Editor's Remarks

Takashi Inoguchi, Editor-in-Chief

In the inaugural issue of the Asian Journal of Public Opinion Research, President Sung Kyum Cho stressed the importance of a knowledge production community as a function of ANPOR (Cho, 2013, pp2-6).

We are a platform for understanding between Asian scholars, a meeting of cultures, so to speak, but we are also a meeting of disciplines. ...It is not enough to confine ourselves to a single discipline when knowledge from other fields can be applied to the work we are trying to do. In today’s world, we need research teams with members from more than one field. We also need to understand our colleagues’ fields in order to fully utilize the collected knowledge of several fields as we seek novel solutions.

As public opinion and communication research covers so many varieties of human perception, preference and prescription and all those related issues, President Cho’s point cannot be overstated. Especially in an era of the deepening tide of globalization, one cannot exaggerate the need to have multiple angles. As editor-in-chief, echoing President Cho’s appeal, I would like to present my humble thoughts on political communication as complex fields of study in a broad stroke.
My Humble Thoughts on Political Communication Research in Asia

Takashi Inoguchi¹

Editor-in-chief

University of Niigata Prefecture, Japan

Abstract

Politics is defined as who gets what, when, and how. Communication is defined as the process, outcomes and effects of message transmission through a medium. Thus political communication in Asia, the most dynamic and uncertain region of the world, has been very dense, requiring rigorous scientific analysis and culturally sensitive reflection. Mass media brought about a revolution in political communication in the last century. In the 21st century, complex monitory devices from the state and international organizations and from the society and transnational groups have transformed the features of political communication. It has triggered another revolution in political communication. Illustrations are given focusing on Asia. A theoretical reflection from the angle of political science is attempted focusing on political communication medium and its effects. I compare no medium (face-to-face communication), mass media, and social media in relation to their effects.

Keyword: Political Communication Research

¹ All correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Takashi Inoguchi at University of Niigata Prefecture, 471, Ebigase, Higashi-ku, Niigata City, Niigata, Japan 950-8680 or by email at: inoguchi@ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp.
Politics is defined as who gets what, when, and how. This definition is harmonious when one reflects on communication. Communication is defined as the process, outcomes, and effects of message transmission through a medium. Thus political communication is defined as the process, outcomes, and effects of message transmitted through a medium with political purposes. Thus defined, the scope of political communication research in Asia is immensely wide-ranging and the methods deployed therefore are innumerable. Why? There are many reasons that coalesce to explain why. Asia is geographically enormous; demographically, it is the largest region; linguistically, it is astoundingly complex; and culturally, it is both exquisitely subtle and unabashedly direct. One needs good eyes and ears to comprehend political communication in Asia. In my view, much political communication research has been formulated by the basic frameworks and concepts of sociology and social psychology. This piece is a quick survey of medium-focused political communication research in Asia from a political science angle.

Medium-Focused Political Communication Research

Political communication needs to be examined at least from three angles in terms of the kind of medium used to transmit the message: (1) no medium, or face-to-face or tête-à-tête, (2) mass media, and (3) social media.

No Medium or Face-to-Face or Tête-à-Tête

What is meant by no medium is that a speaker or an author has an audience directly in front of him or her. A speaker may have just one person or many as in an audience. What is important is that a speaker speaks directly on the spot. An author may have only one receiver of his or her letter. An author may have a mass audience watching an author’s slogan written on a poster sheet. There is no difference of this style of communications whether it is national or international. In an ancient Greek democracy, those assembling in a place address their speech directly to others, using only the medium of the speaker’s voice. A speaker addresses a person standing face to face. This form of political
communication is universal and common. Behind-the-door meetings and tête-à-tête discussions between politicians without other persons present are well known. Politicians normally do not want these exchanges made public. It is most common at the highest level of diplomatic meetings.

