• Journal of the Korean Operations Research and Management Science Society
• /
• v.33 no.1
• /
• pp.19-33
• /
• 2008

In the previous double auction research for the market optimization, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, and (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, each buyer and seller in a double auction market may have diverse utility functions for trading goods. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. In particular, the flexible mechanism is more useful in a synchronous double auction because traders can properly change utilities in each round. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a flexible synchronous double auction mechanism in which traders can express diverse utility functions for the price and quantity of the goods, and optimal total market utility is guaranteed. In order to optimize the total market utility which consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders. We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through a several simulation experiments.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
• /
• 2007.11a
• /
• pp.592-601
• /
• 2007

In the conventional double auction approaches, two basic assumptions are usually applied - (1) each trader has a linear or quasi-linear utility function of price and quantity, (2) buyers as well as sellers have identical utility functions. However, in practice, these assumptions are unrealisitc. Therefore, a flexible and integrated double auction mechanism that can integrate all traders' diverse utility functions is necessary. We propose a double auction mechanism with resource allocation based on nonlinear utility functions, namely a flexible synchronous double auction system where each participant can express a diverse utility function on the price and quantity. In order to optimize the total market utility consists of multiple complex utility functions of traders, our study proposes a genetic algorithm (GA) We show the viability of the proposed mechanism through several simulation experiments.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
• /
• 2005.11a
• /
• pp.379-390
• /
• 2005

In this paper, we introduce a new combinatorial auction mechanism - N-Bilateral Optimized Combinatorial Auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers optimized trading for multi-suppliers and multi-purchasers in the supply chain. We design the N-BOCA system from the perspectives of architecture, protocol, and trading strategy. Under the given N-BOCA architecture and protocol, auctioneers and bidders have diverse decision strategies for winner determination. This needs flexible modeling environments. Hence, we propose an optimization modeling agent for bid and auctioneer selection. The agent has the capability to automatic model formulation for Integer Programming modeling. Finally, we show the viability of N-BOCA through prototype and experiments. The results say both higher allocation efficiency and effectiveness compared with I-to-N general combinatorial auction mechanisms.

• Journal of the Korea Convergence Society
• /
• v.10 no.1
• /
• pp.205-214
• /
• 2019

In Korea, the first-price sealed bid auction and the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction(buchal-je in Korean) have been used alternatively as procurement auctions. In this paper, we characterize the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction in the context of mechanism design. We consider the general ?-bidder case in which each bidder has private information. Under the assumptions of uniformly distributed valuations and linear strategies, we derive the equilibrium of the constrained mean-price sealed bid auction. Furthermore, we analyze the efficiency and the expected revenue of this auction mechanism in comparison with the first-price sealed bid auction. Finally, we conclude with the critical remarks on the practical intention of the government which uses this auction.

• Advances in robotics research
• /
• v.2 no.3
• /
• pp.247-257
• /
• 2018

Various studies have been performed to coordinate robots in transporting objects and different artificial intelligence algorithms have been considered in this field. In this paper, we investigate and solve Multi-Robot Transportation problem by using a combined auction algorithm. In this algorithm each robot, as an agent, can perform the auction and allocate tasks. This agent tries to clear the auction by studying different states to increase payoff function. The algorithm presented in this paper has been applied to a multi-robot system where robots are responsible for transporting objects. Using this algorithm, robots are able to improve their actions and decisions. To show the excellence of the proposed algorithm, its performance is compared with three heuristic algorithms by statistical simulation approach.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.10 no.12
• /
• pp.5616-5642
• /
• 2016

Different from traditional auctions, electronic auctions provide a platform to allow bidders and auctioneers merchandise to each other over network anytime and anywhere. Auctioneers can publish information of goods, and bidders can choose the interested targets through this bidding platform. To ensure the fairness and security of electronic auctions, Li et al. have proposed a practical electronic auction scheme which can confirm the requirement of strong anonymity, bidding privacy, and secret bidding price. However, we have found out that Li et al.'s scheme may lurk the risk of the denial-of-service attack during the bidding phase in a sealed-bid auction. Thus, we propose a brand-new sealed-bid auction mechanism, in which the essentials of e-auction can be firmly preserved. In particular, each bidder only needs to register at the center once and then can join to multiple plays launched by different auctioneers. Moreover, the correctness of mutual authentication is confirmed according to the BAN logic model.

