• Journal of Electrical Engineering and Technology
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• v.12 no.6
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• pp.2196-2207
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• 2017

This paper presents a two-stage market auction model in a pool-based electricity market, which explicitly takes into account the system network security. The security network-constrained market auction model considers the use of corrective control to yield economically efficient actions in the post-contingency state, while ensuring a certain security level. Under this framework, the proposed model shows not only for quantifying the correlation between secure system operation and efficient market operation, but also for providing transparent information on the pricing system security for market participants. The two-stage market auction procedure is formulated using Benders decomposition (BD). In the first stage, the market participants bid in the market for maximizing their profit, and the independent system operator (ISO) clears the market based on social welfare maximization. System network constraints incorporating post-contingency control actions are described in the second stage of the market auction procedure. The market solutions, along with the BD, yield nodal spot prices (NSPs) and nodal congestion prices (NCPs) as byproducts of the proposed two-stage market auction model. Two benchmark systems are used to test and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.17 no.6
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• pp.566-576
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• 2016

It is known that the Real Estate Sales Market and Auction Market are closely interrelated with each other in a variety of respects and the media often mention the real estate auction market as a leading indicator of the real estate market. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationships between the housing market and auction market before and after macroeconomic fluctuations using VECM. The period from January 2002 to December 2008, which was before the financial crisis, was set as Model 1 and the period from January 2009 to November 2015, which was after the financial crisis, was set as Model 2. The results are as follows. First, the housing auction market is less sensitive to changes in the housing market than it is to fluctuations in the auction market. This means that changes in the auction market precede fluctuations in the housing market, which shows that the auction market as a trading market is activated. In this respect, public institutions need to realize the importance of the housing auction market and check trends in the housing contract price in the auction market. Also, investors need to ensure that they have expertise in the auction market.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.19-33
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• 2008

In the previous double auction research for the market optimization, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, and (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, the flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because traders can properly change utilities in each round. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a flexible synchronous double auction mechanism in which traders can express diverse utility functions for the price and quantity of the goods, and optimal total market utility is guaranteed. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a several simulation experiments.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• Communications for Statistical Applications and Methods
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• v.18 no.1
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• pp.23-34
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• 2011

Property auctions have become a new method for real estate investment because the property auction market grows in tandem with the growth of the real estate market. This study focused on the statistical model for predicting bid price rates which is the main index for participants in the real estate auction market. For estimating the monthly bid price rate, we proposed a new method to make up for the mean of regions and terms as well as to reduce the prediction error using a decision tree analysis. We also proposed a linear regression model to predict a bid price rate for individual auction property. We applied the proposed model to apartment auction property and tried to predict the bid price rate as well as categorize individual auction property into an auction grade.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.19 no.12
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• pp.535-545
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• 2019

If the real estate auction market indicators are relevant and meaningful, they can be meaningful information to the real estate market in connection with general real estate. The purpose of this study is to examine whether time-supply logic is applied in auction market by identifying time series correlations for the number of auctions, the auction rate, and the auction price rate, which are major indicators of real estate auction market. The real estate types were classified into three categories: residential real estate, land, and commercial real estate. The monthly time series of auctions in the metropolitan real estate were compiled for 96 months. Based on this data, the auction market model for each type was established and the mutual influences between the indicators were analyzed. As a result, the supply and demand indicators, the number of auctions and the auction rate, showed the nature of supply and demand according to the supply and demand logic of the market. However, the correlation was high for residential real estate and relatively low for commercial real estate. the auction rate has a long-term impact on price indicators, especially residential real estate, which is quantitatively explanatory and significant. The three auction-related indicators differ in degree, but there is a correlation, especially for residential real estate, which can be useful information for policy making.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.592-601
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• 2007

In the conventional double auction approaches, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, these assumptions are unrealisitc. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. We propose a double auction mechanism with resource allocation based on nonlinear utility functions, namely a flexible synchronous double auction system where each participant can express a diverse utility function on the price and quantity. In order to optimize the total market utility consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders, our study proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through several simulation experiments.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.13 no.10
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• pp.4432-4439
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• 2012

Previous studies on art pricing mostly focused on auction data because of the limitation of non-auction market data. This study investigated on both auction and non-auction markets to see the difference in art pricing mechanisms of both markets. Especially, while prior hedonic models included only quantatative variables to predict art prices, we added a qualitative measure, artistic value of a artwork, along with the original hedonic model to develop a more comprehensive model, and tested if his change may make more precise predictions. As a result, when we did not divide our data into auction and non-auction groups, we did not find any significant difference between the original hedonic model and the new model including artistic value. However, when we separated non-auction group from auction group, we found that predicted prices in the new model showed significantly closer values to the actual prices. This study contributes to our knowledge on art pricing by showing that artistic value may have important but differential impacts on different art dealing channels.

• ETRI Journal
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• v.32 no.4
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• pp.634-637
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• 2010

This letter presents a model for a dynamic collaboration (DC) platform among cloud providers (CPs) that prevents adverse business impacts, cloud vendor lock-in and violation of service level agreements with consumers, and also offers collaborative cloud services to consumers. We consider two major challenges. The first challenge is to find an appropriate market model in order to enable the DC platform. The second is to select suitable collaborative partners to provide services. We propose a novel combinatorial auction-based cloud market model that enables a DC platform among CPs. We also propose a new promising multi-objective optimization model to quantitatively evaluate the partners. Simulation experiments were conducted to verify both of the proposed models.

• The Journal of Information Systems
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.99-116
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• 2012

As a way to allocate lots of orders to many participants for vehicle allocation problem, this study has used an agent negotiation based reverse auction model. This agent negotiation provides coordination functions allowing all participants to make a profit, and accomplishing Pareto optimum solution from the viewpoint of a whole trucking cargo transportation network. In order to build a strategic cooperation relationship based on information sharing, this agent negotiation provides a coordination mechanism in which all the participants including consignors, brokerage firms, and car owners are able to attain their own profits, and also that ensure a competitive market. This study has tried to prove that the result of an agent-based negotiation is the Pareto optimal solution under the present market environment. We established a mathematical formulation for a comparison with the Integer Programming model, and analysing e-Marketplace, structure of shipping expenses and brokerage system in the trucking cargo transportation industry.