• Hwankyungkyoyuk
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.38-50
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• 2000

We are evidently Home Economicus, egoistic rational utility maximiger, and all the capitalism economic situation make us adapt to such life, and recognize that it is rational to act like that. This can be demonstrated in Prisoner′s Dilemma(PD) which always select the non-cooperative choice for free rider in rational selection process of public goods. This paper notice the "what is problem\ulcorner"The problem is not in free rider itself but in free rider egoism. The practical behavior of free rider egoism can be explained by way of Prisoner′s Dilemma. In PD situation, the prisoner makes a rational choice, non-cooperative alternative, but he doesn′arrive at preto-optimality. It is dilemma. Why can′t he arrive \ulcorner Because he is isolated from other prisoner. So we call it prisoner′s dilemma. The PD situation can be compared with our real economic life, which, we think, have kept by rational choice of the public goods. We actually have made our life as an individual one although we organized communities of capitalism. Of course, we know each others as members of same society, but each individual being can′t secure the belief, which has composed basis of community. So, it is very similar and common between PD situation and our real economic life in the production of public goods. We conclude that this non-cooperative process of PD situation can be utilized as instrument of EE. So this non-cooperative process can show us the effectiveness of EE as follows. \circled1 Game situation life PD can be used as good instrument for explaining the rational selection dilemma(error) to Homo-Economicus, the rational agent, with the optimal and rational language. \circled2 We can show that the selection result is dilemma, not arrive pareto - optimality. \circled3 The dilemma can be resolved with accomplishing the good communal life based on the belief, not on the isolation.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartA
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• v.12A no.6 s.96
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• pp.493-498
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• 2005

P2P service is a method that can share various information through direct connection between computer of a person who have information and a Person who have information without server in the Internet and it is getting a lot of popularity by method for free ex change of file. P2P file sharing systems have become popular as a new paradigm for information exchange. Because all users who use service in P2P file sharing system can use shared files of several users freely by equal access privilege, it is happening the 'free rider' that only download shared file of other users without share own files. Although a user share a malicious file including virus, worm or file that have title differing with actuality contents, can use file sharing service without limitation. In this paper, we propose a method that restrict access of 'free rider' that only download using reputation information that indicate reliability of user. Also, we restrict usage ons hared file of other users about users who share harmful file.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems Conference
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• 2006.05a
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• pp.327-330
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• 2006

P2P 파일 공유 시스템은 중앙 서버를 거치지 않고 피어 컴퓨터들 간의 직접적인 자원 공유로 특징지워지는 P2P 기술의 대표적인 응용으로, 사용자는 인터넷을 통해 원하는 파일을 쉽게 검색, 획득, 유포할 수 있다. 그러나 악의적인 사용자가 허위 파일이나 바이러스를 유포할 수 있어, 허위파일로 인한 재전송이 빈번해짐으로써 네트워크 트래픽이 증가하고, 바이러스로 인한 피해가 발행할 수 있다. 또한, 자신의 파일에 대한 공유없이 다른 사용자들의 공유 파일만 다운로드하는 free riding 문제가 발생할 수 있다. 이 논문에서는 사용자의 파일 공유 트랜잭션 정보에 기반한 신뢰 정보를 이용하여 P2P 파일 공유 시스템의 문제점을 보완할 수 있는 시스템을 제안한다. 제안한 시스템에서 중앙 서버는 사용자의 파일 공유 트랜잭션 피드백을 이용하여 사용자 신뢰도를 구하여 허위파일이나 바이러스를 유포하는 악의적인 사용자나 free rider에 대해 시스템 사용을 제한한다. 사용자는 파일 다운로드 시에 중앙 서버로부터 사용자 메타데이터를 수신하여 자신의 선호도를 반영한 파일 신뢰도를 이용함으로써 허위파일이나 바이러스를 다운로드할 위험을 줄인다.

• Management Science and Financial Engineering
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.25-48
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• 2005

Firms often collaborate on building an infrastructure, which benefits all the firms in the industry, although in unequal magnitudes. Then a difficult and tricky issue is concerned with 'free riding.' Should there be only 'common, i.e., industry-wide' benefits in such collaboration, the literature indicated that the free rider problem is unavoidable, In this paper, however, we suggest that while collaborating, the firm also learns firm-specific knowledge, experience, and know-how, which can be directly utilized for its own internal improvement. That is, the collaboration between firms provides them with not only 'industry-wide,' but also 'firm-specific' benefits, Our analysis shows that if there indeed exist two types of benefits simultaneously, depending on the balance between the two, the free rider problem can be mitigated or even eliminated.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.19 no.7
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• pp.19-27
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• 2021

