• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.12
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• pp.66-77
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• 2000

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.47-67
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• 2009

In recent years, greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction has become high priority issue in international aviation. GHG emissions from the aviation sector only accounts for approximately 2 percent of total GHG emissions in the world. However, as with GHG gases in other sectors, it has been pointed out as a contributing factor to global warming and there is an ongoing conversation in the aviation community to establish international framework for emissions reductions. In the case of international aviation, effects of aviation activities of a State go beyond the airports and airspace of that State. This makes compiling of GHG emissions data very difficult. There are also other legal and technical issues, namely the principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR)” under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and “Fair Opportunity” principle of the Chicago Convention. For all these reason, it is expected that it will not be an easy job to establish an internationally agreed mechanism for reducing emissions in spite of continuing collaboration among States. UN adopted the UNFCCC in 1990 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 to impose common but differentiated responsibility on emissions reductions. In international aviation, ICAO has been taking the lead in measures for the aviation sector. In this role, ICAO held the High-level Meeting on International Aviation and Climate Change on 7 to 9 October 2009 at its Headquarters in Montreal and endorsed recommendations on reducing GHG from international aviation which will also be reported to the 15th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP15). Key items include basic principle in global aviation emissions reduction: aspirational goals and implementation options: strategies and measures to achieve goals: means to measure and monitor the implementation; and financial and human resources. It is very likely that the Republic of Korea will be included among the Parties subject to mandatory limitation or reduction of GHG emissions after 2013. Therefore, it is necessary for Korea to thoroughly analyze ICAO measures to develop comprehensive measures for reducing aviation emissions and to take proactive actions to prepare for future discussions on critical issues after COP15.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.139-145
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• 2013

This study examines the logistics policy and system to activate the air freight known shipper system in Korea in order to suggest how to use the system necessary to convert and expand common shippers into known shippers. Even though "The Act on Aviation Safety and Security" and "Air Freight Security Criteria for Known Shippers" were revised in 2012 and 2011 each, the purpose was to regulate procedures to control aviation safety and security and air also freight security, so it does not include any measures to activate the known shipper system. Therefore, to activate the known shipper system, this study suggests measures to use the logistics security support system of "The Fundamental Law on Logistics Policy" revised in 2012, the logistics cooperation system, and consulting support as well.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.39 no.6 s.105
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• pp.955-970
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• 2004

With the flow of globalization, world aviation markets are showing growing trends toward liberalization, deregulation, and privatization. At the same time, also apparent is a strong trend toward regionalism on aviation markets to realize open skies at the regional level. This research examines the recent trend of regionalism in the world aviation market from a political economic perspective, taking a single European aviation market as an example. The results show that the creation of a single European aviation market is the EU's strategic response against the US to enhance the European aviation industry's competitiveness. More specifically, the results show that the European countries are creating a single European aviation market in order to stand against the US' so-called 'divide and nile policy' and 'encirclement strategy' and to make their airliners to have competitive advantages over the US airliners on the lucrative North-Atlantic air routes. Recently, the single European aviation market is expanding by including the Mediterranean and Balkan states to pursue Pan European aviation cooperation and to develop European Common Aviation Area so that it can continuously enhance its negotiating leverage against external markets. The results imply that it is urgent for the Northeast Asian countries to create their own regional aviation bloc to develop their aviation industry and to increase their negotiating power against external countries.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.12 no.3
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• pp.41-63
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• 2004

The area covered by product liability in broadest sense is so vast that an attempt to analyse all its impact on the aviation world risk. Every effort has been made to confine our review of subject a closely as possible to its influence on aircraft manufacturers, airlines and passengers, in spite of strong connections with other spheres of commercial. Product Liability in aviation is the liability of aircraft's manufacturer, processor or non-manufacturing seller for injury to the person or property of a buyer or third party caused by a product which has been sold. Here-in a product is aircraft, third party is passengers who suffered damage by defective design, defective construction, inadequate instructions for handling in aircraft. Whenever a product turns out to be defective after it has been sold, there are under Anglo-American law three remedies available against the aircraft's manufacturer (1) liability for negligence (2) breach of warranty (3) strict liability in tort. There are Under continental law Three remedies available against the aircraft's manufacturer (1) liability for defective warranty (2) liability for non-fulfillment of obligation (3) liability in tort. It is worth pointing out here an action for breach of warranty or for defective warranty, for non-fulfillment of obligation is available only to direct purchaser on the basis of his contract with the aircraft's manufacturer, which of course weakness its range and effectiveness. An action for tort offers the advantage of being available also to third parties who have acquired the defective product at a later stage. In tort, obligations are constituted not only by contract, but also by stature and common law. In conclusion, There in no difference in principle of law. In conclusion I would like to make few suggestions regarding the product liability for aircraft's manufacturer. Firstly, current general product liability code does not specify whether government offices(e.g. FAA) inspector conducted the inspection and auditory certificate can qualify as conclusive legal evidence. These need to be clarified. Secondly, because Korea is gaining potential of becoming aircraft's manufacturer through co-manufacturing and subcontracting-manufacturing with the US and independent production, there needs legislation that can harmonize the protection of both aircraft's manufacturers and their injured parties. Since Korea is in primary stage of aviation industry, considerate policy cannot be overlooked for its protection and promotion. Thirdly, because aircraft manufacturers are risking restitution like air-carriers whose scope of restitution have widened to strict and unlimited liability, there needs importation of mandatory liability insurance and national warranty into the product liability for aircraft's manufacturers. Fourthly, there needs domestic legislation of air transportation law that clearly regulates overall legal relationship in air transportation such as carrier & aircraft manufacturer's liability, and aviation insurance.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.33 no.2
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• pp.169-197
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• 2018

