• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.193-200
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• 2021

This study investigates the impact of managerial ability and managerial incentives on firm performance. In particular, it studies how managerial ability factor can exert significant influence on the profitability and the risk of firms. By doing this, the study can provide several policy implications about how managerial ability can influence firm decisions and its corresponding business policies. Data of the study was collected from the Annual Enterprises Survey (AES), which is conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) during the 2009-2013 period. After removing firms with insufficient financial information, our final dataset includes over 50,000 firms in Vietnam. The main result of the study shows that there is a significant and positive relationship between managerial ability and firm leverage. This finding indicates that managerial ability significantly plays an important role in making financial decisions. In addition, our study provides empirical evidence about the causal relationship between managerial compensation and firm risk-taking behavior. Specifically, we find that firm risks are significantly associated with compensation schemes including lower delta and higher vega. In other words, our study implies that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility can positively affect both delta and vega or managerial incentives schemes.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.2 no.2
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• pp.133-169
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• 1995

• Quality Improvement in Health Care
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.93-112
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• 2006

This study reviewed published studies on interventions used by hospitals, health insurance programs, or governments to improve use of medicines in foreign countries. Interventions to improve use of medicines are classified into two categories: 1) information strategies-dissemination of educational materials, group education, one-to-one educational outreach, drug utilization review, and feedback; 2) managerial strategies- formularies, prior authorization, and financial incentives. Dissemination of educational materials, which is a common intervention, was unsuccessful in changing physicians' prescribing behaviors. Problem-based small group education was more likely to change behaviors than didactic large group education. One-to-one educational outreach(academic detailing) was among the most effective strategies used to change prescribing behaviors. Prospective drug utilization review (DUR) program was more successful in improving use of medicines than retrospective DUR program. Feedback intervention has been reported to be ineffective to change behaviors. Formularies are frequently used to control medication use by most health insurance programs. Financial incentives provide physicians economic incentives according to appropriateness of prescribing. However, few published studies have assessed the efficacy of formularies or financial incentives. Prior authorization requires physicians to get authorization from health insurers before prescribing a certain group of drugs which is usually of high costs or risk. There is no magic bullet for quality use of medicines. Multifaceted interventions that help to predispose, enable, and reinforce desired behaviors are more likely to be successful.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.205-237
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• 2005

This paper analyzes a mechanism through which product market competition affects allocation of the managerial efforts. There are two types of firms, incumbents and entrants. Each incumbent firm delegates its control to a manager and cannot observe the manager's total effort. The managers of incumbent firms allocate their effort to two different activities: cost reduction (productive effort) and rent protection (unproductive effort). An increase in competition, measured by the number of incumbent firms, has two effects: an "output effect" which decreases the managerial incentive for productive effort, and an "effort substitution effect" that makes managers exert more productive effort and less unproductive effort. This paper identifies the conditions under which product market competition lowers the cost of providing incentives for productive effort and hence, to the conclusion that increased competition leads to increased efficiency.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.4
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• pp.394-402
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• 2019

This study examines the effect of managerial ownership on the value of firms' cash holdings. According to the management entrenchment hypothesis, managers have incentives to make decisions that can undermine shareholders' value for their own private interests. In this situation, as the managerial ownership increases, investors may evaluate that the cash held by the company may be utilized inefficiently and the value of the cash holdings may decrease. On the other hand, based on the incentive alignment hypothesis, the value of cash holdings may increase as investors perceive cash holdings to be effectively used to increase corporate value as managers' interests are in agreement with shareholders. Empirical results show that the value of cash holdings decreased as managerial ownership increased. This study finds a contribution in that it presents empirical evidence on whether the cash held by the company is differentially evaluated according to the level of the managerial ownership.

• Journal of the Korean Regional Science Association
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.155-187
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• 1999