When Henry Kissinger flew to Beijing to negotiate with Zhou Enlai the establishment of diplomatic normalization with China in 1971, the whole matter was kept secret for some time until the two countries reached an agreement. Kissinger flew to Beijing via Islamabad. His memoir revealed the entire process in detail. Zhou Enlai skillfully conveyed China’s desire to establish some diplomatic ties with the United States if only to thwart the Soviet "hegemonic" pressure toward China and Southeast Asia. Zhou Enlai’s commitment, style, and substance impressed Kissinger so immensely that Kissinger recalls Zhou Enlai as one of the most impressive Asian leaders. Also, Kissinger flew to Lisbon in 1974 to advise and warn then Socialist Foreign Minister Mario Soares (who would later become prime minister in 1976) who was then working with communists to destroy Portugal’s dictatorship and negotiate independence of Portugal’s overseas colonies. Kissinger told Soares, "Mario, you are a Kerensky." Soares rebuffed, "Henry, I don’t want to become a Kerensky." Kissinger pithily replied, "Neither did Kerensky." Although the meeting presumably took place tête-à-tête, somehow the journalist, Michel Tatu (1985), gained access to, and made public, this exchange. Based on Kissinger’s words of caution, Soares terminated work with communists and Portugal achieved a more moderate social democratic revolution. Political communications tête-à-tête is often very crucial in diplomatic negotiation in Asia as well as anywhere.

In domestic politics such political communication is a daily occurrence. In Japanese settings as well as presumably many other contexts, weekend golf games are a favorite means for two politicians to converse in private. In such contexts privacy and off the record conversation are a favorite means for two politicians to converse. Along similar lines in the Japanese context, staying at a summer resort house or hotel is used also for such secret political communication. Witlingly or unwittingly, in Japanese politics, political plots often
manifest themselves once summer vacations are over, that is, in September. During the period between 2006 and 2012 when seven prime ministers rotated through the office, voices usually became strong after autumn, leading to a steady monthly decline of 3-5% in popularity, oftenbottoming out at 15-20% public support. Then newspaper coverage that raises rumors spread to the point where the public asks whether a prime minister is worth keeping. This is compounded by international travel in the autumn period in which the prime minister gives speeches at major diplomatic gatherings like the United Nations Assembly and many multilateral meetings. Newspapers also play a role in that articles cover national economic performance and future economic forecasts, and frequently pose the question of whether the prime minister has not been sufficiently effective in lifting up the economy. Many of the plots start as summer resort conversations that ultimately lead to a prime minister being replaced sometime in autumn (Inoguchi, 2013).

Face-to-face communications among politicians in summer resorts such as Beidaihe are similarly deemed politically crucial to top Chinese communist elites (Vogel, 2009). Beidaihe is a resort town about 280 km away from Beijing, where Chinese communist leaders come to communicate each other and come up with coordinated positions in such meetings as central committee meetings and national people's congresses. In Asia as well as elsewhere, face-to-face and off the record conversations are often keys among politicians.

Petitioning is a distinctive act with no medium. Petitioning has been increasing in the 2000s and 2010s in China. China retains a political culture whereby the public views high-ranking elites in Beijing with awe but is much more critical and accusatory of local officials. Petitioning is addressed to high-ranking national officials and takes a direct form (Li, 2007). Petition leaders carry a placard that explains the grievance and accuses local government of unjust conduct, thereby making petitioning a direct form of political communication.

Mikami and Inoguchi (2008) take up the question of trust in institutions. How citizens lend trust to organizations especially public institutions does make a difference in
politics. In 2006 a military coup d'etat took place in Thailand. Using the trust-in-institutions question from surveys in 2004 and in 2007, Mikami and Inoguchi (2008) found that a small but strong and solid degree of trust expressed in the military among Thai citizens did make a large difference in stabilizing the situation after the coup in a national environment where most other public institutions were taking a wait-and-see attitude, not enjoying a strong trust among citizens.

Ikeda and Richey (2012) take up the question of cultural impacts of interpersonal communication on democratic politics in Japan. Examining both the Japanese Elections Study III and the East Asian Barometers, the author argue that the Japanese partial adaptation of Confucian values helps Japan to practice democracy well in contrast to other East Asian societies more strongly affected by Confucian values in both public and private matters.