The purpose of this study is to present a reasonable and concrete standard for the Korean aviation insurance compulsory subscription system. Through this, we aim to improve the current revision of laws and regulations, and ultimately create an environment in which the safety and property of the Korean people who use aircraft with appropriate aviation insurance can be secured. In particular, by reviewing the aviation business law and its new laws and regulations enacted in 2017, the legislative improvement direction of aviation insurance will be proposed. In order to maintain the continuous growth of the air transportation industry and to make amicable compensation for the victims, considering the characteristics of the total accident, instantness, and giganticness of air accidents in which a lot of people and property are lost in the event of an accident, adequate insurance coverage is essential. In this respect, the compulsory insurance to amend the principle of freedom of contract, which is the great principle of the modern judicial system, will be persuasive. However, in comparison with foreign legislation, the legal provisions on Korea's obligation to comply with aviation insurance need to be revised around the following issues: First, it is reasonable to enforce the regulation of the mandatory aviation insurance by legislation from the Congress not by administrative regulations. Because it will force the monetary obligations of the individual such as common air carriers. Second, our law regulations respond to various kinds of air damages by using the phrase "limit of liability stipulated in international conventions". However, as we have seen in the text, the range of compensation are various according to the use of legal instruments in international conventions such as the Montreal Convention, which governs the compensation of passengers for damages to passengers today. Third, in countries with narrow territories, such as Korea, there are big differences in flying time and insurable risk between domestic and international transportation. Therefore, it is necessary to divide domestic transportation and international transportation even in the obligation to join the insurance. This dual discipline has the advantage for rookies in air carrier market who mainly start their business from domestic service. Fourth, according to Korean law, the regulations of automobile loss insurance is applicable to the aviation mandatory insurance of unmanned aerial vehicle accident which is lack of persuasion. In the future, it will be appropriate to discipline insurance for unmanned aerial vehicles with unlimited potential for development from a long-term perspective.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.29 no.1
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• pp.67-95
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• 2014

Some Contracting States of the Chicago Convention issue FAOC(Foreign Air Operator Certificate) and conduct various safety assessments for the safety of the foreign operators which operate to their state. These FAOC and safety audits on the foreign operators are being expanded to other parts of the world. While this trend is the strengthening measure of aviation safety resulting in the reduction of aircraft accident. FAOC also burdens the other contracting States to the Chicago Convention due to additional requirements and late permission. EASA(European Aviation Safety Agency) is a body governed by European Basic Regulation. EASA was set up in 2003 and conduct specific regulatory and executive tasks in the field of civil aviation safety and environmental protection. EASA's mission is to promote the highest common standards of safety and environmental protection in civil aviation. The task of the EASA has been expanded from airworthiness to air operations and currently includes the rulemaking and standardization of airworthiness, air crew, air operations, TCO, ATM/ANS safety oversight, aerodromes, etc. According to Implementing Rule, Commission Regulation(EU) No 452/2014, EASA has the mandate to issue safety authorizations to commercial air carriers from outside the EU as from 26 May 2014. Third country operators (TCO) flying to any of the 28 EU Member States and/or to 4 EFTA States (Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) must apply to EASA for a so called TCO authorization. EASA will only take over the safety-related part of foreign operator assessment. Operating permits will continue to be issued by the national authorities. A 30-month transition period ensures smooth implementation without interrupting international air operations of foreign air carriers to the EU/EASA. Operators who are currently flying to Europe can continue to do so, but must submit an application for a TCO authorization before 26 November 2014. After the transition period, which lasts until 26 November 2016, a valid TCO authorization will be a mandatory prerequisite, in the absence of which an operating permit cannot be issued by a Member State. The European TCO authorization regime does not differentiate between scheduled and non-scheduled commercial air transport operations in principle. All TCO with commercial air transport need to apply for a TCO authorization. Operators with a potential need of operating to the EU at some time in the near future are advised to apply for a TCO authorization in due course, even when the date of operations is unknown. For all the issue mentioned above, I have studied the function of EASA and EU Regulation including TCO Implementing Rule newly introduced, and suggested some proposals. I hope that this paper is 1) to help preparation of TCO authorization, 2) to help understanding about the international issue, 3) to help the improvement of korean aviation regulations and government organizations, 4) to help compliance with international standards and to contribute to the promotion of aviation safety, in addition.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.15 no.1
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• pp.38-53
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• 2007

