• Title/Summary/Keyword: Profit Sharing

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The Effects of Profit-Sharing on Employer-Provided Training: Evidence from an Individual Panel Survey (성과배분의 교육훈련 효과: 개인 패널자료를 이용한 분석)

  • Lee, Injae;Kim, Dong-Bae
    • Journal of Labour Economics
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    • v.43 no.1
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    • pp.35-57
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    • 2020
  • Using the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study(KLIPS), this study analyzes the effects of profit sharing on employer-provided training. The estimation results of the fixed effect model that controls for endogeneity show that the workers of profit-sharing firms have a 6.7%-6.8%p higher probability of receiving employer-provided training than the workers of firms without profit sharing. They also show that the workers of profit-sharing firms have a 3.3%p higher likelihood of having employer-provided OJT than their counterparts. The impacts of profit-sharing on employer-provided training appear consistently regardless of the estimation models and in the subsamples. These findings support the hypothesis that profit-sharing promotes employer-provided training.

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Optional Tariffs for Channel Coordination

  • Song, Jae-Do
    • Asia Marketing Journal
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    • v.14 no.3
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    • pp.49-68
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    • 2012
  • When a channel is vertically separated, there can be inefficiencies, double marginalization. Channel coordination to amend this inefficiency has been an important issue in marketing and economics. Channel coordination deals with maximization of joint profit and achieving proper profit sharing among participants. In this paper, a manufacturer and heterogeneous multiple retailers with exclusive territory are assumed, and channel coordination with two-part tariff is considered. When multiple heterogeneous retailers are assumed, profit sharing can be an issue even though the tariffs based on marginal cost can maximize joint profit. In case of multiple heterogeneous retailers, the manufacturer earns the same profit (fixed fee) from each retailer. This means that a large retailer occupies all the gaps of channel profit between small and large markets. Then, the manufacturer, which generally plays the role of Stackelberg leader, will consider increasing fixed price or marginal price to earn more profit from large retailer. Those reactions can sacrifice maximization of joint profit by making small retailer withdraw or by changing the sales quantities. In this paper, to maximize joint profit and achieve proper profit sharing, two kinds of optional tariffs are considered. The first is an optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost and the second is an optional modified two-part tariff in which marginal prices are higher than the manufacturer's marginal cost. In both types of optional tariffs, maximization of joint profit in each market can be achieved. Moreover, optional tariffs alleviate the problem of profit sharing. Optional tariffs can provide a manufacturer more profit from a large retailer when profit from a small retailer is given. However, the analysis shows that the maximum share of manufacturer from a large retailer is restricted by the condition for self-selection. In case of optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost, if the gap between demands is large, the maximum share of the manufacturer is sufficient to achieve proper profit sharing. If the gap between demands is not sufficiently large, the manufacturer cannot earn sufficient share from increased profit. An optional modified two-part tariff where marginal price is more than marginal cost of manufacturer is considered because of this scenario. The marginal price above the marginal cost may additionally control the distribution of the increased profit. However, the analysis shows that a manufacturer's maximum profit from a large retailer with given profit from a small retailer is the same as or lower than the maximum profit when optional two-part tariffs based on marginal cost are applied. Therefore, it can be concluded that the optional modified tariffs do not have additional contribution to profit sharing relative to the tariffs based on marginal cost. Although this paper does not cover all kinds of optional tariffs that are different from tariffs based on marginal cost, it shows the advantage of optional tariffs based on marginal cost and has important theoretical implications. The result of this paper also gives guide for channel coordination. Optional two-part tariff based on marginal cost can increase efficiency in channel coordination.

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Strategic Alliance and Profit Sharing in the Internet Market with Network Effects (인터넷기업 간 전략적 제휴와 이윤배분: 네트워크 효과를 중심으로)

  • Oh, Jeong-Hun
    • Asia pacific journal of information systems
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    • v.16 no.3
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    • pp.229-241
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    • 2006
  • In this paper, we develop three stage non-cooperative game models to analyze the alliance strategies of companies in internet markets where network effects are present. Regardless of its market share, an internet company's strategic alliance appears to be a superior strategy. The analysis also identifies profit sharing structures in the internet market where a smaller and unknown company is enforced to split its own profits with a larger and well-known company. It is shown that the amount of profit sharing grows as the size of network effects becomes larger.