The East Asian Region has experienced remarkable economic growth and transformation of interurban networking over the past three decades, and urban competiti veness for a networking hub in this region has become a critical issue confronting cities. Competitiveness of the Seoul capital region for a networking hub in Northeast Asia is outstripped by other competing cities in East Asia, notwithstanding its geo-politically and geo-economically advantageous location in this region. In this paper, we aim to appraise the Seoul capital region's competitiveness in terms of logistics distribution, financial function and logistics distribution, financial function and agglomeration of transnational corporations (especially of RHOs and other managerial functions), and to advance the networking strategies of the region for a Northeast Asia hyb. As a result of analysis, we suggest that the Seoul capital region be developed as a Northeast Asian center for regional headquarters or leading global corporations and financial services for being a strategic nodal point in Northeast Asia in the 21st century. A recent survey shows that where to locate an RHQ is influenced by various factors, such as potential market and manufacturing site in the city's hinterland, quality of life, such things as culture, health, safety, education, a well-educated, English-speaking population, reliable air transport, state-of-the-art communications, and an active policy to offer foreign companies generous incentives. The Seoul capital region, which is located at a strategic nodal point advantageous as a springboard for its Northeast Asian hinterland, cannot meet the other conditions mentioned above. To overcome these drawbacks in attracting transnational capital and to create competitiveness as a strategic hub of RHQs in Northeast Asia, it is urgent to initiate a structural reform of the Korean economy, politics, and overall society, to minimize the regulation of FDI, and to provide various incentives for foreign investment. Moreover, we propose the construction of an 'International Business Town' in the Seoul capital region, as a medium to intermediate these strategies and to shape them in a spatial scale. The projected 'International Business Town(IBT)' will be a 'free city' open to international business in which liberal economic activities are guaranteed by special legislation and administration, infrastructures needed for international and improved accessibility to the airport are furnished, and the preference of foreign high-income investors for cultural and living environment are satisfactorily met. IBT is conspicuously differentiated from a raft of other cities' incentives in that it combines deregulation and incentive programs to attract the investment of transnational capital, with a spatial program of offering an urban environment preferred by the high-income investors for cultural and living environment are satisfactorily met. IBT is conspicuously differentiated from a raft of other cities' incentives in that it combines deregulation and incentive programs to attract the investment of transnational capita, with a spatial program of offering an urban environment preferred by the high-income and managerial class. Furthermore, it can be an excellent way of overcoming the xenophobia that has spread among the Korean population by concentrating foreign businesses and their lifestyles in a specific foreign businesses and their lifestyles in a specific zone. In conclusion, 'International Business Town', in line with other legislative and administrative incentive programs, will function as a driving force to make the Seoul capital regional more competitive as a regional business hub in Northeast Asia.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.18 no.6
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• pp.157-166
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• 2020

Firms perform various actions that affect management performance measurement by managing the volatility and capital cost of reported income through income smoothing. This study attempted to analyze with a focus on the relationship between managerial competence and income smoothing. Therefore, this study attempted to analyze and focus on the relationship between managerial competency and profit softening using a measure of managerial competency presented in Demerjian et al. (2012). The results of the analysis are as follows. It was confirmed that there was a significant positive relationship between manager ability and income smoothing at the 1% level. When managers make income, it can be interpreted that managers with superior ability can make profits better by accurately predicting the future. It is the same result as the expectation of this study that managers with excellent ability have high incentives to soften profits by reducing profit volatility through more accurate forecasting. Therefore, this study empirically analyzed that managers with excellent abilities are more effective in implementing income smoothing strategies.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.93-118
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• 2022

Purpose - Export marketers may have incentives to attempt real earnings management to avoid low reported earnings. Therefore, we attempted to verify the relationship between cost stickiness and real earnings management in the context of export marketing. Design/methodology/approach - Data were collected from exporters that settle-accounts in December excluding financial businesses listed on the stock market from 2015 to 2019. Multiple regression analysis were employed to analyze the data. Findings - The results showed that there is a negative relationship between cost stickiness and real earnings management. In addition, the results showed that export marketers little attempt to offset the cost inefficiency caused by the increase in expense because of cost stickiness with opportunistic management activities through real earnings management. Rather, as the level of real earnings management appears lower, exporters showing cost stickiness are expected to report management performance based on actual marketing. Furthermore, exporters with a high level of managerial centrality or high managerial overconfidence little attempt to offset cost inefficiency caused by cost stickiness with real earnings management activities. Research implications or Originality - Our study is the first to investigate the quality of earnings information of exporters with cost stickiness. Based on the results, we suggested efficient marketing strategies for exporters.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.17 no.5
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• pp.8-17
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• 2017

Using 1855 observations from 5 years-371 firms panel data during 2010 to 2014 in Chinese stock exchanges, this study examines the impact of managers' ownership on R & D expenditures. The empirical study finds that when firms are state-owned, managers' ownership have negative relation with the level of R & D expenses as well as the likelihood of executing R & D investment, implying that managers are less likely to invest in high risky projects due to managerial ownership's entrenchment effects to pursue private benefits rather than alignment of interest effect as shareholders. The empirical study also finds that when firms are private-owned, managerial ownership are inverse U shaped related to the level of R & D expenses, implying that managers are less likely to invest in high risky projects due to increasing risk aversion resulting from concentration of private wealth at its high level while managers are more likely to invest in high risky projects due to increasing incentives as shareholders at its low level. The results support that the effects of managerial ownership on R & D expenses may be different according to the ownership type of Chinese listed firms.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.81-111
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• 2007

The agency relationship between managers and shareholders has the potential to influence decision-making in the firm which in turn potentially impacts on firm characteristics such as value and leverage. Using an agency framework, we examine the relation between ownership structure and capital structure during post-IMF period. We used the balanced panel data for 378 korean listed companies during the 1999-2005. The panel data sets consist of time-series observation on each of 378 cross-sectional units. The results indicate a non-linear U-shaped relation between the level of managerial share ownership and leverage with the relation reaching a minimum at 58.48 per cent of management share ownership. As managerial share ownership increase from a low level, managers have incentive to reduce the debt level for decreasing the financial risk, resulting in a lower lever of debt. However, when corporate managers hold a significant proportion of a firm's shares, managers have incentive to increase the debt level for leverage effects, resulting in a higher lever of debt.