• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.145-153
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• 2014

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through the online and offline distribution channels. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy heavily depends on the size of the online distribution channel's loyal customers and the difference between the retail prices of the online and the offline distribution channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the online distribution channel has incentive to downsize its loyal customers and its retail price for a better bargaining outcome.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.31-39
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• 2015

In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a distributor who sells vertically differentiated, i.e. high and low brand products. We derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games among the distributor, the high brand product manufacturer and the low brand product manufacturer. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy for the distributor heavily depends on the relative quality and price level of the low brand product comparing to those of the high brand product. It is also shown that, for more bargaining profit, the distributor has strong motivation to prefer a low brand product which has lower quality level per unit price.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.137-146
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• 2013

This paper outlines the findings of a model of plea bargaining with multiple defendants, in which a prosecutor makes plea offer sequentially. It is shown that plea discount can be minimized with sequential offers and that not all of defendants shall be induced to plead guilty. By allowing sequential offer, a prosecutor has more power in the plea bargaining, which may increase social welfare by giving appropriate level of punishment to the guilty.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.209-222
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• 1997

In this paper, we study a bargaining order problem where one buyer sequentially bargains with two sellers whose reservation prices are unknown to the buyer but correlated. Our main question is who the buyer should bargain first with to maximize his expected payoff. This type of problem is widely applicable to business and political situations where one party negotiates with multiple parties sequentially. One of the most important element in a sequential bargaining is "linkage effect" which exists when the aggreement of the previous bargaining affects the outcome of the following bargaining. To examine "linkage effect", we assume that the sellers'objects are similar so that the sellers' reservation prices are correlated. In addition, to consider incomplete information aspect regarding reservation prices, it is assumed that the sellers' reservation prices are unknown to the buyer. That is, we deal with one sided incomplete information case. In our model, there are two stages in each of which the buyer meets one seller. Since we are concerned with the bargaining order, we consider two different bargaining orders. Using game theory, we find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and compute the buyer's expected payoff for each bargaining order. Finally we identify the advantageous bargaining order for the buyer by comparing the expected payoffs obtained under two different bargaining orders. Our results are as follows: the advantageous bargaining order depends on the prior probability of the seller type. However, in general, the buyer should bargain first with the seller whose object is less valuable to the buyer. The basic reason for our result is that the buyer wants to experiment in the first stage to find out the sellers' reservation prices and in doing so, to minimize the experimental cost and maximize potential gain in case of negotiation failure in the first stage. in the first stage.

• Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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• v.38 no.4
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• pp.80-87
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• 2015

The proliferation of the Internet and communication technologies and applications, besides the conventional retailers, has led to a new form of distribution channel, namely home sopping through the telephone, TV, catalog or the Internet. The conventional and new distribution channels have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the possibility of 'touch and feel' to test the quality of the product, the delivery time and the concern for the security for the personal information. Difference in the transaction costs between the distribution channels results in the different selling prices even for the same product. Moreover, distribution channels with different selling prices necessarily result in different business surpluses. In this paper, we study the multilateral bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through multiple distribution channels with different transaction costs. We first derive the Nash equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The numerical analyses for the Nash equilibrium solutions show that the optimal bargaining strategy of the manufacturer heavily depends not only on the degree of competition between the distribution channels but on the difference of the business surpluses of the distribution channels. First, it is shown that there can be four types of locally optimal bargaining strategies if we assume the market powers of the manufacturer over the distribution channels can be different. It is also shown that, among the four local optimal bargaining strategies, simultaneous bargaining with the distribution channels is the most preferred bargaining strategy for the manufacturer.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.12 no.10
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• pp.299-308
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• 2023

As the spectrum shortage problem has accelerated by the emergence of various services, New Radio-Unlicensed (NR-U) has appeared, allowing users who communicated in licensed bands to communicate in unlicensed bands. However, NR-U network users reduce the performance of Wi-Fi network users who communicate in the same unlicensed band. In this paper, we aim to simultaneously maximize the fairness and throughput of the unlicensed band, where the NR-U network users and the WiFi network users coexist. First, we propose an optimal power allocation scheme based on Monte Carlo Policy Gradient of reinforcement learning to maximize the sum of rates of NR-U networks utilizing rate-splitting multiple access in unlicensed bands. Then, we propose a channel occupancy time division algorithm based on sequential Raiffa bargaining solution of game theory that can simultaneously maximize system throughput and fairness for the coexistence of NR-U and WiFi networks in the same unlicensed band. Simulation results show that the rate splitting multiple access shows better performance than the conventional multiple access technology by comparing the sum-rate when the result value is finally converged under the same transmission power. In addition, we compare the data transfer amount and fairness of NR-U network users, WiFi network users, and total system, and prove that the channel occupancy time division algorithm based on sequential Raiffa bargaining solution of this paper satisfies throughput and fairness at the same time than other algorithms.

• KIEE International Transactions on Power Engineering
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• v.3A no.1
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• pp.42-46
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• 2003

The economic operation of a utility in a deregulated environment brings about optimization problems different from those in vertically integrated one［1］. While each utility operates its own generation capacity to maximize profit, the market operator (or system operator) manages and allocates all the system resources and facilities to achieve the maximum social welfare. This paper presents a sequential application of non-cooperative and cooperative game theories in analyzing the entire power transaction process.