• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.340-346
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• 2003

This paper presents a game theory application for an analysis of uniform price auction in a simplified competitive electricity market and analyzes the properties of Nash equilibrium for various conditions. We have assumed that each generation firm submits his bid to a market in the form of a sealed bid and the market is operated as a uniform price auction. Two firms are supposed to be the players of the market, and we consider the maximum generation quantity constraint of one firm only. The system demand is assumed to have a linear relationship with market clearing prices and the bidding curve of each firm, representing the price at which he has a willingness to sell his generation quantity, is also assumed to have a linear function. In this paper, we analyze the effects of maximum generation quantity constraints on the Nash equilibrium of the uniform price auction. A simple numerical example with two generation firms is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed methodology.

• Communications for Statistical Applications and Methods
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.229-236
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• 2011

A continuous time stochastic volatility model for financial assets suggested by Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2001) is considered, where the volatility process is modelled as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type process driven by a general L$\'{e}$vy process and the price process is then obtained by using an independent Brownian motion as the driving noise. The uniform ergodicity of the volatility process and exponential ${\alpha}$-mixing properties of the log price processes of given continuous time stochastic volatility models are obtained.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
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• v.59 no.5
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• pp.871-881
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• 2010

In the uniform price electricity market or bilateral electricity market, the energy transactions in which the network is not considered and ISO's system operation costs which ISO try to minimize are settled separately. In this paper, transmission loss, one of the ISO's system operation costs, was dealt. The conventional marginal loss allocation method gives economic signals but three aspects have to be considered; excessiveness, arbitrariness and cross-subsidy. In this paper, marginal loss compensation efficiency method was suggested which consider those aspects of the conventional marginal loss allocation method. Also the characteristics of the marginal loss compensation efficiency were analyzed in the appendixes. And simple 2-bus system and IEEE 14 bus system were used to explain these characteristics.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.17-26
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• 2020

Purpose - This paper studies the welfare impacts of behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD) when firms are asymmetric in quality improvement costs. Design/methodology/approach - To this end, we consider a differentiated duopoly model with an inherited market share, where firms first make quality decisions and then compete in prices according to the pricing scheme, namely, uniform pricing or BBPD. Findings - We show that BBPD increases social welfare relative to uniform pricing if the firms' cost gap is large enough. This is because BBPD induces more consumers to buy a high-quality product than under uniform pricing, and because a low-cost firm's profit loss from BBPD decreases as the cost difference increases. Research implications or Originality - Our analysis offers policy implications for markets where BBPD raises antitrust concerns, and quality competition prevails.

• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.6
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• pp.627-638
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• 2014

In this paper, we study the joint price and power allocation in spectrum sharing macro-femtocell networks. The proposed game theoretic framework is based on bi-level Stackelberg game where macro base station (MBS) works as a leader and underlaid femto base stations (FBSs) work as followers. MBS has fixed data rate and imposes interference price on FBSs for maintaining its data rate and earns revenue while FBSs jointly adjust their power for maximizing their data rates and utility functions. Since the interference from FBSs to macro user equipment is kept under a given threshold and FBSs compete against each other for power allocation, there is a need to determine a power allocation strategy which converges to Stackelberg equilibrium. We consider two cases for MBS power allocation, i.e., fixed and dynamic power. MBS can adjust its power in case of dynamic power allocation according to its minimum data rate requirement and number of FBSs willing to share the spectrum. For both cases we consider uniform and non-uniform pricing where MBS charges same price to all FBSs for uniform pricing and different price to each FBS for non-uniform pricing according to its induced interference. We obtain unique closed form solution for each case if the co-interference at FBSs is assumed fixed. And an iterative algorithm which converges rapidly is also proposed to take into account the effect of co-tier interference on interference price and power allocation strategy. The results are explained with numerical simulation examples which validate the effectiveness of our proposed solutions.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.84-98
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• 2003

This research objective is to determine the optimal price break points for n­block tariff, because comparing non­linear pricing with uniform pricing on the basis of profit, n­block tariff outperforms two­part tariff, all unit discount price schedule, and uniform pricing. Although the merits of non­linear pricing are well documented, the attempt to practice the non-linear pricing in medical service sector has been relatively rare. The determination of the parameters under n­block tariff is the interesting decision making agenda for marketers. Under n­block tariff, the marketers should decide the optimal price break points and the optimal marginal price for each price zone. The results can be summarized as follows: The researchers found that mixture model can be the feasible methodology for determining the optimal number of n­block tariff and identifying the optimal segmentation criteria. We demonstrate the feasibility and the superiority of the mixture model by applying it to the database of medical examination. The results appear that the number of patients per month can be the optimal segmentation variable. And 6­block tariff is the optimal price break for this medical service.

• Journal of Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.65-77
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• 1987

Congestion occurs whenever users interfere with each other, while competing for scarce resources. In a congested market, such as a telecommunication service market, users of telecommunication services incur costs in using the service in addition to the price. The user's own time costs involved in learning to use the service, waiting for the service, and making use of the service are typically greater than the price of telecommunication services. A market equilibrium analysis is performed in which a method for user demand aggregation is developed. The effects of price changes on user demands and market demands for congested services are examined. It is found that total market demands may increase as the price for less-congested services increase under certain demand conditions. This suggests that a nonuniform pricing scheme for a congested service may improve the utilization of the congested system. The sign of price cross-elasticity for congested services is show to vary with demand conditions. A possible complementary property of congested services is found and the implication of such a property is discussed. It is argued that such a complementary property may lead to a cross subsidy in a market with congestion. Finally, comparisons between uniform pricing and nonuniform pricing policies are made. A specific numerical example is given to show that a nonuniform pricing policy may be Pareto superior to a uniform pricing policy.

• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.27-36
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• 1986

This paper deals with four types of multiple unit simultaneous auctions such as the discriminating. uniform-price, lowest accepted-price, and progressive auctions. These auctions have been studied by Vickrey, Ortega-Reichert, Herris and Raviv and so forth. In this paper, their studies are extended to the case with a reserve price and an entry fee, and then the equilibrium bidding strategy are presented. Further, those are analyzed with respect to the change of a reserve price, an entry fee, and the number of bidders and objects.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
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• v.52 no.6
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• pp.333-339
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• 2003

Competition among electric generation companies is a major goal of restructuring in the electricity industry. In electricity market, a huge volume of commodities will be traded through competitive bidding. The choice between uniform and pay-as-bid pricing for electricity auction has been one of most important issues in deregulated electricity market. This paper proposes a constrained Bertrand model for analyzing the electricity auction market of price competition model. The issue of the two pricing rules of uniform and pay-as-bid is studied from the viewpoint of consumer's benefit. This paper also shows that transmission congestion depends on the pricing mechanism. Pay-as-bid pricing gives less possibility of transmission congestion by price competition, and less burden to consumers in the simulation results.

• Communications for Statistical Applications and Methods
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• v.19 no.5
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• pp.639-646
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• 2012

The exponential continuous time GARCH(p,q) model for financial assets suggested by Haug and Czado (2007) is considered, where the log volatility process is driven by a general L$\acute{e}$vy process and the price process is then obtained by using the same L$\acute{e}$vy process as driving noise. Uniform ergodicity and ${\beta}$-mixing property of the log volatility process is obtained by adopting an extended generator and drift condition.