In a seminal judgment of November 2002 (Case C-476/98) relating to the compatibility with Community laws of the 'nationality clause' in the 1996 amending protocol to the 1955 U.S.-German Air Services Agreement, the European Court of Justice(ECJ) decided that the provision constituted a measure of an intrinsically discriminatory nature and was thus contrary to the principle of national treatment established under Art. 52 of the EC Treaty. The Court, rejecting bluntly the German government' submissions relying on public policy grounds(Art. 56, EC Treaty), seemed content to declare and rule that the protocol provision requiring a contracting state party to ensure substantial ownership and effective control by its nationals of its designated airlines had violated the requirement of national treatment reserved for other Community Members under the salient Treaty provision. The German counterclaims against the Commission, although tantalizing not only from the perusal of the judgment but from the perspective of international air law, were nonetheless invariably correct and to the point. For such a clause has been justified to defend the 'fundamental interests of society from a serious threat' that may result from granting operating licenses or necessary technical authorizations to an airline company of a third country. Indeed, the nationality clause has been inserted in most of the liberal bilaterals to allow the parties to enforce their own national laws and regulations governing aviation safety and security. Such a clause is not targeted as a device for discriminating against the nationals of any third State. It simply acts as the minimum legal safeguards against aviation risk empowering a party to take legal control of the designated airlines. Unfortunately, the German call for the review of such a foremost objective and rationale underlying the nationality clause landed on the deaf ears of the Court which appeared quite happy not to take stock of the potential implications and consequences in its absence and of the legality under international law of the 'national treatment' requirement of Community laws. Again, while US law limits foreign shareholders to 24.9% of its airlines, the European Community limits non-EC ownership to 49%, precluding any ownership and effective control by foreign nationals of EC airlines, let alone any foreign takeover and merger. Given this, it appears inconsistent and unreasonable for the EC to demand, $vis-{\grave{a}}-vis$ a non-EC third State, national treatment for all of its Member States. The ECJ's decision was also wrongly premised on the precedence of Community laws over international law, and in particular, international air law. It simply is another form of asserting and enforcing de facto extraterritorial application of Community laws to a non-EC third country. Again, the ruling runs counter to an established rule of international law that a treaty does not, as a matter of principle, create either obligations or rights for a third State. Aside from the legal problems, the 'national treatment' may not be economically justified either, in light of the free-rider problem and resulting externalities or inefficiency. On the strength of international law and economics, therefore, airlines of Community Members other than the designated German and U.S. air carriers are neither eligible for traffic rights, nor entitled to operate between or 'free-ride' on the U.S. and German points. All in all and in all fairness, the European Court's ruling was nothing short of an outright condemnation of established rules and principles of international law and international air law. Nor is the national treatment requirement justified by the economic logic of deregulation or liberalization of aviation markets. Nor has the requirement much to do with fair competition and increased efficiency.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.109-133
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• 2007

