• The Korean Journal of Franchise Management
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.35-44
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• 2021

Purpose: This study examines the opportunism moderating effect by the startup experience in the relationship between franchisor and franchisees. In the case of a franchise system that has a continuous relational exchange transaction, relationship management is a very important activity because the relationship management between franchisor and franchisees improves the quality of the relationship. Nevertheless, there is insufficient of research on opportunism, which is a negative factor in managing the relationship between franchisor and franchisees in continuous relationship. Research design, data and methodology: This study, we explore the cause of opportunism based on transaction cost theory through prior research and establish a research model based by goal incongruity, uncertainty, information asymmetry, transaction specific assets, the relevance to determinant of opportunism and the startup experienced which is a moderating variable. To verify several hypotheses, the data were collected from 300 out of 1,760 domestic franchisees and analyzed using multiple regression analysis with SPSS program. Results: The findings are as follows. Goal incongruity did not affect opportunism. Opportunism increased as uncertainty increased, and as information asymmetry increased, opportunism increased. An opportunism decreased as transaction specific assets increased. Moreover, the findings show that startup experience only plays a moderating role in the relationship between information asymmetry and opportunism. Therefore, 4 out of 8 hypotheses were supported. Conclusions: The findings show that uncertainty, information asymmetry, and transaction specific assets are the determinants of opportunism. In addition, the results of the analysis of the moderating role of startup experience show that the less entrepreneurial experience, the greater the influence of information asymmetry on opportunism. Our findings mean that maintaining a successful relationship between franchisors and franchisees is possible when franchisors provide knowledge sharing, goal sharing, environmental sharing, and management information sharing to franchisees. In addition, the findings of this study shows that the contract content and management should be changed according to the entrepreneurial experience. In other words, the franchisors must share and integrate the accumulated franchisees' and franchisors' experience with the franchisees to create a synergy that can lead to successful bilateral relationship maintenance, which in turn reduces opportunism.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.2
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• pp.165-184
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• 2020

In this study, the factors affecting opportunism in the relationship between suppliers and key accounts were analyzed from the viewpoint of transaction cost theory, market power theory, and relationship marketing theory. As a result of the hypothesis test, Hypothesis 1 stating that demand volatility will have a positive effect on opportunism and Hypothesis 2 that transaction-specific investment will have a positive effect on opportunism were also supported. In addition, Hypothesis 3 stating that channel power will have a positive effect on opportunism was also supported. Lastly, Hypothesis 4 stating that relational commitment will have a negative effect on opportunism was not supported, along with Hypothesis 5 stating that transaction satisfaction will have a negative effect on opportunism. The theoretical and practical implications of this study are as follows. This study has identified the antecedents of opportunism by comprehensively applying the transaction cost theory, market power theory, and relationship marketing theory. In addition, this study can identify what a company should manage specifically to lower opportunism by identifying the antecedents of opportunism. The limitations of this study and the directions for future studies are as follows. First, not all of the antecedents of opportunism of key accounts have been extensively investigated from the viewpoint of the transaction cost theory, market power theory, and relationship marketing theory. In the future, it is necessary to identify additional factors. Second, the study was conducted only in the supplier's viewpoint. In future studies, it is expected that more accurate research results can be obtained by simultaneously examining not only the supplier's point of view but also the buyer's point of view.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.8 no.5
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• pp.53-63
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• 2017

Purpose - The main feature of this study is understanding of the vendor's opportunism on the collaboration context between buyer and vendor from the buyer's viewpoint with resource dependence theory. A number of studies on opportunism have focused on opportunistic definitions and its theoretical studies. Other researches emphasize the importance of governance in ways that reduce opportunism. We think that this research could be filled with the lack of previous studies. Research design, data, and methodology - In order to accomplish research purpose, four hypotheses have been established based on the framework of resource dependence theory and previous studies. And we have used 599 survey data jointly collected by Korea Productivity Center and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy. To verify these hypothesis, we have conducted multiple regression analysis with SPSS 23.0. Results - The vendor 's opportunism decreases as mutual trust with buyer becomes higher. However, as the degree of dependence of buyers on vendor resources increases, vendor's opportunism increases. And monitoring vendor's capacity has a moderating effect with buyer resource dependency to vendor's opportunism. Conclusions - This study suggest there are two options to decrease vendor's opportunism. Increasing mutual trust or decrease dependence on vendor's resources. Also, monitoring suppler's capacity could be effective when vendor's resource dependence is high.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.30 no.4
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• pp.139-161
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• 2020