A Study on Calculating the Fee Range of Broadcasting Contents : Focus on IPTV

  • Shin, Minsoo;Kil, Jinho;Bae, Seonghoon
    • Journal of Information Technology Applications and Management
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    • v.22 no.2
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    • pp.43-70
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    • 2015
  • Concerns have been growing about whether domestic internet protocol television (IPTV) can establish a solid foothold in the pay TV market, largely because of the lack of IPTV-only content and service differentiation. It has been difficult for IPTV providers to attract valuable PPs (program providers) to strengthen their positions, and IPTV providers have invested much money into procuring content. To survive this difficult situation, IPTV providers need to reappraise their profit sharing methods and content distribution structure to facilitate the expansion of their subscriber base. This can be done by attracting valuable PPs to IPTV providers and securing extra revenue by distributing more content for their PP partners. The IPTV industry has a different structure and value chain from the digital cable industry. Moreover, profit sharing schemes among participants in the IPTV industry are complicated. Thus it is essential to analyze the criteria for profit sharing, the selection of attributes in profit sharing, and their cause-effect relationship in developing fair pricing for broadcast content in the IPTV industry. This study introduces the attributes that need to be considered for the pricing of content and profit sharing among IPTV providers and PPs. In addition, this study uses system dynamics to analyze the relationship among those attributes along with additional associated factors for the pricing of content.

The Foundation of a Fair Mudarabah Profit Sharing Ratio: A Case Study of Islamic Banks in Indonesia

  • RYANDONO, Muhamad Nafik Hadi;KUSUMA, Kumara Adji;PRASETYO, Ari
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.8 no.4
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    • pp.329-337
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    • 2021
  • This research aims to expose the Islamic perspective on the concept of justice on the Mudarabah contract's profit-sharing ratio. In certain verses in Al-Qur'an, Islamic values in Muamalah, the rules dictated by the Qur'an and its practices, and explanations rendered (more commonly known as Sunnah) by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and Sahabah (the companions of the Prophet Muhammad), and Fiqh Axiom (rules) in Muamalah (Islamic jurisprudence), are used as the instruments of sharia to achieve the study objective. Islamic monetary establishments in Indonesia are still not in full consistency with the Shariah principles, significantly as far as satisfying equity and justice by Islamic banks in mudarabah contract (with clients). The ignominy is the nisbah (ratio) between the capital proprietor and the capital director. There are models or propositions to decide the benefit (profit)-sharing proportion. Nevertheless, none of them explains or specifies the possibility of equity/justice in the profit-sharing ratio. This research utilizes an explorative and subjective methodology that contributes to the philosophical premise of deciding the profit-sharing fairness. The elements of a just ratio for the Mudharabah contract are mutual willingness, the existence of negotiation, and the level of advantages and risks of the labor.

A Study on Renewable Energy Profit-Sharing Method for Improving Residential Conditions in Rural Area - Focused on the Smart Green Village in Cheorwon-gun, Gangwon-do Province - (농촌지역 정주여건 향상을 위한 재생에너지 이익공유 방식에 관한 연구 - 강원도 철원군 스마트그린빌리지를 중심으로 -)

  • Yoo, Byung-Chun;Lee, Dong-Hee;Kim, Jung-Uk
    • Journal of the Korean Institute of Rural Architecture
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    • v.23 no.1
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    • pp.9-18
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    • 2021
  • In this study, surveys and data collection on new profit-sharing measures were carried out in order to improve the residential environment and residents' participation in 65 MW large-scale solar power complex located at Munhye 5-ri, Galmal-eup, Cheorwon-gun, Gangwon-do province. From May to September 2018, the presentation and meetings for residents were held and a survey for 67 households were carried out in order to collect profit-sharing data which is sharing profits from solar power project improving residential environment. The results of the survey shows that it needs to improve some obstacles of residential environment in rural areas, such as improvement of living infrastructure at village level, improvement of monotonous leisure activities from the residents' point of view, improvement of economic income sources depending on farm income and Basic Old-age Pensions, inconvenience factors in the unsuitable residential environment due to aging. Based on these findings, this paper suggests that Profit-Sharing solar power complex project has possibilities to improve living environment in rural areas by sharing profits from power generation and residents participating in the project with consensus for need of renewable energy.

