Environmental Engineering Research

Korean Society of Environmental Engineers (대한환경공학회)
권호 표지
DOI QR코드

DOI QR Code

Two-stage concession game approach for analyzing greenhouse gases emission reduction schemes

  • Yuan, Liang (School of Business, HoHai University) ;
  • He, Weijun (Collborative Innovation Center of China Three Gorges University) ;
  • Degefu, Dagmawi Mulugeta (Collborative Innovation Center of China Three Gorges University) ;
  • Kim, Soonja (School of Hydraulic and Environmental Engineering, China Three Gorges University) ;
  • Shen, Juqin (School of Business, HoHai University) ;
  • An, Min (School of Business, HoHai University)
  • Received : 2016.05.16
  • Accepted : 2016.09.02
  • Published : 2016.12.30
Download PDF
⟨ Previous Next ⟩

Abstract

Climate change imposes a huge treat on the sustainability of our environment. One of the major reasons for the increasing impacts of climate change is the emission of greenhouse gases. Therefore, cooperative greenhouse gas emission reduction schemes with a general consensus are needed in order to reduce the impacts of climate change. Due to the strong link between greenhouse gas emission and economic development there is disagreement among countries on the designing and implementation of emission reduction plans. In this paper the authors proposed a two-stage concession game to analyze emission reduction plans and determine a balanced emission range that improves the utilities of the bargaining parties. Furthermore the game was applied to a hypothetical example. Our results from the case study indicated that even though the utilities of the bargaining parties is highly affected by emission reductions, after making concessions their utilities can be improved given their emission reductions are within in a certain desirable range. The authors hope that this article provides insights which could be useful for understanding emission reduction plans and their consequences on the negotiating parties.

Keywords

References

  1. Jeunesse IL, Cirelli C, Aubin D, et al. Is climate change a threat for water uses in the Mediterranean region? Results from a survey at local scale. Sci. Total. Environ. 2016;543: 981-996. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2015.04.062
  2. Hai LL, Patrick W, An MB, et al. Effect of climate change on the vulnerability of a socio-ecological system in an arid area. Glob. Planet. Chang. 2016;137:1-9. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloplacha.2015.12.014
  3. Gibbs MT. Coastal climate risk and adaptation on studies: The importance of understanding different classes of problem. Ocean Coast Manage. 2015;103:9-13. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2014.10.018
  4. Ronald C. The problem of social cost. J. Law Econ. 1960;3:1-44. https://doi.org/10.1086/466560
  5. John D. Land, water and ownership. Can. J. Econ. 1968;4: 791-804.
  6. Montgomery WD. Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs. J. Econ. Theo. 1972;5:395-418. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(72)90049-X
  7. Thomas E, Rudiger P. International carbon emissions trading and strategic incentives to subsidize green energy. Res. Energ. Econ. 2014;36:469-486. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.reseneeco.2013.06.001
  8. Woodward RT, Kaiser RA. Market structures for U.S. water quality trading. Rev. Agri. Econ. 2002;24:366-383. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9353.00025
  9. Michael F. Game theory and international environmental cooperation. Cheltenham-Northampton: Edward Elgar; 2001. p. 145-150.
  10. Madani K. Game theory and water resources. J. Hydrol. 2010;81:225-238.
  11. Wei SK, Yang H. Using game theory based approaches to simulate stakeholder conflicts concerning domestic water allocation and pollution reduction in inter-basin water transfer in china. J. Beijing Nor. Uni. 2016;6:254-267.
  12. Valipour M. Optimization of neural networks for precipitation analysis in a humid region to detect drought and wet year alarms. Meteo. Appl. 2016;23:91-100. https://doi.org/10.1002/met.1533
  13. Yannopoulos SI, Lyberatos G, Theodossiou N, et al. Evolution of water lifting devices (pumps) over the centuries worldwide: A review. Water 2015;7:5031-5060. https://doi.org/10.3390/w7095031
  14. Valipour M. Sprinkle and trickle irrigation system design using tapered pipes for pressure loss adjusting. J. Agri. Sci. 2012;4: 125-133.
  15. Mahdizadeh Khasraghi M, Gholami Sefidkouhi MA, Valipour M. Simulation of open- and closed-end border irrigation systems using SIRMOD. Arch. Agro. Soil Sci. 2015;61:929-941. https://doi.org/10.1080/03650340.2014.981163
  16. Valipour M. Comparison of surface irrigation simulation models: Full hydrodynamic, zero inertia, kinematic wave. J. Agri. Sci. 2012;4:68-74.
  17. Valipour M, Sefidkouhi MAG, Eslamian S. Surface irrigation simulation models: A review. Int. J. Hydro. Sci. Technol. 2015;5:51-70. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJHST.2015.069279
  18. Degefu DM, He W, Yuan L, Zhao JH. Water allocation in transboundary river basins under water scarcity: A cooperative bargaining approach. Water Resour. Manage. 2016;30:4451-4466. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-016-1431-6
  19. Rob JHM, Veeren DV, Tol RSJ. Game theoretic analysis of nitrate emission reduction strategies in the Rhine river basin. Int. J. Glob. Environ. Issues 2003;3:74-103. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJGENVI.2003.002412
  20. Hassan B , Guiomar M. The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 2016;251:300-309. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.11.014
  21. Chew IML, Tan RR, Foo DCY, et al. Game theory approach to the analysis of inter-plant water integration in an eco-industrial park. J. Clean. Prod. 2009;17:1611-1619. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2009.08.005
  22. Stephen JD, Anders F. Game theory and climate diplomacy. Ecol. Econ. 2013;85:177-187. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.04.016
  23. Moshe H. Game theory and international environmental cooperation. J. Energ. Nat. Res. Law 2009;27:503-510.
  24. George BF, Margriet FC. Transboundary water management game-theoretic lessons for projects on the US-Mexico border. Agri. Econ. 2000;24:101-111.
  25. Ponce de Leon Barido D, Marshall JD. Relationship between urbanization and CO2 emissions depends on income level and policy. Environ. Sci. Technol. 2014;48:3632-3639. https://doi.org/10.1021/es405117n
  26. Magombeyi MS, Rollin D, Lankford B. The river basin game as a tool for collective water management at community level in South Africa. Phys. Chem. Earth 2008;33:873-880. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pce.2008.06.045
  27. Perry J. Climate change adaptation in the world's best places: A wicked problem in need of immediate attention. Landscape Urban Plan. 2015;133:1-11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2014.08.013
  28. Heidari N, Pearce JM. A review of greenhouse gas emission liabilities as the value of renewable energy for mitigating lawsuits for climate change related damages. Renew. Sust. Energ. Rev. 2016;55:899-908. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.11.025
  29. JOrgensen S, Yeung DWK. A strategic concession game. Int. Game Theor. Rev. 1999;1:103-129. https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198999000086
  30. Panayotou T. Demystifying the environmental Kuznets curve: Turning a black box into a policy tool. Environ. Devel. Econ. 2001;4:465-484.
  31. Dinda S. Environmental kuznets curve hypothesis: A survey. Ecol. Econ. 2004;49:431-455. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.02.011
  32. Chen BY. Revealing characteristics of mixed consortia for Azo Dye Decolonization: Lotka-Volterra model and game theory. J. Hazard. Mater. 2007;149:508-514. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhazmat.2007.04.022
  33. Ostrom E. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1990. p. 87-101.
  34. Loaiciga HA. Analytic game-theoretic approach to ground-water extraction. J. Hydrol. 2004;297:22-33. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2004.04.006