• Journal of Korea Trade
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• 제23권3호
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• pp.105-117
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• 2019

Purpose - Underdog positioning is often used to evoke a positive attitude when interacting with consumers. However, little research has been conducted on the market competition structure and innovation contexts in which underdog positioning produces the most impact. This research aims to investigate unexplored boundary conditions of underdog positioning and addresses two issues: market structures (oligopoly vs monopolistic competition) and perceived firm innovativeness (PFI). Design/methodology - Two one-way ANOVA designs (market structures: monopolistic competitions vs. oligopoly; perceived frim innovativeness: strong vs. weak) were randomly assigned to 297 graduate and undergraduate students (52 % female) majoring in business. Study 1 examined the effect of underdog positioning on consumer attitudes in the different market structures. Study 2 investigated the relationship between underdog effect and consumer attitudes through viewing conditions that varied in PFI. Findings - Drawing on the results of the study, the authors conclude that underdog positioning is effective to generate more positive consumer attitudes when employed in the market structure of monopolistic competition rather than oligopoly. Moreover, both underdog and top dog positioning are likely to generate more positive consumer attitudes when accompanied with strong PFI than weak PFI. Originality/value -This is the first study to distinguish between monopolistic competition and oligopoly market structures with underdog positioning as well as to demonstrate a positive effect of PFI, regardless of the type of brand narratives.

• 한국경영과학회:학술대회논문집
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• 한국경영과학회 1993년도 추계학술대회발표논문집; 서강대학교, 서울; 25 Sep. 1993
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• pp.194-211
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• 1993

This paper proposes an optimal incentive scheme for environmental pollution and output control in oligopoly markets under asymmetric information situation where the regulator has no information about each firm's technology on output productions and pollution abatements. We compare two interesting optimal incentive schemes (one is static model previously proposed and the other is dynamic model suggested in this paper), analyze features of these schemes, and carefully discuss its relevances to other schemes.

• 제어로봇시스템학회논문지
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• 제17권4호
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• pp.304-312
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• 2011

In an oligopolistic market, only a few firms account for most or all of total production, e.g., automobile, steel, and computer industries. For a dynamic oligopolistic market with two firms competing in quantities, we show that supervisory control theory of discrete event systems provides a novel approach to solve the dynamic oligopoly problem with the aim of maximizing the profits of both firms. Specifically, we show that the controllability, observability, and nonblocking property (which are the core concepts in supervisory control theory) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for two oligopolistic firms in disequilibrium to eventually reach equilibrium states of maximizing the profits of both firms.

• 대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A
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• 제55권5호
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• pp.214-219
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• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• 제5A권4호
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• pp.403-411
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• 2005

At present, the Cournot model is one of the most commonly used theories to analyze the gaming situation in an oligopoly type market. However, several problems exist in the successful application of this model to the electricity market. The representative one is obtaining the inverse demand curve able to be induced from the relationship between market price and demand response. In the Cournot model, each player offers their generation quantity to obtain maximum profit, which is accomplished by reducing their quantity compared with available total capacity. As stated above, to obtain the probable Cournot equilibrium to reflect the real market situation, we have to induce the correct demand function first of all. Usually the correlation between price and demand appears over the long-term through statistical data analysis (for example, regression analysis) or by investigating consumer utility functions of several consumer groups classified as residential, industrial, and commercial. However, the elasticity has a tendency to change continuously according to the total market demand size or the level of market price. Therefore it should be updated as the trading period passes by. In this paper we propose a method for inducing and updating this price elasticity of demand function for more realistic market equilibrium.

• ETRI Journal
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• 제44권6호
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• pp.945-954
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• 2022

The 5G mobile network is promising to handle the dynamic traffic demands of user equipment (UE). Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) equipped with wireless transceivers can act as flying base stations in heterogeneous networks to ensure the quality of service of UE. However, it is challenging to efficiently allocate limited bandwidth to UE due to dynamic traffic demands and low network coverage. In this study, a blockchain-enabled bandwidth allocation framework is proposed for secure bandwidth trading. Furthermore, the proposed framework is based on the Cournot oligopoly game theoretical model to provide the optimal solution; that is, bandwidth is allocated to different UE based on the available bandwidth at UAV-assisted-based stations (UBSs) with optimal profit. The Cournot oligopoly game is performed between UBSs and cellular base stations (CBSs). Utility functions for both UBSs and CBSs are introduced on the basis of the available bandwidth, total demand of CSBs, and cost of providing cellular services. The proposed framework prevents security attacks and maximizes the utility functions of UBSs and CBSs.

