Environmental and Resource Economics Review (자원ㆍ환경경제연구)

Korean Resource Economics Association (한국자원경제학회)
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Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility in a Polluting Duopoly and Endogenous Timing Game

오염배출기업의 환경에 대한 사회적 책임과 내생적 시간게임

  • Lee, Sang-Ho (Graduate School of Economics, Chonnam National University) ;
  • Park, Chul-Hi (BK21Plus, Graduate School of Economics, Chonnam National University)
  • 이상호 (전남대학교 경제학부) ;
  • 박철희 (전남대학교 대학원 경제학과 BK21PLUS)
  • Received : 2017.05.25
  • Accepted : 2017.12.19
  • Published : 2018.03.31
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Abstract

This study investigates the strategic environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) of polluting duopoly when two firms have different production costs and compete with prices. We then examine an endogenous timing game in choosing ECSR and its effects on environmental damage and social welfare. The followings are the main findings: First, sequential choice of ECSR is strategic complements and it provides late adopter advantage irrespective of cost difference. Second, sequential choice of ECSR is the equilibrium of endogenous timing game. In particular, an efficient firm-leading ECSR is the payoff dominance equilibrium when cost difference is significant. Finally, environmental damage and social welfare depend on the social cost of pollution. In particular, an efficient firm-leading ECSR is socially desirable when social cost is high. However, an inefficient firm-leading ECSR increases environmental damage irrespective of social cost and it reduces social welfare when cost difference is significant.

본 연구는 비용조건이 다른 오염배출기업이 가격경쟁을 할 때 환경에 대한 사회적 책임(ECSR)의 정도가 시장균형과 환경오염, 그리고 사회후생에 미치는 영향을 분석한다. 주요한 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 순차적 ECSR은 상호보완성을 지니고 있으며 비용조건에 상관없이 후발 기업이 항상 더 높은 이윤을 얻게 된다. 둘째, ECSR의 선택시기를 내생화하는 경우 순차게임이 항상 균형이 되고, 비용 비대칭성이 유의하면 효율적인 기업이 ECSR을 선도하는 것이 보수우위균형이 된다. 마지막으로, 순차적 ECSR이 환경오염과 사회후생에 미치는 효과는 오염의 사회적 한계비용에 의해 영향을 받는다. 사회적 비용이 충분히 크다면 효율적인 기업이 ECSR을 선도하는 균형이 사회적으로 바람직하지만, 비효율적인 기업이 ECSR을 선도하는 균형에서는 사회적 비용의 크기에 상관없이 항상 환경오염이 더 심각해질 뿐만 아니라 시장규모가 작아서 비용 비대칭성이 유의하다면 사회후생은 더 낮아진다.

Keywords

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