Mass Media

Secondly, political communication with mass media is most frequently examined in academic research. This is because political communication research flourished in the twentieth century when mass media transformed society and politics in a most revolutionary fashion. With mass media what is called representative democracy (Keane, 2009) reached its zenith in the latter half of the twentieth century. When Franklin Delano Roosevelt spoke in front of a microphone on radio, he was most effective. He created the notion of a fireside chat, which gives the impression of the president speaking directly to the nation and to every citizen in each family. Although he was partially paralyzed by a bout of polio, he managed to conceal this fact almost until the end of his political life. Most revealing of the effect of mass media in political communication was the advent of television. Political communication with mass media widened the scope and nature of academic research accordingly. In Asia the advent of radio and television has transformed dependent colonies to independent nations in the 20th century.
First of all, national independence sprouted in the 1930s through the 1960s in Asia. In the 1930s, India’s nationalists followed non-violent methods vis-à-vis British colonial authorities, led by Mahatma Gandhi and others. Without much diffusion of radio or television in cities and the countryside, political communication relied on petitions, hunger strikes, and non-violent demonstrations. Yet the surrender of British forces in Singapore to the invading Japanese from the north in 1941, prompted those nationalists, led by Subhas Chandra Bose, to arm themselves in Singapore as the Indian National Army and to march toward Delhi. Radio news of the fall of Singapore influenced the form of political communication from non-violent resistance to armed resistance. The victory of the Allied Powers in World War II meant that colonialism had to be steadily replaced with independence in Asia. In 1955 the meeting of the non-aligned movements, among newly independent countries, found its rallying leaders like Sukarno, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Zhou Enlai in Bandung, Indonesia. At home, most of those leaders of newly independent countries relied on radio and television to enforce authoritarian rule. These often charismatic leaders and their speeches went a long way with radio and television appearances. Speeches in their national languages enhanced the effectiveness of their political communication. Indonesian leaders used a newly established language, bahasa Indonesia, neither Dutch nor English, to help to facilitate the penetration of the idea of national independence. Imagined communities (Anderson, 1983) became real through bahasa.

The establishment of national parliaments and bureaucracies meant that some segments of the population became people’s deputies in parliament and other segments became people’s agents as experts and administrators. The nature and scope of political communication also changed. Government sounded the authoritative voice. People’s identities became more focused on national identity rather than local and religious identities. No less important is the development of intermediate organizations between citizens and the state. They included political parties, interest associations, labor unions, and business sectorial organizations. Political liberalization and democratization as well as economic and financial deregulation further facilitated this trend.
Political parties compete in elections appealing to the election manifestoes. In the 1960s and 1970s, Japanese election manifestoes were not made by political parties in a very formal or systematic way. Instead, major daily commercial newspapers asked each political party a set of questions about their policy lines that were limited to a certain number of Japanese characters. Normally, each party's team on policy affairs and elections provided responses. As the framework and length of replies were the same for each party, newspaper summaries of each political party's election manifestoes were analogously taken as a quasi-formal election manifesto document, at least, without formal alternatives (Inoguchi, 1987). After the 1993-1994 political reform period, election manifesto publication became the norm in Japan as it is with West European political parties. Election manifestoes issued by political parties have become one of the most important political communication channels to the electorates since then.

Traditionally a candidate's personality was considered more important than party pledges under the electoral system whereby 2-5 persons are elected from a district by one vote per electorate. Since the proportional representation system was introduced in a mixed form with the traditional system in 1993, political communications between candidates and electorates has been more policy focused. Japanese election manifestoes during the period of one-party dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party registered two principal policies as its platforms: strategic alliance and growth. Alliance refers to whether Japan's national security is assured by Japan’s alliance with the United States or not. The governing party said it is, whereas most of the opposition parties disagreed. Growth refers to whether economic policy should be geared to an accelerating high economic annual growth rate even at the cost of growing income gaps and environmental hazards or whether income equity and environmental justice should be just as important as sustaining a high growth policy. In Asia the similar importance of election manifesto issuing practice has been noted in such countries as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea (Inoguchi and Blondel, 2013).
The prolonged recession in Japan in the mid-1990s through the mid-2010s marked a shift as policy cleavages among political parties became dramatically different. Changes in political cleavages are as follows: (1) Although pro-alliance parties have increased in number, those parties which are just as concerned about the rise of China, about the disputes with China and the two Koreas, and about Japan's national pride have increased in number. (2) The relentlessly deepening tide of globalization has sharpened the pro-globalization school, on the one hand, and the anti-globalization school, on the other. The prolonged recession (1993-2013) has made the departure from each perspective more complex. (Taniguchi, 2013)

