• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.59-86
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• 2002

Using the simulated data set which is based upon the data set merging Economically Active Population Survey(EAPS) and the Supplementary Survey (SS) in 1998-2001, this paper examines the relevance of alternative programs Unemployment Insurance Savings Account (UISA) and Pension-funded Unemployment Benefit (PUB) - to unemployment insurance system in Korea. Estimating the relative size of unemployment benefit and IA balance under a specific type of UISA or PUB by simulation, this paper yields the two main results. First, replacing UI by UISA with the same benefit being maintained would be beneficial in terms of search efficiency in general, although its effectiveness is a little doubtful as for the non-regular workers. Second, the PUB is better than UISA as an alternative to UI, and also works relatively well even for the non-regular workers.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.31-59
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• 2003

This paper analyzes a social insurance system that integrates unemployment insurance with a pension program, allowing workers to borrow against their future wage income to finance consumption during an unemployment episode and thus improving their search incentives while reducing risks. This paper identifies the conditions under which the integration improves welfare and the factors which determine the optimal degree of integration. A fully integrated system is one in which no reliance is placed at all on a separate tax-funded unemployment insurance program. We show that when the duration of unemployment is very short compared to the period of employment or retirement, the optimal system involves an exclusive reliance on pension-funded self-insurance. This system imposes a negligible risk burden for workers while avoiding attenuating search incentives. We also argue that a joint integration of several social insurance programs with a pension program through an individual account is desirable unless the risks are perfectly correlated to each other.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.61
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• pp.165-190
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• 2014

The purpose of this study is to measure the trade insurance's macroeconomic effects by analyzing the causality between major economic variables(GDP per capita, market interest rate, inflation, unemployment rate, exchange rate) and trade insurance variable. I conducted empirical analyses using First-difference GMM(Generalized Method of Moments), System GMM and Panel-VAR Model, with panel data from 11 countries(Korea, United States, Japan, BRICs, Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong, Vietnam) between 1992 and 2011. There are several important findings. Above all, Trade insurance is positively and significantly related to GDP. This results show that trade insurance serves to increase economic growth. In other words, trade insurance leads to economic growth by helping increase GDP per capita. Especially, trade insurance negatively related to unemployment rate, it is for sure that trade insurance contribute to decrease unemployment rate. And trade insurance helps control of inflation. It is also confirmed that trade insurance contributes to price stability, which in turn serves to stabilize the overall economy. And this research finds as uncertainty in the market increases, seen it as increase of exchange rate, increasing trade insurance supply is stabilize the exchange rate.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.55-83
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• 2007

This paper examines the welfare aspects of loan-based self-insurance against unemployment, and discusses the scope of government intervention in its provision. This paper deals with these issues in a model where the individuals may experience unemployment shocks frequently to leave little savings for retirement, so that the government may have to provide them with unemployment and retirement insurance benefits during their unemployment and retirement, respectively. We identify the two interesting features in the model: the externality that the self-insurance exerts, upon other social insurances, and the incentive of private sector to provide loans that exerts the externality upon other social insurances. In particular, this paper shows that, although the inefficiency associated with private loan warrants the government provision of loans to unemployed workers, the over-incentive of the private sector to offer loans may reduce the scope of the government intervention. This paper also shows that, unless the inefficiency associated with private loans is high, the private incentive for loans would reduce welfare because of the externality generated by private loans.

• Korean Journal of Labor Studies
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.321-365
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• 2018

Though the British shipbuilding industry dominated the world market in the 19th century, it could not avoid the repetitive rise and fall of the unemployment following after the cyclical fluctuations. Without challenging the employers' rights to fire at will, the boilermakers maintained their own unemployment insurance in order to escape from the new poverty law system. In the beginning the craft union could continue their own unemployment insurance under the National Insurance Act of 1911, but it went into bankruptcy under the massive unemployment of the 1920s and the attacks of shipyard employers. The Act of 1911 was a step towards social solidarity in that it spread the risks beyond the occupational boundaries, applying unemployment insurance to unskilled and non-union workers, and the employer and the government also paid the premium. In the Great Depression, the shipyard trade unions demanded that the government should intervene in the shipbuilding market to provide jobs, but it was not accepted by the government. The government responded only to the another demand of the union for the maintenance, which could be achieved partially through the abnormal operation of the insurance system, abandoning the insurance principle. After all, unemployment in the shipbuilding industry was resolved only by the expansion of rearmaments and the outbreak of World War II. From the 19th century to the World War II, the craft unions did not challenge the employers' right to fire at will and did not attempt to regulate dismissal procedures or make any demands on dismissal compensations. During interwar periods rules and practices related with weak employment protection - one of the main features of the liberal employment adjustment institution - were prevalent in Britain. The principle of 'employment at will' could survive through the historical events such as the World War I, II as the operation of the unemployment insurance became the focus of the social conflicts.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.39-59
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• 2000

Given the constraint that the unemployment benefit is not allowed to vary freely over the unemployment duration, this paper examines the optimal UI benefit structure. In particular, identifying the conflicting effects of benefit amount and benefit duration upon incentive and insurance, this paper characterizes the optimal combination of UI benefit amount and duration. Based upon some important factors determining the optimal UI benefit structure that are derived from the model, a set of directions for UI reform in Korea have been proposed.