The legal labyrinth through which we have just walked is one in which even a highly proficient lawyer could easily become lost. Warsaw Convention's original objective of uniformity of private international aviation liability law has been eroded as the world community ha attempted again to address perceived problems. Efforts to create simplicity and certainty of recovery actually may have created less of both. In any particular case, the issue of which international convention, intercarrier agreement or national law to apply will likely be inconsistent with other decisions. The law has evolved faster for some nations, and slower for others. Under the Warsaw Convention of 1929, strict liability is imposed on the air carrier for damage, loss, or destruction of cargo, luggage, or goods sustained either: (1) during carriage in air, which is comprised of the period during which cargo is 'in charge of the carrier (a) within an aerodrome, (b) on board the aircraft, or (c) in any place if the aircraft lands outside an aerodrome; or (2) as a result of delay. By 2007, 151 nations had ratified the original Warsaw Convention, 136 nations had ratified the Hague Protocol, 84 had ratified the Guadalajara Protocol, and 53 nations had ratified Montreal Protocol No.4, all of which have entered into force. In November 2003, the Montreal Convention of 1999 entered into force. Several airlines have embraced the Montreal Agreement or the IATA Intercarrier Agreements. Only seven nations had ratified the moribund Guatemala City Protocol. Meanwhile, the highly influential U.S. Second Circuit has rendered an opinion that no treaty on the subject was in force at all unless both affected nations had ratified the identical convention, leaving some cases to fall between the cracks into the arena of common law. Moreover, in the United States, a surface transportation movement prior or subsequent to the air movement may, depending upon the facts, be subject to Warsaw, or to common law. At present, International private air law regime can be described as a "situation of utter chaos" in which "even legal advisers and judges are confused." The net result of this barnacle-like layering of international and domestic rules, standards, agreements, and criteria in the elimination of legal simplicity and the substitution in its stead of complexity and commercial uncertainty, which manifestly can not inure to the efficient and economical flow of world trade. All this makes a strong case for universal ratification of the Montreal Convention, which will supersede the Warsaw Convention and its various reformulations. Now that the Montreal Convention has entered into force, the insurance community may press the airlines to embrace it, which in turn may encourage the world's governments to ratify it. Under the Montreal Convention, the common law defence is available to the carrier even when it was not the sole cause of the loss or damage, again making way for the application of comparative fault principle. Hopefully, the recent entry into force of the Montreal Convention of 1999 will re-establish the international legal uniformity the Warsaw Convention of 1929 sought to achieve, though far a transitional period at least, the courts of different nations will be applying different legal regimes.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.2
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• pp.31-67
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• 1990

One of the first issues which arose in the evolution of air law was the determination of the vertical limits of airspace over private property. In 1959 the UN in its Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, started to give attention to the question of the meaning of the term "outer space". Discussions in the United Nations regarding the delimitation issue were often divided between those in favour of a functional approach ("functionalists"), and those seeking the delineation of a boundary ("spatialists"). The functionalists, backed initially by both major space powers, which viewed any boundary as possibly restricting their access to space(Whether for peaceful or military purposes), won the first rounds, starting with the 1959 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space which did not consider that the topic called for priority consideration. In 1966, however, the spatialists, were able to place the issue on the agenda of the Outer Sapce Committee pursuant to Resolution 2222 (xxx1). However, the spatialists were not able to present a common position since there existed a variety of propositions for delineation of a boundary. Over the years, the funtionalists have seemed to be losing ground. As the element of location is a decisive factor for the choice of the legal regime to be applied, a purely functional approach to the regulation of activities in the space above the Earth does not offer a solution. It is therefore to be welcomed that there is clear evidence of a growing recognition of the defect inherent to such an approach and that a spatial approach to the problem is gaining support both by a growing number of States as well as by publicists. The search for a solution of the problem of demarcating the two different legal regimes governing the space above the Earth has undoubtedly been facilitated, and a number of countries, among them Argentina, Belgium, France, Italy and Mexico have already advocated the acceptance of the lower boundary of outer space at a height of 100km. The adoption of the principle of sovereignty at that height does not mean that States would not be allowed to take protective measures against space activities above that height which constitute a threat to their security. A parallel can be drawn with the defence of the State's security on the high seas. Measures taken by States in their own protection on the high seas outside the territorial waters-provided that they are proportionate to the danger-are not considered to infringe the principle of international law. The most important issue in this context relates to the problem of a right of passage for space craft through foreign air space in order to reach outer space. In the reports to former ILA Conferences an explanation was given of the reasons why no customary rule of freedom of passage for aircraft through foreign territorial air space could as yet be said to exist. It was suggested, however, that though the essential elements for the creation of a rule of customary international law allowing such passage were still lacking, developments apperaed to point to a steady growth of a feeling of necessity for such a rule. A definite treaty solution of the demarcation problem would require further study which should be carried out by the UN Outer Space Committee in close co-operation with other interested international organizations, including ICAO. If a limit between air space and outer space were established, air space would automatically come under the regime of the Chicago Convention alone. The use of the word "recognize" in Art. I of chicago convention is an acknowledgement of sovereignty over airspace existing as a general principle of law, the binding force of which exists independently of the Convention. Further it is important to note that the Aricle recognizes this sovereignty, as existing for every state, holding it immaterial whether the state is or is not a contracting state. The functional criteria having been created by reference to either the nature of activity or the nature of the space object, the next hurdle would be to provide methods of verification. With regard to the question of international verification the establishment of an International Satelite Monitoring Agency is required. The path towards the successful delimitation of outer space from territorial space is doubtless narrow and stony but the establishment of a precise legal framework, consonant with the basic principles of international law, for the future activities of states in outer space will, it is still believed, remove a source of potentially dangerous conflicts between states, and furthermore afford some safeguard of the rights and interests of non-space powers which otherwise are likely to be eroded by incipient customs based on at present almost complete freedom of action of the space powers.