After the introduction of mass media to political life in the 1940s and 1950s, Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld theorized the communication process and effect of mass media. Instead of directly influencing the recipients of the broadcast message, what may be called opinion leaders became the intermediaries of the message. It is called the theory of two-step flows of communication through mass media. With the advent of mass media, the process of intermediation has become important. In a similar way, the advent of big business companies and standardized format of working in an office or factory created a massive number of white and blue color workers. David Riesman (1950) called them the lonely crowd. With or without opinion leaders, the citizens were exposed to mass media. Opinion leaders are like people's deputies in a national parliament.

**Social Media**

Communication technology has gone through revolutionary experiences since the 1990s when electronic information and communication technology made substantial leaps upward. Political communication has thus transformed and metamorphosed itself in a dramatic fashion. In addition to (1) political communications that are done directly without a medium (face-to-face or tete-a-tete) and (2) political communications that are done on a wide and massive level and at a swift pace through mass media, a new medium has sprung up and diffused globally. That is, (3) political communications with other persons in ways
more tailored to individual emotion, mood, and memory through social medium (cf. Ok, 2011). With the advent of social media, political communications have experienced dramatic changes. People’s deputies or politicians have been losing the erstwhile shining influence. This picture is ubiquitous. Not only in the United States, but also in Asia, especially those societies where a large number of populations are equipped with social media instruments such as South Korea, Taiwan, China, and Japan.

At least four aspects of social media should be described and discussed. First, social media is one of sharing. Shelley Turkle’s Alone Together (2011) singles out the yearning for being together without physically being together as the most important feature of social media. Person A tweets something that does not exceed 140 characters. A number of persons respond to person A, tweeting back “nice.” Person A feels that he or she is not alone, but through an exchange is together with others. Politicians use social media as an instrument to gauge the number of followers and their power of appeal. Second, government apparatus use social media to monitor and identify persona non grata for a regime. The process of monitoring and identifying starts with a list of words that flag the users of such terms. Trigger words like terrorism, September 11 (9.11 terrorism of 2001), jihadism, and corruption allow governments to follow, and if necessary suspend, communication networks. By doing so, a regime can deter further communications among “terrorists” or “democracy advocates.” A regime also has the ability to zero in on targets and arrest and eliminate them if they so choose. Third, social media provides an outlet for the discontentment of rebellious and subversive individuals to vent without acting on their negative feelings. As long as social media users are able to express themselves, those unhappy with the government may not engage in physical violence or other actions collectively against the regime. The Chinese Communist Party allowed citizens to express themselves through social media despite the strict ban on anti-party and anti-government opinions in the 2000s and sometime in the 2010s. By allowing social media to flourish, the party and the government have been able to appease, to a certain extent, disaffected citizens. Most posts on Twitter are political and economic grievances (Wu, 2013). Curiously,
political grievances tend to be expressed in Chinese, whereas economic grievances tend to be expressed in English. In other words, social media has the potential to disperse anti-regime collective actions. Fourth, although this aspect is somewhat contrary to the third facet of social media functions, social media can be used as a polling instrument, hedging against suppression by a regime. A massive outburst of social media protests can be a threat to a regime. In 2012, the Chinese government handled the clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands, the disputed islands between Japan and China, by initially allowing anti-Japanese sentiment to overflow into street demonstrations. Yet after the collective expression of these sentiments overheated and gained substantial momentum, the Chinese government started to worry about the possibility of these public expressions metamorphosing into anti-government riots.

At the same time, the party and the government of China have been investing a huge number of personnel in efforts to silence anti-party and anti-government citizens through social media. Government budgets on internal political security have surpassed the level of those for national defense. The party and government are apprehensive because of the ubiquitous nature of corruption and the astounding income gaps that exist due to the domination of state enterprises in the capitalist market extract surplus from people to the party and the government (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010).