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.39
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• pp.5-40
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• 1999

Little is known about unemployment duration and re-employment pattern. This paper empirically examines unemployment duration and re-employment pattern using data by the 1998 national survey about the unemployed and their needs. A parametric survival model(Weibull model) is adopted to identify variables predicting unemployment duration. It is found that the data including people without unemployment insurance as well as people with unemployment insurance fit the Weibull model including the hazard distribution that the hazard of reemployment is increasing at an decreasing rate. Variables that affect unemployment duration are age, householdership, family income, size of prior employment organization, and cause of unemployment. In re-employment pattern, statistically significant variables are age, type of prior employment industry, prior employment pattern, and membership in unemployment insurance. This paper provides a basic knowledge about realities of unemployed individuals in the economic crisis period of Korea, identifies research areas for further research, and develops policy implications for the unemployed.

• 한국사회정책
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.345-375
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• 2018

This study examines labour market and unemployment protection policies as a configuration in 12 OECD countries in order to investigate how countries from different regime conform to or diverse from previous welfare state regime discussion, and to examine its relationship with poverty and inequality. In analyzing the combination of the unemployment insurance, the unemployment assistance, and active labour market policy, firstly, fuzzy scores of unemployment insurance was calculated by analyzing the strictness of eligibility, duration of benefit and the generosity of income replacement rate. For unemployment assistance, the ratio of public assistance expenditure to the GDP in each country and the ratio of unemployment benefit level to the average wage in each country have been considered. As for the active labour market policy, the total expenditure per GDP of this policy was converted into fuzzy points and analyzed. As a result, 5 types in 2005 and 6 types in 2010 were generated. Specifically, 'assistance type(iAp)', 'insurance type (Iap)', 'comprehensive safety net type (IAP)', 'weak safety net type(iap)' were analyzed. This paper suggested policy implication for South Korean case, which consistently had high score for weak safety net type(iap).

• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.37
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• pp.1-31
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• 1999

In Korea, little is known about unemployment duration and exit rate from unemployment. This paper empirically examines the duration of unemployment using data for the years 1996 and 1997 on unemployed individuals who are eligible for unemployment insurance benefits in Korea. A parametric survival model (log-normal model) is adopted to identify factors predicting transitions to reemployment. Factors that affect unemployment duration are sex, age, employment duration (year), prior salary, region, prior employment industry, cause of unemployment, officially determined unemployment benefit duration, degree of benefit exhaustion, and amount of benefits for early reemployment. However, education is not statistically significant In degree of benefit exhaustion, the exit rate from unemployment decreases as benefit exhaustion is approached. In amount of benefits for early reemployment, the exit rate from unemployment increases as amount of benefits increases. Hazards for reemployment gradually increase until 80 days after unemployment and gradually decrease in the following period. Thus, we find that distribution of hazards for reemployment has log-normal shapes between inverted U and inverted L This paper takes advantage of a unique analysis about unemployment duration and exit rate from unemployment in the Korean Unemployment Insurance system which functions as the most valuable social safely-net mechanism in the recent national economic crisis. Indeed, this paper provides a basic knowledge about realities of unemployed individuals in the Unemployment Insurance system and identifies research areas that require further study.

• The Journal of Korean Institute for Practical Engineering Education
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• v.4 no.2
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• pp.144-149
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• 2012

This paper reviews the uncovered people of the Korean Employment Insurance System (EIS) and analyzes policy options for minimizing the dead zone of the EIS. There are several policy options such as subsidizing insurance premium to employers and employees of small companies, extending coverage of excluded groups, relaxing qualifications of unemployment benefits and increasing benefit period and level, introducing the unemployment assistance system, introducing the unemployment insurance savings account system, extending coverage to non-wage workers and individualizing package services. According to the survey to the specialists and comparative evaluation criteria, the best policy option to minimize the dead zone of the EIS was to activate individualizing package services of intensive consultation, job place services, tailored vocational training, income support, daycare services, etc. to cure complex employment barriers of job seekers.