The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A (대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A)

The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers (대한전기학회)
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Solving Mixed Strategy Equilibria of Multi-Player Games with a Transmission Congestion

다자게임 전력시장에서 송전선 혼잡시의 복합전략 내쉬균형 계산

  • Published : 2006.11.01
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Abstract

Nash Equilibrium (NE) is essential to investigate a participant's bidding strategy in a competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the NE due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The competition among multi-participants is modeled by a two-level hierarchical optimization problem. A mathematical programming approach is widely used in finding this equilibrium. However, there are difficulties to solving a mixed strategy NE. This paper presents two propositions to add heuristics to the mathematical programming method. The propositions are based on empirical studies on mixed strategies in numerous sample systems. Based on the propositions a new formulation is provided with a set of linear and nonlinear equations, and an algorithm is suggested for using the prepositions and the newly-formulated equations.

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