• 시큐리티연구
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• 제18호
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• pp.143-167
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• 2009

21세기에 들어서면서 선진국은 민간경비산업의 전문화를 위해 자격제도 및 교육훈련을 강화하고 있는 추세이다. 우리나라도 전문성 강화를 위한 교육훈련 시스템의 변화를 시도하고 있으나 합리적이지 못한 선발기준과 교육시스템 운영으로 과점시장이 형성되어 있는 실정이다. 오히려 '직업면허제도'를 통하여 자격증 소지자나 경비업체, 교육기관 및 위탁자의 지대추구행위가 증가하고 있는 상태이다. 경비산업 종사자의 질적 향상을 목적으로 자격증 발급 및 지정교육기관을 통한 기본교육이 실시되고 있으나 실질적인 효과는 적은편이다. 이에 본 연구는 민간경비원 선발 및 교육에 관한 문제점을 찾아본 결과, 이원화된 검정제도와 교육시스템의 구조적 문제 그리고 경비업체 운영자 및 최고관리자(임원)의 전문성과 운영능력에 대한 검증이 전혀 이루어지지 않고 있는 것을 알 수 있었다. 이러한 문제를 해결하기 위해서는 이원화 되어있는 경비지도사 자격증 제도와 경비원 교육 이수 제도를 '공인자격검증제도'로 단일화하며, 그 자격검정 대상은 관련 종사자 전체로 확대하여야 할 것이다. 또한 시장 지배적 지위를 이용한 과점현상으로 발생되는 후생손실을 최소화하고 자율경쟁이 가능하도록 지정교육기관의 수를 늘리고 경비원들의 교육 및 취업(업체) 선택에 자율권을 부여하여야 할 것이다. 앞서 제시한 문제점들을 최소화 하고 객관성을 유지하기 위해서는 전문가 집단부터 이해관계자, 시민단체 까지 모두 참여하는 거버넌스 네트워크 형태의 '민간보안산업위원회'와 같은 새로운 관리 감독 기관 설립이 필요하다.

• Asia Marketing Journal
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• 제16권1호
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• pp.35-69
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• 2014

The impact of competition on pricing has been studied in the context of counterfactual merger analyses where expected optimal prices in a hypothetical monopoly are compared with observed prices in an oligopolistic market. Such analyses would typically assume static decision making by consumers and firms and thus have been applied mostly to data obtained from consumer packed goods such as cereal and soft drinks. However such static modeling approach is not suitable when decision makers are forward looking. When it comes to the markets for durable products with indirect network effects, consumer purchase decisions and firm pricing decisions are inherently dynamic as they take into account future states when making purchase and pricing decisions. Researchers need to take into account the dynamic aspects of decision making both in the consumer side and in the supplier side for such markets. Firms in a two-sided market typically subsidize one side of the market to exploit the indirect network effect. Such pricing behaviors would be more prevalent in competitive markets where firms would try to win over the battle for standard. While such qualitative expectation on the relationship between pricing behaviors and competitive structures could be easily formed, little empirical studies have measured the extent to which the distinct pricing structure in two-sided markets depends on the competitive structure of the market. This paper develops an empirical model to measure the impact of competition on optimal pricing of durable products under indirect network effects. In order to measure the impact of exogenously determined competition among firms on pricing, we compare the equilibrium prices in the observed oligopoly market to those in a hypothetical monopoly market. In computing the equilibrium prices, we account for the forward looking behaviors of consumers and supplier. We first estimate a demand function that accounts for consumers' forward-looking behaviors and indirect network effects. And then, for the supply side, the pricing equation is obtained as an outcome of the Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pricing. In doing so, we utilize numerical dynamic programming techniques. We apply our model to a data set obtained from the U.S. video game console market. The video game console market is considered a prototypical case of two-sided markets in which the platform typically subsidizes one side of market to expand the installed base anticipating larger revenues in the other side of market resulting from the expanded installed base. The data consist of monthly observations of price, hardware unit sales and the number of compatible software titles for Sony PlayStation and Nintendo 64 from September 1996 to August 2002. Sony PlayStation was released to the market a year before Nintendo 64 was launched. We compute the expected equilibrium price path for Nintendo 64 and Playstation for both oligopoly and for monopoly. Our analysis reveals that the price level differs significantly between two competition structures. The merged monopoly is expected to set prices higher by 14.8% for Sony PlayStation and 21.8% for Nintendo 64 on average than the independent firms in an oligopoly would do. And such removal of competition would result in a reduction in consumer value by 43.1%. Higher prices are expected for the hypothetical monopoly because the merged firm does not need to engage in the battle for industry standard. This result is attributed to the distinct property of a two-sided market that competing firms tend to set low prices particularly at the initial period to attract consumers at the introductory stage and to reinforce their own networks and eventually finally to dominate the market.

• 한국경영과학회지
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• 제19권2호
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• pp.45-56
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• 1994

This paper the profit maximizing order quantity model to the symmetric oligopoly consisting of sellers of a homogeneous product who compete with each other for the same potential buyers. Buyers are classified by type, each selecting an optimal purchase quantity in response to the nonlinear quantity discount pricing schedule given by the sellers. Symmetric equilibrium and the economic quantities that sellers must determine are analysed in a Cournot framework, which explicitly depend on the number of sellers. Economic implications are obtianed from the optimality conditions based on themarket share paraments which are used to characterize the competitior's marketing strategy.

• 대한전기학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한전기학회 2005년도 제36회 하계학술대회 논문집 A
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• pp.778-780
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• 2005

Electric power industry throughout the world is restructured. The electric power industry has a characteristics of an oligopoly with an imperfect competition. In Korea rules, all information is not available. So the strategy under such incomplete information market differ firm those under complete information system in game theory. This paper presents a analysis technique if Korea ma rket model with incomplete information.