• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.31-62
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• 2010

This paper analyzes empirically how analysts' forecasts affected by ownership structure. This study examine a sample of 1,037~1,629 the analysts' forecasts of firms registered in Korean Stock Exchange in the period from 2000 to 2006. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, from the analysis, companies which have higher major shareholder's holdings tend to increase earnings forecast errors and earnings forecast accuracy. Meanwhile, companies which have higher institution shareholder's holdings tend to decrease earnings forecast errors and earnings forecast accuracy. This result is in line with the view of previous works that companies with higher major shareholder's holdings look towards more of analysts' optimistic forecasts in order to maintain friendly relations with major shareholders. Because of analysts' private information use from major shareholders, earnings forecast accuracy is higher in high major shareholder's holdings firm than in high institution shareholder's holdings it. Second, this analysis is whether the minimal required selection condition of outside directors, audit committee adoption and audit quality affect the relation between ownership structure and analysts' forecasts. This result is that variables related corporate governance do not affect statically the relation between ownership structure and analysts' forecasts. The meanings of this paper is to suggest the positive relations between ownership structure and analysts' forecasts. After this, if analysts will notice forecasts of more many firms, capital market will be more efficient and this field works are plentiful. Also it will need monitoring systems not to distort market efficiency by analysts' dishonest forecasts.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.161-194
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• 2018

This study examines performances of cooperatives relative to investor-owned firms in the US electric power industry. Using a panel data of firms from 2001 to 2014, the results show that cooperatives operate under conditions of more difficult capital constraints associated with the higher cost of debt and limited access to external equity capital. While investor-owned utilities, especially the large utilities that are less capital constrained, take benefits from substantial scale economies existing in the industry, the marginal cost of operation substantially increases with output for cooperatives. I do not find differences in profitability between the two ownership structures, measured by return on assets and return on equity. Plant capacity utilization, which is a measure of plant efficiency conditional on the operation, is also not statistically different between the two groups.