• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.51 no.4
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• pp.202-208
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• 2002

In a dynamic game where the players move in a periodical sequence, each player observes the strategy of the others. So the players who move later in a game get to know the moves of others having made before them. Those who move earlier must take this into account in devising their optimal strategy. In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating in the bidding game accumulates the information of its own and others'strategies, and payoffs through the repeated bidding process. Thereby, the players in this game would be able to map out how get the maximum profit, and get closer to the optimal strategy. This paper presents a mathematical modeling for a player to determine his or her optimal strategy at period T, based on the information acquired from the previous rounds for the periods, T-1, T-2, and so on. The proposed modeling is demonstrated with a dynamic fame theory.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.33 no.3
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• pp.322-328
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• 2007

Highly standardized products are suitable for automated purchasing using electronic commerce technology, where the price becomes the most important factor. Suppliers can change the prices dynamically based on the inventory level and market situation in order to maximize the sales and profit. In the virtual marketplace where multiple customers purchase multiple standardized products from multiple suppliers repetitively, customers can purchase the required amount of each item as a dynamic bidding by allocating purchase orders to the suppliers based on the current price. Customers need a method to quickly determine the optimal allocation of orders to the suppliers using the dynamically changing data to minimize the total cost. We present a LP model which minimizes the sum of the total price plus transportation cost for this problem. Simulation results using random data show meaningful reduction of the total cost.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.64-74
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• 2015

Because of the burgeoning demand of the energy, the countries are finding sustainable solutions for these emerging challenges. Demand Side Management is playing a significant role in managing the demand with an aim to support the electrical grid during the peak hours. However, advancement in controls and communication technologies, the aggregators are appearing as a third party entity in implementing demand response program. In this paper, a detailed mathematical framework is discussed in which the aggregator acts as an energy service provider between the utility and the consumers, and facilitate the consumers to actively participate in demand side management by introducing the new concept of demand reduction bidding (DRB) under constrained direct load control. Paper also presented an algorithm for the proposed framework and demonstrated the efficacy of the algorithm by considering few case studies and concluded with simulation results and discussions.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
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• 2001.11b
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• pp.63-66
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• 2001

In the Poolco model, the bidding game is executed periodically. The player participating to the bidding game accumulates the information of others' strategies and payoffs through the repeated process. Thereby, he is able to map out how he gets his maximum profit, and proceed to the optimal strategy region. This paper shows the algorithm for a player to determine his strategy in t period based the information of the game results of t-1, t-2 period. And this algorithm can be formulated by using Dynamic game theory.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.10 no.12
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• pp.5616-5642
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• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.1336-1356
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• 2017

The spectrum scarcity crisis has resulted in a shortage of resources for many emerging wireless services, and research on dynamic spectrum management has been used to solve this problem. Game theory can allocate resources to users in an economic way through market competition. In this paper, we propose a bidding game-based spectrum allocation mechanism in cognitive radio network. In our framework, primary networks provide heterogeneous wireless service and different numbers of channels, while secondary users have diverse bandwidth demands for transmission. Considering the features of traffic and QoS demands, we design a weighted interference graph-based grouping algorithm to divide users into several groups and construct the non-interference user-set in the first step. In the second step, we propose the dynamic bidding game-based spectrum allocation strategy; we analyze both buyer's and seller's revenue and determine the best allocation strategy. We also prove that our mechanism can achieve balanced pricing schema in competition. Theoretical and simulation results show that our strategy provides a feasible solution to improve spectrum utilization, can maximize overall utility and guarantee users' individual rationality.

• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.7 no.5
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• pp.681-688
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• 2012

This paper presents the application of Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm to obtain a solution for Bid Based Dynamic Economic Dispatch (BBDED) problem including the transmission losses and to maximize the social profit in a deregulated power system. The IEEE-30 bus test system with six generators, two customers and two trading periods are considered under various bidding strategies in a day-ahead electricity market. By matching the bids received from supplying and distributing entities, the Independent System Operator (ISO) maximize the social profit, (with the choices available). The simulation results of DE are compared with the results of Particle swarm optimization (PSO). The results demonstrate the potential of DE algorithm and show its effectiveness to solve BBDED.

• International Journal of Precision Engineering and Manufacturing
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.124-131
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• 2000

A shop floor can be considered as and importand level to develop a Computer Integrated Manufacturing system (CIMs). The shop foor is a dynamic environment where unexpected events contrinuously occur, and impose changes to planned activities. The shop floor should adopt an appropriate control system that is responsible for scheduling coordination and moving the manufacturing material and information flow. In this paper, the architecture of the hybrid control model identifies three levels; i.e., the shop floor controller (SFC), the cell controller(CC) and the equipment controller (EC). The methodology for developing these controller is employ an object-oriented approach for static models and IDEF0 for function models for dispatching a job. SFC and CC are coordinated by employing a multi-factors bidding and an adapted Analytic Hierarchy Process(AHP) prove applicability of the suggested method. Test experiment has been conducted by with the shopfloor, consisting of six manufacturing cells.

• Korean Management Science Review
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.187-201
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• 1999

In this paper, we propose a multi-layered architecture of workflow management systems based on CORBA (Common Object Request Broker Architecture). The system aims to support product development processes in distributed environment. Many companies have started to adopt workflow management systems to manage and support their business processes. However, there are many problems in direct application of those systems to product development environments. These mainly resulted from the dynamic features of product development processes. It is strongly required to support dynamic processes as well as static and procedural ones in an integrated and consistent manner. To meet these requirements, a basic workflow management system has been developed as the core component of the integrated architecture. This performs the basic functions of workflow management system. Second, a dynamic workflow management system based on a bidding mechanism has been developed to manage processes that cannot be easily defined or are likely to be modified, Finally, an SGML workflow management system, which is the third layer in the architecture, has been developed to manage documents processing workflows by integration SGML documents contents and process information into the structured SGML document.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.18 no.4
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• pp.658-669
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• 2016

The tremendous increase in mobile data traffic coupled with fierce competition in wireless industry brings about spectrum scarcity and bandwidth fragmentation. This inevitably results in asymmetric-valued long term evolution (LTE) spectrum allocation that stems from different timing for twice improvement in capacity between competing operators, given spectrum allocations today. This motivates us to study the economic effects of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum allocation. In this paper, we formulate the interactions between operators and users as a hierarchical dynamic game framework, where two spiteful operators simultaneously make spectrum acquisition decisions in the upper-level first-price sealed-bid auction game, and dynamic pricing decisions in the lower-level differential game, taking into account user subscription dynamics. Using backward induction, we derive the equilibrium of the entire game under mild conditions. Through analytical and numerical results, we verify our studies by comparing the latest result of LTE spectrum auction in South Korea, which serves as the benchmark of asymmetric-valued LTE spectrum auction designs.