• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.31 no.3
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• pp.411-422
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• 2021

The autonomous driving system mounted on the unmanned vehicle recognizes the external environment through several sensors and derives the optimum control value through it. Recently, studies on physical level attacks that maliciously manipulate sensor data by performing signal-injection attacks have been published. signal-injection attacks are performed at the physical level and are difficult to detect at the software level because the sensor measures erroneous data by applying physical manipulations to the surrounding environment. In order to detect a signal-injection attack, it is necessary to verify the dependability of the data measured by the sensor. As so far, various methods have been proposed to attempt physical level attacks against sensors mounted on autonomous driving systems. However, it is still insufficient that methods for defending and detecting the physical level attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate signal-injection attacks targeting MEMS sensors that are widely used in unmanned vehicles, and propose a method to detect the attack. We present a signal-injection detection model to analyze the accuracy of the proposed method, and verify its effectiveness in a laboratory environment.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.23 no.4
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• pp.585-591
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• 2013

Recently, the combined attack which is a combination of side channel analysis and fault attack has been developed to extract the secret key during the cryptographic processes using a security device. Unfortunately, an attacker can find the private key of RSA cryptosystem through one time fault injection and power signal analysis. In this paper, we diagnosed SPA/FA resistant BNP(Boscher, Naciri, and Prouff) exponentiation algorithm as having threats to a similar combined attack. And we proposed a simple countermeasure to resist against this combined attack by randomizing the private key using error infective method.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.25 no.7
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• pp.955-961
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• 2021

In modern warfare, the importance of electronic warfare, which carries out a mission that using radio wave to find out enemy information or to protect ally information, has increased. Radar jamming technique is one of the most representative techniques of EA(Electronic Attack), it disturbs and deceives enemy radar system in order to secure ally location information. Velocity deception jamming technique, which is one of the radar jamming techniques, generally operate against pulse-doppler radar which use doppler effect in order to track target's velocity and location. Velocity Deception Jamming Technique can be implemented using DRFM(Digital Radio Frequency Memory) that performs Frequency Modulation. In this paper, I describe implementation method of VGPO/VGPI(Velocity Gate Pull-Off/Pull-In) velocity deception jamming technique using phase-sampled DRFM, and verify the operation of VGPO/VGPI velocity deception jamming technique with board test under signal injection condition.