The collective protests at Wukan, Guangdong in 2012 reveal the kind of coopting in which government engages. Wukan peasants whose farming land had been confiscated for non-farming infrastructure construction protested so fiercely that the provincial governor, Wang Yang, had to accommodate protesters and appoint a protest leader as village chief. These and other functions of social media make governance more complex and set a quicker pace for evolving. The global picture now unfolding in the early twenty-first century is that of social media. Varieties of social networking services penetrate global citizens of all sorts. The key nature of social media is that each communicates with others of similar taste, wave-length, opinion, lifestyle, religion, income level, etc. Social space is not the only segment of life to be increasingly structured via social media in an unprecedented
way. Users of social media can act alone together. The result is that special space is fragmented and that each social space is led by a charismatic leader who attracts many followers and re-tweeters. Cass Sunstein (2009) calls this phenomenon the cyber-balkanization of social space. It is also the process of disintermediation. This characterization is perhaps apt with respect to Chinese civil society. Social media under Hu Qingtao (2002-2012) flourished while Xi Jinping (2012—) expelled Google and domesticated and tamed social media fairly thoroughly (Yamaya, 2015; Renmin wan, 2012).

Politics under the influence of two medium regimes, mass media and social media, have very different features. Mass media creates opinion leaders. National politics is played out by the thoughts and assessments of opinion leaders with an eye on the national scene. Social media creates charismatic leaders who communicate to citizens with similar taste, preference, and wave-length like feudal chieftains. National politics is played out by those chieftains and followers on a global scale. An illegal fruit and vegetable vendor in Tunis, Tunisia brought about what is called the Arab Spring in 2012 via social media’s critical role of utilizing the power of “alone together” against authoritarian regimes across Arab societies.

Political parties have been losing their power of appealing to electorates and aggregating electorate preferences, which are then used to bring about public policy bills legislated in national parliaments. In many countries the number of party members has been on a steady decline, so much so that a local party chapter often has far fewer members compared to the membership of a football team support organization, say the Tories versus the Manchester United in Manchester, England. Those legislative tribes working to promote certain sectoral interests have been on the decline when measured by the number of votes they obtain in the House of Councilors elections under the nation-wide proportional presentation system. Those legislative tribes focusing on construction, medical doctors, agriculture, national infrastructure, and science and technology are such noted examples. They thrived during the high economic growth period of 1960-1991 (Inoguchi & Iwai, 1987). But in the low growth and recessionary period of 1991-2012, their influence
declined visibly. The legislative tribes' records of getting votes reduced substantially and often times many of them were not elected.

Ostracism is a social phenomenon. In a mathematically derived model Kim (2014) shows that individual efforts to increase his/her own sense of belonging is responsible for both growth of groups and creation of an outcast. Alienation is a pervasive phenomenon in the social sphere of life. It has a devastating effect. In school, ijime or intimidation or social rejection has been persistent and the introduction of a penalty for disliking does not terminate alienating of minority. The number of those students in primary, junior high, and senior high school in Japan who committed suicide because of intimidation is reported to be 200 in 2012 (Sankei shimbun, 2012). Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso likens Japan as a favorite target for intimidation in the world community (Aso, 2014). He argues that in primary school, three conditions are conducive to intimidation: a pupil whose academic score is not good, who is physically feeble, and whose father is very wealthy. In the world community, three conditions for intimidation are: high cultural standards, modest military power, and wealthy population. According to Aso, Japan is an easy target for intimidation.

**Theoretical Reflections**

On the basis of the medium-focused literature review of political communication research in Asia, I next tackle with theoretical reflections linking medium-focused political communication modes with effects.
Figure 1