Optimal Revenue Sharing in a Supply Chain of Rental Industries (대여산업 공급사슬의 최적 수입공유모형)

  • Park, Hae-Churl;Cho, Jae-Eun
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.34 no.3
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    • pp.55-69
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    • 2009
  • It is often to apply revenue sharing models in rental industries which consist of a retailer and a wholesaler. This research analyzed the influences to profit of the supply chain if we adopt the revenue sharing model when the demand is uncertain and price sensitive. We found the conditions of the revenue sharing model to maximize the profit of the supply chain, and identified incentive compatible conditions for revenue sharing. It is proved that vertical integration guarantees maximization of profit for the supply chain. Also we found that it is possible to derive Incentive compatible schemes by controlling ranges of revenue sharing ratios.

Financing Risk in Indonesian Islamic Rural Banks: Do Financing Products Matter?

  • WIDARJONO, Agus;ANTO, M.B. Hendrie;FAKHRUNNAS, Faaza
    • The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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    • v.7 no.9
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    • pp.305-314
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    • 2020
  • This paper investigates the impact of profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts on non-performing financing of Islamic rural banks as Islamic small banks focus on small and medium enterprises at province level across country. Our study employs panel data, consisting of 142 Islamic rural banks and using quarterly data from 2013Q1 to 2018Q4, and splits them based on the bank's size and geographical area. Both static and dynamic panel regressions are then applied. The results obviously indicate that a high proportion of profit and loss sharing contracts leads to high financing risk. The large Islamic banks encounter a higher non-performing financing stemming from profit and loss contracts compared to small Islamic banks. Profit and loss contracts also produce higher financing risk for Islamic banks outside Java, as those areas are less developed areas than Java itself. A more efficient Islamic bank is less financing risk. Income diversification lessens the impaired financing and, more particularly, large Islamic banks and Islamic banks located in Java much benefit by diversifying income and financing to lower financing risk. Our study suggests that Islamic rural banks may consider the optimal level of profit and loss sharing contracts to minimize financing risk.

Profit Sharing Model in Product-Service System (제품-서비스 통합시스템(Product-Service System)에서의 수익분배모형)

  • Kim, Jin-Min;Park, Jin-Soo;Park, Kwang-Tae;Kim, Kwang-Jae;Hong, Yoo-Suk
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.36 no.4
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    • pp.81-89
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    • 2011
  • In recent business environments, the competition among firms is shifting from the competition based on individual firm only to the competition based on alliance of firms. This is because it is not easy for a firm to perform all functions which consumers want. Thus, it is more effective to combine core competencies of different firms based on a strategic partnership. It is essential to establish a strategic partnership and this strategic partnership is a key success factor in PSS(Product-Service System) which combines products and services. In this paper, we propose a profit sharing model for PSS partnership. We first analyze customer's utility using Cobb-Douglas utility function and then propose the PSS profit sharing ratio considering functionalities and cost structures based on the combination ratio of PSS. This paper helps firms to develop partnership strategies for PSS.

Risk Sharing in a Supply Chain (공급사슬에서의 위험공유)

  • Ahn, Seongje
    • Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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    • v.28 no.4
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    • pp.115-129
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    • 2003
  • This paper suggests that the profit sharing contract can be Pareto optimal for both supplier and the purchaser. It is shown that Pareto optimal risk sharing contract can be obtained even though the decisions are made in a decentralized manner. The effect of risk attitude of the members of the supply chain is discussed. We examined various aspects of the risk sharing contract such as risk altitude, bargaining power, and cost of information system. The different risk attitude changes the optimal parameters and decision variables. Especially, we proved that, when both the supplier and the purchaser are risk averse, the purchaser orders less quantity than when the one is risk neutral and the other is risk averse. If the fixed cost for the information system is big enough to satisfy a certain condition, it is Pareto optimal not to share the profit and the purchaser takes all the risk even though he is risk averse.