• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.411-422
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• 2021

The autonomous driving system mounted on the unmanned vehicle recognizes the external environment through several sensors and derives the optimum control value through it. Recently, studies on physical level attacks that maliciously manipulate sensor data by performing signal-injection attacks have been published. signal-injection attacks are performed at the physical level and are difficult to detect at the software level because the sensor measures erroneous data by applying physical manipulations to the surrounding environment. In order to detect a signal-injection attack, it is necessary to verify the dependability of the data measured by the sensor. As so far, various methods have been proposed to attempt physical level attacks against sensors mounted on autonomous driving systems. However, it is still insufficient that methods for defending and detecting the physical level attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate signal-injection attacks targeting MEMS sensors that are widely used in unmanned vehicles, and propose a method to detect the attack. We present a signal-injection detection model to analyze the accuracy of the proposed method, and verify its effectiveness in a laboratory environment.