는 점을 보여주어 연구 자료에 따른 적합한 연구모형의 형성이 통계적으로 유의한 실증결과의 도출을 위해 무엇보다 중요하다는 점을 시사하고 있다.

Keywords

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