Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회논문지)

The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
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Related Party Transactions and Corporate Value: Test of the Efficient Transaction and Conflict of Interests Hypothesis

특수관계자간 거래와 기업가치: 효율적 거래가설과 이해상충가설 검증

  • Lee, Sang-Gyu (Department of Business Administration, Changwon National University) ;
  • Kim, Byoung-Gon (Department of Business Administration, Changwon National University) ;
  • Kim, Dong-Wook (Busan Economic Promotion Agency)
  • Received : 2018.06.18
  • Accepted : 2018.09.07
  • Published : 2018.09.30
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Abstract

This study analyzed the effect of related party transactions on the corporate value of Korean firms using panel data regression analysis. We tested the efficient transaction hypothesis and conflict of interests hypothesis which concern related party transactions. Five types of related party transactions were considered, including long term supply contracts, assets and business transfers, affiliate loans, equity investment, and credit offerings. If related party transactions were conducted for the purpose of enhancing corporate efficiency, results would have a positive effect on firm value. If related party transactions were conducted for the purpose of private profits of the controlling shareholders, the results would show a negative effect on firm value. Results were as follows. Firstly, it is confirmed that affiliate loans, equity investment, and credit offerings had negative effects on firm value. This implies that these types of related party transactions used by controlling shareholders for the purpose of their private profit, which supports the conflict of interests hypothesis. Secondly, it was found that long term supply contracts and assets and business transfers had no effect on firm value.

본 연구는 특수관계자간 거래가 기업가치에 미치는 영향을 패널자료회귀모형을 이용하여 분석하였다. 즉 한국기업의 특수관계자간 거래가 효율적 거래가설과 이해상충의 가설을 지지하는가를 검증하였다. 특수관계자간 거래의 유형은 장기공급계약, 자산 및 영업양수도, 대여금, 지분출자, 신용공여 등 다섯 가지를 고려하였다. 특수관계자간 거래가 기업의 효율성을 증가시키기 위한 목적으로 이루어진다면 특수관계자간 거래는 기업가치에 긍정적인 영향을 미치게 된다. 반면에 지배주주의 사익을 추구하기 위해 터널링 목적으로 이루어진다면 기업가치에 부정적인 영향을 나타내게 된다. 본 연구의 실증분석 결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 다섯 가지 특수관계자간 거래 형태 중에서 대여금, 지분출자, 신용공여는 기업가치에 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타나서 이해상충의 가설을 지지하는 결과를 보였다. 즉 대여금이나 지분출자, 신용공여 등과 같은 특수관계자와의 재무적 거래는 지배주주의 사익추구 목적으로 이루어질 가능성이 높은 것으로 이해되었다. 둘째, 장기공급계약과 자산 및 영업양수도 형태의 특수관계자간 거래는 기업가치와 유의한 영향관계를 확인할 수 없었다. 따라서 장기공급계약이나 자산 및 영업양수도 형태의 특수관계자간 거래는 효율적 거래 목적으로 이루어지는 것인지 혹은 지배주주의 사익추구 목적으로 이루어지는 것인지 명확하지 않았다.

Keywords

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