• Journal of Construction Engineering and Project Management
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.18-28
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• 2015

Bidding and contract systems are used for public construction projects to select contractors following fair competition principles and to execute national budgets effectively. Many challenges have arisen due to a lack of transparency and fairness and because bidding practices have been luck-based. Few comprehensive or comparative analyses have been conducted on the performance and limitations of bidding and contract systems, and empirical analyses designed to improve policies on and the practice of such systems are lacking. This study empirically analyzed current bidding and contract systems to seek ways of improving them. The study proposes several alternatives to resolve the problems with and irrationalities of the current system: 1) improving bidding and selection systems by changing them from a luck-based price competition into a technical merit- and value-based competition; 2) improving the assessment criteria to meet the current market level of bid and winning prices; 3) adjusting contractual responsibilities and sharing structures to meet the current trend; and 4) strengthening the competitiveness and expanding the social responsibility-based procurement systems of construction companies.

• The Journal of Information Systems
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• v.25 no.4
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• pp.63-85
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• 2016

Purpose While the popularity of C2C auction platforms such as eBay is gradually decreased, this domain is still undermined to explain online bidding behaviors. Online bidders sometimes engage in impulsive bidding due to some of the online auction characteristics. Therefore, this study develops and tests a model of the impulsive bidding exhibited by online bidders in C2C auction platforms. Based on S-O-R framework, our model posits that both perceived time-pressure and competition intensity affect cognitive absorption which ultimately influences the impulsive bidding. Design/methodology/approach This study collected survey data from 214 C2C auction participants, who have prior experience on impulsive bidding and tested both measurement model and structural model by using CB-SEM (covariate-based structural equation modelling) technique. In this study, by using AMOS 20.0, we tested the measurement model for its overall fit, item reliability, and validity and further conducted the structural model to test our proposed hypotheses. Findings Based on our results, we found that perceived tim-pressure and competition intensity were positively related to cognitive absorption. We also found that the cognitive absorption was positively associated with impulsive bidding behavior. In this study, by developing our research model in S-O-R framework, we provide an alternative theoretical mechanism to describe online impulsive bidding behavior.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.53 no.1
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• pp.56-66
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric industry. Participants of competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by adequately pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze the price-clearing in the generation bidding competition and the competition is modeled as the noncooperative and complete information. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity and generating entity's strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.4A no.4
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• pp.243-253
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• 2004

As deregulation evolves, pricing electricity becomes a major issue in the electric power industry. Participants in the competitive marketplace are able to improve their profits substantially by effectively pricing the electricity. In this paper, game theory is applied to analyze price-clearing in the generation bidding competition with the competition modeled as the non-cooperative and complete information game. The result of this analysis can be useful in understanding spot price-clearing of electricity as well as GENCOs' strategic behavior in the competitive electricity market.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2013.01a
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• pp.479-487
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• 2013

State Highway Agencies (SHAs) have started utilizing cost-plus-time bidding (A+B bidding) since Federal Highway Agency (FHWA) declared it operational on May 4, 1995. Although this technique has successfully accelerated many projects by incorporating construction time in the bidding competition, a framework to illustrate the interactions of incentive/disincentive (I/D) rates on the competitiveness of contractors participating in the bid competition is yet to be developed. In a previous research, authors indicated that for each bid competition there is an efficient cap for I/D rates which are dictated by the capabilities of contractors in project acceleration. However, the results of previous study were based on the assumption that there is a statistically significant relationship between cost and time. In this study, the entire cost-plus-time projects implemented by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) were investigated. Then the significance of relationship between cost and time were analyzed for each contractor utilizing Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) technique, and the price-time function of each contractor was determined by regression analysis. The results of the analysis indicate that there is a significant relationship between cost and time for the majority of contractors. However, a quadratic relationship is not always significant and for some contractors a linear price-time relationship is significant. The results of this project can be used not only by ODOT to optimize the incentive/disincentive rates but also by contractors to determine the most competitive strategies of other bid participants.

• International conference on construction engineering and project management
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• 2022.06a
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• pp.18-24
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• 2022

State highway agencies (SHAs) typically apply a competitive procurement procedure to select contractors for their design-bid-build projects. Since the level of competition affects construction bid prices and project outcomes, the Federal Highway Agency (FHWA) suggests SHAs seek ways to improve competition among contractors continuously. However, they rarely conduct an empirical assessment of the current competition level necessary to identify room for improvement. Besides the number of bidders on a project, other factors such as winning or losing rates among the contractors in previous projects can also indicate the degree of competition; only a few contractors may have won the majority of the projects in a specific region. However, few studies have investigated such factors. This paper proposes a network analysis-based approach to evaluating contractor competition levels of highway projects using historical bid tabulation data. The proposed method provides insights into overall competition levels, the determination of competitive contractors, and winning rate distribution among contractors.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.5A no.4
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• pp.396-402
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• 2005

In an electricity market with imperfect competition, participants devise bidding plans and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) is analyzed by using bi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare (SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2002.11b
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• pp.369-371
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• 2002

In a competitive electricity market, the transactions of the electric power can be accomplished through the bidding which is submitted by suppliers and consumers. It is essential that the optimal decision for the bidding is required to take a dominant position in the competition. Therefore, in this paper we presents bidding variables from bidding curves of suppliers and consumers and proposes the algorithm of an optimal bidding strategy using optimal power flow. Furthermore, the variation of the optimal bidding is investigated through numerical studies.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• summer
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• pp.710-712
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• 2004

Generation companies(Genco) submit the supply functions as a bidding function to a bid market in a competitive electricity market. The profits of Gencos vary in accordance with the bid functions, so the selection of a bidding function plays a key role in increasing their profits. This paper presents an analysis of the selection of the supply function from the viewpoint of Nash equilibrium(NE). Four types of bidding function parameters are used for analizing the electricity market. The competition of selecting bidding parameters is modeled as subgame and overall game in this research. The NEs in both game are computed by using analytic method and payoff matrix method. It is verified in case studies for the NE of overall game to satisfy the equilibrium condition.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.54 no.4
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• pp.199-204
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• 2005

In an electricity market with an imperfect competition, participants make plans of bidding and transaction strategies to maximize their own profits. The market price and the quantity are concerned with the operation reserve as well as the bidding system and demand curves in an electricity market. This paper presents a market model combined by an energy market and an operating reserve market. The competition of the generation producers in the combined market is formulated as a gaming of selecting bid parameters such as intersections and slopes in bid functions. The Nash Equilibrium(NE) is analyzed by using a hi-level optimization; maximization of Social Welfare(SW) and maximization of the producers' profits.