In this study, the factors affecting opportunism that causes conflict in the franchise system between franchisor and franchisee were analyzed based on the transaction cost theory and power-dependency theory. Hypothesis 1 states that franchisor support will negatively affect opportunism. Hypothesis 2 expresses that franchisee transaction-specific investment on the relationship with the franchisor will positively affect opportunism. Hypothesis 3 asserts that franchisee dependency on the franchisor will positively affect opportunism. All of these were supported. However, Hypothesis 4, maintaining that franchisee competitive intensity will positively affect opportunism, was not supported. The theoretical and practical implications of this study are as follows. This study has identified the antecedents of franchisor opportunism that causes conflict in the franchise system by comprehensively applying the transaction cost theory and power-dependency theory. This study can also identify what a company should manage specifically to lower opportunism by identifying the antecedents of franchisor opportunism in the franchise system. The limitations of this study and the directions for future studies are as follows. First, not all of the antecedents of franchisor opportunism in the franchise system have been extensively investigated from the transaction cost theory's and power-dependency theory's viewpoint. In the future, it is necessary to identify additional factors. Second, the study was conducted only from the franchisee's perspective. In future studies, more accurate research results can be obtained by simultaneously examining the franchisee's point of view and the franchisor's point of view.

• Knowledge Management Research
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• v.13 no.3
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• pp.37-54
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• 2012

The purpose of this study is to investigate determinants of partner opportunism in Korean discount store distribution channels. In addition, this study also try to examine moderating role of relational learning in the relationship. This study deals with transaction specific investment asymmetry, mutual hostages, payoff inequity, cultural diversity, and goal incompatibilities as determinants of partner opportunism. For empirical testing, 293 respondents of suppliers of discount store in Korea were surveyed and the analysis utilizing partial least square model indicated that TSI asymmetry, payoff inequity, and goal incompatibilities had positive effects on partner opportunism. On the other hand, mutual hostages had negative effect on partner opportunism. In addition, relational learning had moderating effect on the relationship between TSI asymmetry, mutual hostages, and payoff inequity and partner opportunism.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.39-47
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• 2014

Purpose - The ultimate goal of a franchise system comes from its win-win strategy. Agency theory uses goal incongruity to examine complex contracting problems between buyers and suppliers. Goal incongruity within a contractual relationship can be defined as the agent's desire not to cooperate. It is the degree to which the contractual terms do not satisfy the agent's goals. The greater the goal incongruity between the agent and the contract, the more likely it is that the agent will meet the terms of the contract. Thus, goal incongruity between buyers and suppliers has close relationships with both behavioral and financial performance. This study tries to examine these relationships in the franchise context using a model including related variables, such as regulatory foci, financial performance, and opportunism, to explain the reasons that not all franchisees perform their best. In particular, the study examines the effects of goal incongruity on regulatory focus, and the effects of regulatory focus on performance and opportunism. In short, the objective is to determine goal incongruity's effect on regulatory foci, and the effect of regulatory focus on performance and opportunism. Research design, data, and methodology - This study used data collected from the franchisee managers of 104 franchisors in South Korea. The franchisors include more than 10 franchisees, the majority of whom have been in business for more than five years. The study also surveyed 104 franchisees, matched with their franchisors for the sake of a dyadic approach. The study used regression analysis to test the hypotheses. Results - H1 and H2 predicted that goal incongruity would decrease promotion focus and increase prevention focus. Supporting H1, the result indicates goal incongruity had a positive effect on promotion focus. However, H2 was not supported. Goal incongruity had no significant effect on prevention focus (β = -.375, t = -4.331 and β = -.145, t = -1.950, respectively). H3 and H4 predicted that promotion focus would increase financial performance and decrease opportunism. Supporting these hypotheses, the results indicate that promotion focus had a positive effect on financial performance and a negative effect on opportunism (β = .771, t = 7.899 and β = -.765, t = -6.778, respectively). H5 and H6 predicted that prevention focus would decrease financial performance and increase opportunism. However, the results do not support these hypotheses. The results indicate that prevention focus had no effects on opportunism or financial performance (β = -.130, t = -1.070 and β = .090, t = .641, respectively). Overall, the evidence generally supported the hypotheses. Conclusion - Goal incongruity between a franchisor and a franchisee increases the franchisee's financial performance and opportunism, and the relationship is mediated by promotion focus. Interestingly, however, prevention focus has no mediating effect between goal incongruity and performance. Even though no significant relation exists between goal incongruity and prevention focus, the results have two implications. First, decreasing goal incongruity can improve financial performance and suppress franchisee opportunism. Second, the relationship between goal incongruity and performance affects promotion-focused franchisees.

