Management & Information Systems Review (경영과정보연구)

Daehan Academy of Management Information Systems (대한경영정보학회)
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Accounting Conservatism and Excess Executive Compensation

회계 보수주의와 경영자 초과보상

  • 변설원 (부산대학교 경영학과) ;
  • 박상봉 (동의대학교 상경대학 회계학과)
  • Received : 2018.04.04
  • Accepted : 2018.06.18
  • Published : 2018.06.30
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Abstract

This study examines the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation and examines whether their relationship increases as managerial incentive compensation intensity increases. For this purpose, a total of 2,755 company-years were selected for the analysis of the companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from December 2012 to 2016 as the final sample. The results of this study are as follows. First, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between accounting conservatism and manager overpayment. This implies that managers' incentives to distort future cash flow estimates by over booking assets or accounting profits in order to maximize their compensation when manager compensation is linked to firm performance. In this sense, accounting conservatism can reduce opportunistic behavior by restricting managerial accounting choices, which can be interpreted as a reduction in overpayment to managers. Second, we found that the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation increases with the incentive compensation for accounting performance. The higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity of accounting performance is, the more likely it is that the manager has the incentive to make earnings adjustments. Therefore, the high level of incentive compensation for accounting performance means that the ex post settling up problem due to over-compensation can become serious. In this case, the higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity for accounting performance, the greater the role and utility of conservatism in manager compensation contracts. This study is based on the fact that it presents empirical evidence on the usefulness of accounting conservatism in managerial compensation contracts theoretically presented by Watts (2003) and the additional basis that conservatism can be used as a useful tool for investment decision.

본 연구는 회계 보수주의와 경영자 초과보상 사이의 음(-)의 관련성을 분석하고 이들의 관계가 회계성과에 대한 경영자 유인보상 강도가 높을수록 증가하는지에 대해 살펴본다. 이를 위해 2012년부터 2016년까지 한국 증권거래소의 상장기업 중 12월 결산 제조업만을 대상으로 총 2,755기업-연도를 최종 표본으로 분석에 활용하였다. 본 연구의 분석결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 회계보수주의와 경영자 초과보상은 통계적으로 유의적인 음(-)의 관련성이 있는 것으로 분석되었다. 이는 경영자 보상이 기업성과와 연계될 경우 경영자는 자신의 보상을 극대화하기 위해 자산이나 회계이익의 과대계상을 통하여 미래 현금흐름 추정치를 왜곡할 유인을 가진다. 이에 대해 회계 보수주의가 경영자의 회계선택을 제한하여 기회주의적 행위를 감소시킬 수 있기 때문에 경영자에게 지급되는 초과보상 역시 감소한 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 둘째, 회계보수주의와 경영자 초과보상의 음(-)의 관련성은 회계성과에 대한 경영자 유인보상 강도가 높을수록 증가한다는 실증결과를 발견하였다. 회계성과에 대한 경영자 유인보상 강도가 높을수록 경영자는 자신의 보상을 극대화하고자 회계성과에 대한 이익조정 유인을 가지며 초과보상을 획득할 가능성이 높다. 따라서 회계성과에 대한 경영자 유인보상 강도가 높다는 것은 초과보상으로 인한 사후정산문제가 심각해질 수 있다는 점을 의미한다. 이 경우 회계성과에 대한 경영자 유인보상 강도가 높을수록 경영자 보상계약에 있어서 보수주의의 역할 및 유용성은 더욱 커질 것이므로 보수주의와 초과보상에 대한 음(-)의 관련성이 더욱 증가한 결과로 해석된다. 본 연구는 Watts(2003)에 의해 이론적으로 제시된 경영자 보상계약에 대한 회계보수주의의 유용성과 관련하여 실증적 증거를 제시했다는 측면과 보수주의가 정보이용자들의 투자의사결정에 유용한 도구로 활용될 수 있다는 추가적인 근거를 제시했다는 점에서 의미가 있을 것이다.

Keywords

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