• Journal of Communications and Networks
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• v.16 no.4
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• pp.458-464
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• 2014

In the future, an increasing number of heterogeneous networks will be connected with each other. Each of them has its own interest. Existing systems lack good incentive mechanisms to attract more networks to participate in cooperations. In this paper, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism for routing protocols applied in heterogeneous networking which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through several simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the properties of our mechanism.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.12 no.5
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• pp.717-727
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• 2009

P2P (Peer-to-Peer) network depends on cooperation of peers considerably. However, some peers do not share files at all and only download files. Peers also share low quality files or unpopular files. These selfish behavior of peers is referred to 'free riding'. The free riding of peer may decrease participation of other peers or the system performance. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism, called IcMFS (Incentive Mechanism for File Sharing System), which provides the correct use of incentive mechanism using trust peer, computes contribution values referring behavior of peers and rewards peers. The proposed mechanism assigns bandwidth and TTL(Time-To-Live) to a peer and differentiates the use of service. A case study on simulations shows the service differentiation according to the contribution value of peer, the correct use of incentive mechanism using trust peer and the advantage by use of trust peer. To prove the stability of proposed mechanism, we also show the disadvantage that a peer receives from the incorrect use of incentive mechanism.

• KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems (TIIS)
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• v.12 no.1
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• pp.159-177
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• 2018

Participatory sensing is becoming popular and has shown its great potential in data acquisition for ambient assisted living. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism in participatory sensing for ambient assisted living, which benefits both the platform and the mobile devices that participated in the sensing task. Firstly, we analyze the profit of participant and platform, and a Stackelberg game model is formulated. The model takes privacy, reputation, power state and quality of data into consideration, and aims at maximizing the profit for both participant and publisher. The discussion of properties of the game show that there exists an unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Secondly, two algorithms are given: one describes how to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium and the other presents the procedures of employing the incentive strategy. Finally, we conduct simulations to evaluate the properties and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Simulation results show that the proposed incentive mechanism works well, and the participants and the publisher will be benefitted from it. With the mechanism, the total amount of sensory data can be maximized and the quality of the data can be guaranteed effectively.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.41 no.10
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• pp.1236-1239
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• 2016

In this paper, we propose a new incentive mechanism for hybrid access in cognitive femtocell networks. The purpose of the proposed incentive mechanism is to guarantee the QoS of macro user equipments (MUEs) and to increase femtocell capacity. MUEs channel condition report triggers bidding procedure by neighbor femtocell base stations (FBS). Macro base station (MBS) can offer some subchannels as rewards to encourage FBSs to reliably support its MUEs. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of our proposed scheme.

• Journal of Korea Multimedia Society
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• v.25 no.7
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• pp.973-982
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• 2022

As a new marketing tool, gamification design has been used in marketing practice by e-commerce platforms, aiming to motivate consumers to participate. Based on this, by sorting out relevant domestic and foreign literature, analysis of actual business cases, in-depth interviews with users, experiments and data analysis, this study extracts and describes in detail the elements of the e-commerce platform gamification incentive mechanism. Draw conclusions through research: (1) The incentive mechanism of gamification design of e-commerce platform contains four main dimensions : The richness of symbols, The fun of gamification, The contagiousness of Social and The seduction of achievement. (2) The four elements are closely related, and these can work on a system at the same time and have significant mutual effects. (3) Achievement and fun can bring intrinsic motivation to consumers, while sociability and symbols can bring external motivation to consumers and promote internal motivation through external motivation. (4) The seduction of achievement and the richness of symbol are most closely related.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.31 no.5
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• pp.889-899
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• 2021

This paper proposes a reliable data sharing scheme on the internet of vehicles (IoV) by utilizing blockchain technology for constructing a decentralized system approach. In our model, to maintain the credibility of the information messages sent by the vehicles to the system, we propose a reputation rating mechanism, in which neighboring vehicles validate every received information message. Furthermore, we incorporate an incentive mechanism based on smart contracts, so that vehicles will get certain rewards from the system when they share correct traffic information messages. We simulated the IoV network using a discrete event simulator to analyze network performance, whereas the incentive model is designed by leveraging the smart contract available in the Ethereum platform.

• Journal of Information Processing Systems
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• v.15 no.5
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• pp.1036-1054
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• 2019

Recently, concomitant with a surge in numbers of Internet of Things (IoT) devices with various sensors, mobile crowdsensing (MCS) has provided a new business model for IoT. For example, a person can share road traffic pictures taken with their smartphone via a cloud computing system and the MCS data can provide benefits to other consumers. In this service model, to encourage people to actively engage in sensing activities and to voluntarily share their sensing data, providing appropriate incentives is very important. However, the sensing data from personal devices can be sensitive to privacy, and thus the privacy issue can suppress data sharing. Therefore, the development of an appropriate privacy protection system is essential for successful MCS. In this study, we address this problem due to the conflicting objectives of privacy preservation and incentive payment. We propose a privacy-preserving mechanism that protects identity and location privacy of sensing users through an on-demand incentive payment and group signatures methods. Subsequently, we apply the proposed mechanism to one example of MCS-an intelligent parking system-and demonstrate the feasibility and efficiency of our mechanism through emulation.

• KIPS Transactions on Computer and Communication Systems
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.1-8
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• 2019

In this paper, we design a new mobile crowdsourcing control scheme based on the incentive mechanism. By using a novel incentive mechanism, mobile nodes can get the maximum payoff when they report their true private information. As mobile nodes participate in the overlapping coalition formation game, they can effectively invest their resource while getting the higher reward. Simulation results clearly indicate that the proposed scheme has a better performance than the other existing schemes under various mobile crowdsourcing environments.

• The KIPS Transactions:PartB
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• v.17B no.3
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• pp.189-196
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• 2010

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) has attracted attention as an alternative way to enable streaming videos on the Internet. Although P2P systems depend on bandwidth contribution from peers, peers are likely to refuse to contribute their bandwidth. In this paper, we proposed a P2P streaming system that encourages peers to contribute their upstream bandwidth by maintaining fairness among peers and providing different video quality between cooperative peers and selfish peers with a manageable way. Our proposed system determines if peers are cooperative or selfish by a rating mechanism based on their contributed upstream bandwidth, and offers a high quality video to cooperative peers as an incentive. Also we propose a tree reconstruction algorithm to make the system work effectively. Through simulation, we show that the tree reconstruction algorithm works effectively, and our incentive mechanism allocates more downstream bandwidth to cooperative peers and punished selfish peers with low quality video.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information Security & Cryptology
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.43-52
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• 2010

The Kad network is a peer-to-peer (P2P) network which implements the Kademlia P2P overlay protocol. Nowadays, the Kad network has attracted wide concern as a popular architecture for file sharing systems. Meanwhile, many problems have been coming out in these file sharing systems such as freeriding of users, uploading fake files, spreading viruses, and so on. In order to overcome these problems, we propose an incentive mechanism based on game theory, it establishes a more stable and efficient network environment for Kad users. Users who share valuable resources receive rewards by increasing their credits, while others who supply useless or harmful files are punished. This incentive mechanism in Kad network can be used to detect and prevent malicious behaviors of users and encourage honest interaction among users.