• Journal of Information Technology and Architecture
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.365-376
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• 2012

We examine the value of information sharing in the context of supplier-buyer relationships after controlling for trading partners' opportunism. Given that trading partners' opportunism is not randomly chosen, we explicitly incorporate their self-selection process into our estimation procedure by employing Heckman's self-selection model. According to our analysis, firms that have built safeguards via mutual trust, commitments and information sharing experience less opportunistic risk in supplier-buyer relationships. Our findings also suggest that information sharing has a positive impact on firm performance after controlling for opportunism. Further, firms that are less exposed to trading partners' opportunistic risk have achieved a higher performance than others that are more exposed. Importantly, higher performance for those firms with less opportunistic risk is driven by safeguards in supplier-buyer relationships as well as information sharing. Our findings can be applied for systems analysts to design information systems of supplier-buyer transactions.

• The Journal of Information Technology
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.113-131
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• 2002

The purpose of this study is to investigate the influences of transaction information and reputation about alliance partner on opportunism and alliance performance. In this study, a structural model and several hypotheses were developed regarding the relationships between transaction term, transaction records, reputation of alliance partner, opportunism, and alliance performance. Based on the collected data, the structural model was analyzed with Lisrel 8.12. The results can be summarized as follows. First, the longer the transaction term, the lower the opportunism and the higher the perceived alliance performances. Second, the better the transaction records, the lower the opportunism and the higher the perceived alliance performances. Third, the reputation of alliance partner company has not any influence on the opportunism and the perceived alliance performances. Finally, the lower the opportunism of alliance partner, the higher the perceived alliance performances. At the end of the paper, managerial implications and future research directions are discussed.

• Journal of Information Technology Services
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.167-193
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• 2008

Clients' outsourcing strategies noted in the IT outsourcing literature generate varying levels of client dependence on vendors. This study investigates clients' efforts to mitigate such dependence by utilizing multiple vendors. We use the theoretical lenses of resource dependency and opportunism to study this phenomenon. Specifically. we consider degree of outsourcing, duration of contract, and externalization of control as strategic choices that engender vulnerabilities that clients seek to offset by using multiple vendors. This study then considers the basis of the outsourcing relationships, clients' satisfaction with the relationships. and clients' IT workforce size as conditions that induce clients' concerns about vendor opportunism. This study argues that these conditions can exacerbate clients' experience of vulnerability. further encouraging clients' use of multiple vendors. The research model developed is tested in a survey of firms in South Korea. Results suggest a strong impact of outsourcing strategic choices on the number of vendors used by clients. The anticipated moderating effects of opportunism were only weakly supported by the data though. Theoretical and practical implications of the results are considered and suggestions for future research are offered.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.45 no.5
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• pp.91-116
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• 2020

The construction industry can be described as one of the most volatile industry depending on the situation. As such, a contractor, who is usually positioned to take all kinds of risk, may frequently require to form a strategic partnership for better execution of a project. In this study, we are going to review act or behavior that may happen among such partnership. For such review, a survey targeted at domestic construction companies has been conducted on their thoughts as regards opportunism, risk perception, and the contractual governance between partners. The analysis result of structural equation and regression has indicated that there exists a positive effect on the opportunistic behavior from the risk perception, a moderating effect on contractual governance between the performance risk and opportunism, whereas no such moderating effect on the same between relational risk and the opportunism. The output of this study may assist various domestic individuals who wish to participate large scaled overseas projects.