• Industrial Engineering and Management Systems
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• 제15권4호
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• pp.385-395
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• 2016

Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing the Supply chain (SC) with different conflicting elements. Among them, the Stackelberg game is the one in which a player as leader has more power than the other ones as followers. Since in many SC systems one element has, in essence, more power than the others; the Stackelberg game has found many applications in SC studies. In this paper, we apply the Stackelberg game-theoretic approach and the corresponding equilibrium point to formulate and analyze a two echelon VMI SC. Comprehensive computational results on an experimental case are conducted to numerically analyze the performance of VMI system against three groups of critical parameters. Moreover, a critical comparison demonstrates the poorer performance of decentralized VMI system than centralized one. This naturally necessitates designing proper contracts between VMI partners in order to more effectively implement the realistic decentralized system.

• International Journal of Computer Science & Network Security
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• 제23권8호
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• pp.159-167
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• 2023

Objective: • To detect black hole and warm hole attacks in wireless sensor networks. • To give a solution for energy depletion and security breach in wireless sensor networks. • To address the security problem using strategic decision support system. Methods: The proposed stackelberg game is used to make the spirited relations between multi leaders and multi followers. In this game, all cluster heads are acts as leaders, whereas agent nodes are acts as followers. The game is initially modeled as Quadratic Programming and also use backtracking search optimization algorithm for getting threshold value to determine the optimal strategies of both defender and attacker. Findings: To find optimal payoffs of multi leaders and multi followers are based on their utility functions. The attacks are easily detected based on some defined rules and optimum results of the game. Finally, the simulations are executed in matlab and the impacts of detection of black hole and warm hole attacks are also presented in this paper. Novelty: The novelty of this study is to considering the stackelberg game with backtracking search optimization algorithm (BSOA). BSOA is based on iterative process which tries to minimize the objective function. Thus we obtain the better optimization results than the earlier approaches.

• Journal of applied mathematics & informatics
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• 제17권1_2_3호
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• pp.185-194
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• 2005

A Server-Proxies-Users communication system is studied by using Stackelberg strategy theory of game. A new model, in which the server, proxies and users are not equal is established, and that is a three-level programming. The solution existence of the model is proved.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제8권12호
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• pp.4293-4304
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• 2014

In order to ensure the wireless connectivity and seamless service to mobile users, the next generation network system will be an integration of multiple wireless access networks. In a heterogeneous wireless access system, bandwidth allocation becomes crucial for load balancing to avoid network congestion and improve system utilization efficiency. In this article, we propose a new dynamic bandwidth allocation scheme for hierarchical wireless network systems. First, we derive a multi-objective decision criterion for each access point. Second, a bargaining strategy selection algorithm is developed for the dynamic bandwidth re-allocation. Based on the intervenient Stackelberg game model, the proposed scheme effectively formulates the competitive interaction situation between several access points. The system performance of proposed scheme is evaluated by using extensive simulations. With a simulation study, it is confirmed that the proposed scheme can achieve better performance than other existing schemes under widely diverse network environments.

• 대한교통학회지
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• 제22권7호
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• pp.99-106
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• 2004

본 연구에서는 바이레벨 문제를 풀기 위한 2가지 접근법, 즉 Cournot-Nash 게임과 Stackelbgerg 게임을 서로 비교하기 위한 것으로, 하위문제가 결정적인 통행배정문제(deterministic traffic assignment)인 경우와 확률적 통행배정문제(stochastic traffic assignment)인 경우로 구분하여 분석한다. 바이레벨 프로그램(bi-level program)은 상위문제(upper level program)과 하위 문제(lower level program)로 구성된 수리적인 문제로 상위문제는 목적하는 특정함수를 최적화시키는 형태이며, 하위문제는 통행자의 행태를 반영하는 형태로 구축된다. 기존에 제시된 알고리듬중 바이레벨문제의 대표적인 풀이 알고리듬인 IOA(Iterative Optimization Assignment) 알고리듬과 기종점 통행행렬추정(OD matrix estimation)에 주로 사용되는 IEA(Iterative Estimation Assignment)은 상위문제와 하위문제가 서로 독립적으로 존재하면서 설계변수와 통행량을 서로 주고받는 형태를 갖고 있어 Cournot-Nash 게임형태이다. 이에 반해, 최근에 제시된 민감도분석(Sensitivity analysis)을 기초로 한 알고리듬들은 상위문제에서 결정된 설계변수 변화에 대해 하위문제의 통행량변화를 민감도를 통해 고려하기 때문에 Stackelbeg게임이라고 볼 수 있다. 본 연구에서는 이들 알고리듬들을 비교하는 데 연구의 목적이 있으며, 기존에 제시된 기법과는 다른 좀 더 효율적인 접근법을 제시한다. 예제 교통망을 이용하여 제시된 모형들을 비교해본 결과, 결정적인 통행배정모형을 하위문제로 설정한 경우에는 두가지 접근법 모두 동일한 상위목적함수 값을 보여 우위를 판단할 수 없었지만, 확정적 통행배정모형으로 설정한 경우, Stackelberg게임 접근법이 Cournot-Nash게임 접근법 보다 더 우수함을 확인할 수 있었다.

• 정보보호학회논문지
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• 제19권1호
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• pp.135-144
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• 2009

이 연구는 웹기반 시스템의 운영자와 침해자의 전략과 관계된 정보보안문제를 다룬다. 슈타켈버그 게임상황을 이용하여, 백신 선택 문제의 게임이론적 모형을 제시한다. 이 모형에서 운영자는 잠재적 시스템 침해자에 대응하는 백신조합을 선택하고, 침해자는 운영자의 백신 조합에 가장 효율적으로 침입할 수 있는 방법을 선택한다. 제시된 모형은 운영자의 예산, 시스템 성능 등을 고려한 추가적 현실제약조건을 동시에 고려한다. 더불어, 가정을 적용해 수정된 현실 데이터를 이용하여 2가지 시나리오 분석을 제시한다.

• 대한산업공학회지
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• 제5권2호
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• pp.37-43
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• 1979

A sufficient condition for a Stackelberg strategy to coincide with an equilibrium point is presented. Information pattern of a Stackelberg strategy is essentially different from that of an equilibrium solution and therefore the two strategies need not be the same. However, under score restrictions on the cost functions the difference in information patterns between the two strategies can be disregarded so that the two strategies coincide. The result is extended to the case of discrete-time dynamic games.

• 대한교통학회:학술대회논문집
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• 대한교통학회 2007년도 제57회 학술발표회논문집
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• pp.256-263
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• 2007

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제11권12호
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• pp.5759-5779
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• 2017

As the main means to cope with the stubborn problem of drunk driving, the inspection of drunk driving has already been paid more attention and thus reinforced. In this paper, we model this scenario as a Stackelberg game, where the police department (called defender) allocates resources dynamically in terms of the traffic situation on the traffic network to arrest drink drivers and drivers who drink (called attacker), whether choosing drunk driving or designated driving service, expect to minimize their cost for given travel routes. However, with the number of resources are limited, our goal is to calculate the optimal resource allocation strategy for the defender. Therefore, first, we provide an effective approach (named OISDD) to fulfill our goal, i.e., generate the optimal strategy to inspect drunk driving. Second, we apply OISDD to directed graphs (which are abstracted from Dalian traffic network) to analyze and test its correctness and rationality. The experimental results show that OISDD is feasible and efficient.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• 제12권1호
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.