**Summary of Medium-focused Political Communication Modes and Its Effects**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrations</th>
<th>Face-to-Face Mode</th>
<th>Communication Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ancient Greek direct democracy</td>
<td>discussion and persuasion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Henry Kissinger &amp; Mario Soares</td>
<td>blackmailing succeeded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Henry Kissinger &amp; Zhou Enlai</td>
<td>concurrence achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Japanese politicians in summer</td>
<td>plotting about positional adjustments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Chinese politicians in Beidahe</td>
<td>plotting about positional adjustments</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Petitioning in China</td>
<td>denouncing local leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Japanese interpersonal communication</td>
<td>while revering central leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrations</th>
<th>Mass Media Mode</th>
<th>Communication Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Franklin D. Roosevelt</td>
<td>New Deal hegemony achieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mahatma Gandhi with no mass media</td>
<td>protest won victory through non-violence satya graha</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Subhas Chandra Bose in Singapore, 1941</td>
<td>effectively mobilizing Indian National Army against Colonialism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Bandung Conference 1955</td>
<td>solidarity won among non-aligned newly independent states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political party manifests in Japan</td>
<td>political message made lucid and blurred</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mass media in US (radio and TV)</td>
<td>mass media emitted political message made effective by intermediation (two-step communication)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Mass media in US (radio and TV)</td>
<td>mass media emitted political message generating political demobilization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Illustrations</th>
<th>Social Media Mode</th>
<th>Communication Effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Appealing to individual emotion, mood, memory in US</td>
<td>“alone together” creates psychological and sociological comfort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Government monitors society in US</td>
<td>identifying trouble spots and arrest them, if necessary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Delinking worldwide social media (e.g. Google) from social media in China</td>
<td>reducing xenophobic cries developing to anti-government rallies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Social media helped protestors to unite in Wukan, Guangdong</td>
<td>local protest bringing about replacement of city mayor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Social media helped protestors to unite across Arab societies</td>
<td>Arab Spring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ostracism by social media</td>
<td>ostracism goes extreme</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Figure 1, I have systematically summarized theoretically conscious illustrations of political communication research in Asia with a focus on the relationship between political communication medium and communication effects. Most striking is the complexity originating from the different domains of communication modes and their compounded effects. The cosmos of political communication does not allow one to focus on one single mode of political communication. After all, politics focuses on how much one can attain between desired and resultant effects through various modes of political communication. It is normal that three modes of political communication take place more or less in the same settings. How to combine among the three is where one spends time to enhance the effectiveness of political communication.

When radio and television were barely introduced in early 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt appealed most effectively to the hearts and minds of Americans. In the 1940s and 1950s in the US, mass media’s impacts were considered so significant that mass communication studies highlighted the theory of two-step communication flows propounded by Paul Lazarsfeld and Elihu Katz. It argues that in order to digest the leader’s message normally one more step is required, in which a local or organizational level leader chimes in and prods mass publics in the mass consuming process. Its effect is the process of intermediation. Along another line of logic, it was argued that massive emission leads mass publics to silence their voice to become lonely crowds, in the 1950s and early 1960s before the Great Society and the Vietnam War. While Mahatma Gandhi was successful in making best use of satya graha non-violence when radio was not widely used in the 1920s and 1930s, Subhas Chandra Bose took advantage of the radio toward mobilization of expatriate Indians into the National Indian Army from zero in Singapore, part of British Malaya in 1941. The Bandung conference of Non-aligned countries’ leaders was most effective in demonstrating solidarity among newly independent countries vis-a-vis two super powers. The introduction of practice of political party manifestoes in Japan in the 1980s gave the fresh sense of political parties' message when political parties were widely thought as client and corrupt groupings. However political party manifestoes soon became more
convergent in some policy areas and detailed in many other policy areas in the 1990s and 2000s when mass media such as TV and newspapers were declining their subscription fairly steadily. The retreat in the subscription to newspapers and TV channels have been so ubiquitous in the 2000s and 2010s that party members have been dropping out especially those traditional parties such as the Tories and the Labor that it often happens that those local football supporter club members are much larger than party members.