Purpose: Former research has argued that organizations in distribution channels face several issues to make a better team-based system. The purpose of the present research is to measure between employee's job performance and three major issues which disturb a solid team system. Research design, data and methodology: Scant past studies are available to guide for team practitioners which elements should be eliminated to improve team performance. To achieve this goal, the present authors obtained 267 US workers in distribution channels and conducted ANOVA test to measure the relationship between three team issues (Free-rider, Trust, and Communication) and job performance. Results: Our statistical findings clearly suggests that there was a statistically recognizable difference at the significance level of probability between the mean value of employees' job performance and three major issues, showing the high degree of job performance can be occurred by eliminating three major team issues. Conclusions: Therefore, the present research concludes that it is necessary that team-based management in the supply chain should focus on removing free-rider issues and also adopt open communication lines to overcome team-building challenges due to communication. Above all else, the ability to increase trust can be enhanced via task delegation and more team members' engagement.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.3 no.1
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• pp.31-46
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• 1978

Consider a time interval during which the demand for trips is fixed (e.g. the rush hour period). The traveller has a choice between various public modes, whose travel times and fares are fixed, and the automobile mode, for which travel time and cost depend on the volume of traffic flow on those roads, which are subject to congestion. We consider the equilibrium in terms of a representative travellerm, who choses for any trip the mode and route with the least combined money and time cost. When several (parallel) model or routes are chosen, then the combined cost of money and time must be equal among these. Our problem is first, to find the optimal flows of cars and of public mode carriers on the various links of their networks and second the optimal fares for trips by the variousmodes. The object is to minimize the total operating costs of the carriers and car plus the total time costs to travellers. The optimal fares are related to, but not identical with the dual variables of the underlying Nonlinear Program. They are equal to these dual variables only in the case, when congestion tolls on trips or on the use of specific roads are collected from automobile users. When such tolls are not collected, they must be passed on as subsidies to travellers using competing modes. The optimal fares of public modes are then reduced by the amounts of these subsidies. Note that subsidies are not a flat payment to public carriers, but are calculated on the basis of tickets sold. Fares and subsidies depend in general on tile period considered. They will be higher during periods of higher demand. When the assumption of fixed trip demand is relaxed, this tare system is no longer best, but only second best since too much traffic will, in general, be generated. The Free Rider Theorem states the following : Suppose road tolls can be charged, so that a best pricing system for public modes is posssible. Then there may exist free rides on some routes and modes, but never on a complete round trip.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.1009-1015
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• 2017

Since most of the urban railway operating agencies are established and operated by local governments, Public Service Obligation(PSO) is given priority. Therefore, free riding is carried out based on individual laws and regulations. In Korea, as the aging population goes, the increase in the number of elderly passengers on the urban railways is leading to a free rider as a big part of the fiscal deficit of the city railway operators. However, there have been no previous researches on free pass riding, and especially, it is necessary to study free ride on private investment projects. Several alternatives including a full charge case, free-ride for 70 years old over case, and separate fare charge (900won) are considered. Separate fare charge (900won) was selected as the optimal alternative since there is no fare income adjustment between operating agencies and no subsidy from government.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.36 no.6
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• pp.1069-1073
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• 2016

The current free-riding subway system for the elderly over 65 years old has been implemented since in 1980. As the aging population increases, the number of free riders also increases. It results eventually in the increase of subsidy from government. In addition, a transfer between subway and bus is not good enough since the free ride system is applied to only subway not to bus. The aim of this study is to analyze the transport card data to understand the impact of free-riding in the viewpoint of economic issues. It aims also to analyze the transfer patterns between public transport. At the end it compares Korea case with international cases and finds out some issues on free-ride systems. Finally, counter-measures aimed at improving the current free-rider system is suggested.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.141-147
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• 2013

Teams are used often in the workplace and in educational institute. Despite the advantages of students teams, the two most common problems are social loafing and free riding. I suggest that 'You are fired' method can be used successfully in students team project, especially in our cultural mood. The 'You are fired' method is very simple to execute into business classes using team assignments. Students can fire team members who will not do the necessary work or will not attend meetings with a simple two-step processes. To fire a student of the team must send an e-mail listing specific work that he or she is not doing and/ or meetings he or she is not attending. And a copy of the e-mail must be sent to the faculty member. If the free-rider fails to accomplish the required work, then a second e-mail is sent notifying the student that he or she is fired along with a copy to the faculty member. Data from 257 undergraduate students are analyzed for usefulness of 'You are fired' method. Students are highly supportive of all components parts of the 'You are fired' method. They strongly support the effectiveness of this method to prevent free riding on performing team projects.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.119-129
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• 2013

The degree to which people share knowledge has major impacts on the effectiveness of virtual community of practice (VCoP). As an extension to the previous study which investigated the effect of individual cooperative types (cooperator, reciprocator, and free rider) on knowledge sharing, it is investigated how much increase in the degree of cooperation will enhance knowledge sharing when there are more knowledge contributors and strong ties exist across the community. Simulation method is adopted to measure the effect of the cooperative type and tie strength on knowledge sharing. The results reveal that the tie strength positively affects knowledge contribution in VCoP and strongly tied VCoP generates equivalent level of knowledge contribution as that of weakly-tied VCoP with 5% more contributors.