• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• v.15 no.4
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• pp.385-395
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• 2016

Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing the Supply chain (SC) with different conflicting elements. Among them, the Stackelberg game is the one in which a player as leader has more power than the other ones as followers. Since in many SC systems one element has, in essence, more power than the others; the Stackelberg game has found many applications in SC studies. In this paper, we apply the Stackelberg game-theoretic approach and the corresponding equilibrium point to formulate and analyze a two echelon VMI SC. Comprehensive computational results on an experimental case are conducted to numerically analyze the performance of VMI system against three groups of critical parameters. Moreover, a critical comparison demonstrates the poorer performance of decentralized VMI system than centralized one. This naturally necessitates designing proper contracts between VMI partners in order to more effectively implement the realistic decentralized system.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• v.23 no.8
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• pp.159-167
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• 2023

Objective: • To detect black hole and warm hole attacks in wireless sensor networks. • To give a solution for energy depletion and security breach in wireless sensor networks. • To address the security problem using strategic decision support system. Methods: The proposed stackelberg game is used to make the spirited relations between multi leaders and multi followers. In this game, all cluster heads are acts as leaders, whereas agent nodes are acts as followers. The game is initially modeled as Quadratic Programming and also use backtracking search optimization algorithm for getting threshold value to determine the optimal strategies of both defender and attacker. Findings: To find optimal payoffs of multi leaders and multi followers are based on their utility functions. The attacks are easily detected based on some defined rules and optimum results of the game. Finally, the simulations are executed in matlab and the impacts of detection of black hole and warm hole attacks are also presented in this paper. Novelty: The novelty of this study is to considering the stackelberg game with backtracking search optimization algorithm (BSOA). BSOA is based on iterative process which tries to minimize the objective function. Thus we obtain the better optimization results than the earlier approaches.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• v.17 no.1_2_3
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• pp.185-194
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• 2005

A Server-Proxies-Users communication system is studied by using Stackelberg strategy theory of game. A new model, in which the server, proxies and users are not equal is established, and that is a three-level programming. The solution existence of the model is proved.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.8 no.12
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• pp.4293-4304
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• 2014

In order to ensure the wireless connectivity and seamless service to mobile users, the next generation network system will be an integration of multiple wireless access networks. In a heterogeneous wireless access system, bandwidth allocation becomes crucial for load balancing to avoid network congestion and improve system utilization efficiency. In this article, we propose a new dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme for hierarchical wireless network systems. First, we derive a multi-objective decision criterion for each access point. Second, a bargaining strategy selection algorithm is developed for the dynamic bandwidth re-allocation. Based on the intervenient Stackelberg game model, the proposed scheme effectively formulates the competitive interaction situation between several access points. The system performance of proposed scheme is evaluated by using extensive simulations. With a simulation study, it is confirmed that the proposed scheme can achieve better performance than other existing schemes under widely diverse network environments.

• Journal of Korean Society of Transportation
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• v.22 no.7 s.78
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• pp.99-106
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• 2004

This paper presents some comparisons between Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg game in bi-level program, composed of both upper level program and lower level one. The upper level can be formulated to optimize a specific objective function, while the lower formulated to express travelers' behavior patterns corresponding to the design parameter of upper level problem. This kind of hi-level program is to determine a design parameter, which leads the road network to an optimal state. Bi-level program includes traffic signal control, traffic information provision, congestion charge and new transportation mode introduction as well as road expansion. From the view point of game theory, many existing algorithms for bi-level program such as IOA (Iterative Optimization Assignment) or IEA (Iterative Estimation Assignment) belong to Cournot-Nash game. But sensitivity-based algorithms belongs to Stackelberg one because they consider the reaction of the lower level program. These two game models would be compared by using an example network and show some results that there is no superiority between the models in deterministic case, but in stochastic case Stackelberg approach is better than that of Cournot-Nash one as we expect.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.135-144
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• 2009

This paper deals with an information security problem that involves the strategies of both an attacker and an administrator of a web-based system. A game-theoretic model for the problem, based on an Stackelberg game environment, is presented. In the model, the administrator selects a set of anti-virus vaccines to cope with potential system attackers and the intruder chooses attacking modes that are most effective against the administrator's chosen set of vaccines. Moreover, the model considers a number of practical constraints, such as a budget limit on the vaccine purchase and a limit on the system performance. In addition, two different scenario analyses are provided, based on the results of the proposed model applied to a simulated pseudo-real-world data.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.5 no.2
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• pp.37-43
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• 1979

A sufficient condition for a Stackelberg strategy to coincide with an equilibrium point is presented. Information pattern of a Stackelberg strategy is essentially different from that of an equilibrium solution and therefore the two strategies need not be the same. However, under score restrictions on the cost functions the difference in information patterns between the two strategies can be disregarded so that the two strategies coincide. The result is extended to the case of discrete-time dynamic games.

• Proceedings of the KOR-KST Conference
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• 2007.11a
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• pp.256-263
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• 2007

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.11 no.12
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• pp.5759-5779
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• 2017

As the main means to cope with the stubborn problem of drunk driving, the inspection of drunk driving has already been paid more attention and thus reinforced. In this paper, we model this scenario as a Stackelberg game, where the police department (called defender) allocates resources dynamically in terms of the traffic situation on the traffic network to arrest drink drivers and drivers who drink (called attacker), whether choosing drunk driving or designated driving service, expect to minimize their cost for given travel routes. However, with the number of resources are limited, our goal is to calculate the optimal resource allocation strategy for the defender. Therefore, first, we provide an effective approach (named OISDD) to fulfill our goal, i.e., generate the optimal strategy to inspect drunk driving. Second, we apply OISDD to directed graphs (which are abstracted from Dalian traffic network) to analyze and test its correctness and rationality. The experimental results show that OISDD is feasible and efficient.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.