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The Chilling Trade Effects of Provisional Anti-dumping Duties: The Case of Korea

  • Received : 2019.12.16
  • Accepted : 2020.05.18
  • Published : 2020.05.31

Abstract

Purpose - This study empirically analyzes the effects of provisional anti-dumping duties levied on imports by Korea following anti-dumping investigations. An anti-dumping duty is a legal tool that countries use to impose duties on imports to offset injurious dumping. This study verifies how effective the imposition of a provisional anti-dumping duty is and whether such duties have trade chilling effects on aggregate imports. Specifically, this study examines import trade diversion from named to unnamed countries caused by the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties. Design/methodology - This empirical analysis employs an econometric model of provisional anti-dumping measures for cases in which Korea imposed final affirmative anti-dumping measures. We construct a monthly panel dataset for each stage of anti-dumping investigation undertaken by Korea for all manufacturing industries during 1995-2013. We illustrate a stage-by-stage analysis of anti-dumping investigations from initiation, preliminary decision, imposition of provisional duty, final affirmative decision, and imposition of final affirmative duty on a monthly basis at the six-digit harmonized system code-level. Findings - For cases in which provisional duties are imposed, the reduction in imports from named countries outweighs the increase in imports from unnamed countries. The substantial reduction in imports from named countries is large enough to offset the import diversion to unnamed countries, suggesting that import diversion in investigations is limited during the investigation period. Therefore, the use of provisional anti-dumping duties in Korea is effective, providing evidence of a chilling effect on aggregate imports. Originality/value - Few studies examine the size of the effects on import trade diversion of the imposition of provisional anti-dumping duties. We contribute to the literature by disentangling separate trade effects for each phase of the anti-dumping investigation process and imposition of provisional duty.

Keywords

Acknowledgement

The present research was supported by the research fund of Dankook University in 2019.

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