• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.133-164
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• 2012

Paul Churchland(1989) suggests the theory of representation from the results of cognitive biology and connectionist AI studies. According to the theory, our representations of the diverse phenomena in the world can be represented as the positions of phase state spaces with the actions of the neurons or of the assembly of neurons. He insists connectionist AI neural networks can have the semantical category systems to recognize the world. But Fodor and Lepore(1996) don't look the perspective bright. From their points of view, the Churchland's theory of representation stands on the base of Quine's holism, and the network semantics cannot explain how the criteria of semantical content similarity could be possible, and so cannot the theory. This thesis aims to excavate which one is the better between the perspective of the theory and the one of Fodor and Lepore's. From my understandings of state space theory of representation, artificial nets can coordinates the criteria of contents similarity by the learning algorithm. On the basis of these, I can see that Fodor and Lepore's points cannot penetrate the Churchlands' theory. From the view point of the theory, we can see how the future's artificial systems can have the conceptual systems recognizing the world. Therefore we can have the perspectives what cognitive scientists have to focus on.

• Korean Journal of Cognitive Science
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.65-70
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• 2003

In this article, I show that the cognitive suicide argument does not succeed in refuting eliminativism. The argument misses an important aspect of eliminativism. In Sec. 3, the last section, I will suggest the aspect of eliminativism and, on the basis of it, will develop my criticism against eliminativism.

• Journal of The Korean Association For Science Education
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• v.33 no.1
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• pp.144-160
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• 2013

This study is a proposal, which is the trial to explicate, in neurology, on how critical thinking as a creative method of sciences functions. The creative methods of sciences, even at present, are mostly the hypothetical insistences concerning with the logical processes of researches suggested from the philosophers of science; Popper, Kuhn, Hempel, or Lakatos. These insistences do excavate what process or approach can be scoped out of scientists' creativity. I call the tendency or approach of the researches, "Process Approach of Creativity (PAC)". From my view point, any PAC trial does not concern with how creative theories can actually be invented. On the other hand, this study is focused on the philosophical thinking abilities of scientists who invented new great theories. They mostly had some experiences to study philosophy while studying their science fields, thus had critical thinking abilities on their studies. From my point of view, critical thinking in philosophy raised questions as to their fundamental and basic (old) concepts and principles, and thus gave them new creative theories. I will try to explain this from the point of neurophilosophy. From the perspectives coming from "the state space theory of representation" of Paul & Patricia Churchland, the pioneers of neurophilosphy, the "creative theories" are the networks of topographic maps giving new comprehensive explanations and predictions. From these perspectives, I presuppose that the attitude of critical questioning revises the old networks of maps with back-propagation or feedback, and thus, is the generative power of searching new networks of maps. From the presupposition, I can say, it is important that scientists reflect on the basic premises in their academic branches for issuing out extraordinary creativity. The critical attitude of philosophy can make scientists construct the maps of new conceptual scheme by shaking the maps of the old basic premises. From this context, I am able to propose "Critical Thinking Approach of Creativity (CTAC)".