• Journal of Intelligence and Information Systems
• /
• v.12 no.1
• /
• pp.139-161
• /
• 2006

In this paper, we introduce a new combinatorial auction mechanism - N-Bilateral Optimized Combinatorial Auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers optimized trading for multi-suppliers and multi-purchasers in the supply chain. We design the N-BOCA system from the perspectives of architecture, protocol, and trading strategy. Under the given N-BOCA architecture and protocol, auctioneers and bidders have diverse decision strategies f3r winner determination. This needs flexible modeling environments. Hence, we propose an optimization modeling agent for bid and auctioneer selection. The agent has the capability to automatic model formulation for Integer Programming modeling. Finally, we show the viability of N-BOCA through prototype and experiments. The results say both higher allocation efficiency and effectiveness compared with 1-to-N general combinatorial auction mechanisms.

• Proceedings of the Korea Inteligent Information System Society Conference
• /
• 2001.01a
• /
• pp.83-88
• /
• 2001

To get the items that a buyer wants in Internet auction. he must search for the items through several auction sites. When the bidding starts, he(the buyer) needs to connect to these auction sites frequently so that he can monitor the bid stats and re-bid. A reserve-price auction reduces the number of connections, but this limits the user's bidding strategy. Another problem is equity between the buyer and the seller. Both the buyer and the seller should profit together within proper limits. In this paper, we propose an auction agent system using a collaborative mobile agent and a brokering mechanism called MoCAAS (Mobile Collaborative Auction Agent System), which mediates between the buyer and the seller and executes bidding asynchronously and autonomously. This reduces connection costs. offers more intelligent bidding and solves the equity problem.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
• /
• v.11 no.6
• /
• pp.2811-2830
• /
• 2017

In this paper, we study the problem of mobile data offloading for a network that contains multiple mobile network operators (MNOs), multiple WiFi or femtocell access points (APs) and multiple mobile users (MUs). MNOs offload their subscribed MUs' data traffic by leasing the unused Internet connection bandwidth of third party APs. We propose a combinatorial auction-based two-stage matching mechanism comprised of MU-AP matching and AP-MNO matching. The MU-AP matching is designed to match the MUs to APs in order to maximize the total offloading data traffic and achieve better MU satisfaction. Conversely, for AP-MNO matching, MNOs compete for APs' service using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and the Vickrey auction theories and, in turn, APs will receive monetary compensation. We demonstrated that the proposed mechanism converges to a distributed stable matching result. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm well capture the tradeoff among the total data traffic, social welfare and the QoS of MUs compared to other schemes. Moreover, the proposed mechanism can considerably offload the total data traffic and improve the network social welfare with less computation complexity and communication overhead.

• Information Systems Review
• /
• v.8 no.2
• /
• pp.103-117
• /
• 2006

As the interest in the combinatorial auction has increased, diverse combinatorial auction market types have been proposed. Although there have been several studies on the combinatorial auction design, the studies covered some factors or partial dimensions of combinatorial auction design. Given the potential practical value of combinatorial auctions, it is necessary to approach it with an integrated and systematic design methodology for supporting a comprehensive range of combinatorial auction models. Thus, we present a systematic framework for combinatorial auction design methodology. In particular, we classified the combinatorial auction architecture types, process types, and mechanism types. This framework characterizes the different combinatorial auction models, and lead to a useful taxonomy of the combinatorial auction design factors and taxonomy of the market types by coordination among the design factors. In addition, we illustrate an n-bilateral combinatorial auction market, derived from our design methodology, to show the viability of our study.