In contrast to mass media, this serves the need to be informed massively and promptly and with uniform messages, social media were born of the need to tailor messages to those of similar taste and similar walk of life with moods, emotion, memory, and melody. What do you call this phenomenon? Cass Sunstein calls it cyber-balkanization in the sense that those audiences are fragmented and cleavaged often with no conversation and communication between them. When the freedom of speech exists only insufficiently, government censorship tries to limit it to varying extents. There social media users opt for maneuver along rule through law rather than rule of law. Government tries to identify those users of dangerous and subversive proclivity such as terrorism, September 11, jihadism, subsidies cut to wheat and gasoline, etc. Effects of these processes are the competition between government and decedents. In the 2013 Arab Spring one fruit vendor’s suicide after being arrested for illegal business in Tunis, Tunisia spoke widely all the Arab societies toppling down many of their autocratic regimes. Social media worldwide links are sometimes terminated so that domestic social media serves only for the purpose of allowing grievances at home relatively freely. One possible effect of this taming social media carried out in China during 2012 is that when the Senkaku islets disputes manifested themselves in October 2012 alleged for Japanese government’s purchase of these islets from non-governmental owner, anti-Japanese protests took place in key cities and some others. On December 26, 2012 when President Xi Jinping paid a visit to the Mao Zedong mausoleum and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe paid a visit to the Yasukuni shrine, no mass protests took place in Beijing or Shanghai or anywhere else. By December 2012, the task of terminating Google World Wide in china must have been completed.
Aside from social media and more generally applied to computers, cyber war has become a new normal. Self-censorship, cyber terrorism, and cyber spying are part of the new normal. Visible and invisible state intervention in freedom of expression, attempts to stifle cyber systems of government talk and non-governmental organizations, and spying among supposed allies and purported adversaries have become not uncommon at all. This piece of my thoughts does not examine these and other aspects of political communication in depth.

**Conclusion**

This piece succinctly and selectively reviews the literature of political communication research in Asia through the angle of communication media and their political effects. I humbly present these conclusions:

First, communication media have become far more complex than before when face-to-face communication and mass media communication were two competing and complementary media. Now, since the 1990s, the entry of a new media, social media, has revolutionized political communication in that it aims at tailoring to the taste and walk of life massively, promptly, and focusing on mood, emotion, and memory. In other words, political communication is customized. Not only its variety but also its speed and quantity have dramatically increased.

Second, synchronized use of face-to-face communication, mass media communication, and social media communication has differentiated the effectiveness of political communication when most appropriately designed and executed.

Third, the relentlessly digitalized and globalized world has led political communication a battlefield of cyber struggle in which cyber terrorism, cyber spying, self-censorship have become a daily routine without borders.

Theoretical and empirical work along the lines of this brief piece of my thoughts remains to be carried out.
References


Biographical Note

Takashi Inoguchi is Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo and President, University of Niigata Prefecture. He is also former Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations assigned to The United Nations University Headquarters. He has B.A. and M.A. degrees from University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. from MIT. He has published numerous books and articles on a broad range of subjects. For the last decade he has executed large scale random sampled nation-wide surveys in all the Asian countries and societies (i.e., in East, Southeast, South and Central Asia, except for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and Timor Leste) focusing on quality of life and well-being with 52,515 respondents and about 6 million observations. From this AsiaBarometer project he has published with co-author Seiji Fujii, The Quality of Life in Asia: A Comparison of Quality of Life in 29 Asian Countries and Societies (Springer, 2012). With Doh Chull Shin, coedited The Quality of Life in Asia (Springer 2010), coedited with Miguel Basanez et al., Values and Lifestyle in Urban Asia (SigloXXI Editores, 2005), and another three volumes of the AsiaBarometer (Akashi Shoten, 2001, 2008, 2009). On Japan and international affairs, he has published, among others, The Political Economy of Japan (Stanford University Press, 1988, coedited with Daniel Okimoto), American Democracy Promotion (Oxford University Press, 2000, coedited with Michael Cox and G. John Ikenberry), Japanese Politics Today (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011),
and The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Dr. Inoguchi is a member of the Science Council of Japan, Founding Editor of Japanese Journal of Political Science (Cambridge University Press) and Journal of International Relations of the Asia Pacific (Oxford University Press) and Asian Journal of Comparative Politics (Sage Publications). Of late, he is editor of Asian Journal of Political Opinion Research (open access journal). He also is Director of the AsiaBarometer Project and is Chairman of the Asian Consortium for Political Research. He won the ISQOLS (International Society for Quality of Life Studies) Research Fellow Award in 2014. Based on Google Scholar Impact Indices, his total citations count (up to August 28, 2015) is 2,665; his h-index is 28, and his i10 index is 76.

He can be reached at: University of Niigata Prefecture, 471, Ebigase, Higashi-ku, Niigata City, Niigata, Japan 950-8680 or by email at: inoguchi@ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp.